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ABSTRACT 
Researcher: James Henry Cistone 
Title: An Analysis of Airport Surface Deviations using the Human Factors 
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) 
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy in Aviation 
Year: 2014 
An analysis of accident and incident data from the Federal Aviation Administration 
 Runway Safety database and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) database 
was performed to determine causal factors for airport surface deviations over a 12-year 
period, from January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2012.  The Human Factors Analysis 
and Classification System was used as the framework to analyze the NTSB data for 
causal factors. 
Analysis of the NTSB data produced 289 airport surface deviation cases, which 
were analyzed for causal evidence, and the results indicated that skill-based errors 
occurred at least once in the largest frequency of airport surface deviation accidents and 
incidents investigated by the NTSB.  The unsafe acts precursor of communications, 
coordination and planning contributed to the second highest frequency of airport surface 
deviation accidents and incidents over the period of interest.  The study also noted that 
trends for Category A and B runway incursions declined over the period but trends for 
Category C and D runway incursions, and the total of all runway incursion categories and 
skill-based errors, increased over the period of interest. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Airport Surface Deviations (ASDs) are a category of aviation accidents and 
incidents that began with the creation of the airport, and have continued to become a 
major safety concern around the world.  Since these events occur at an airport and 
generally involve aircraft operating on the surface of the airport, the only requirement to 
encounter an airport surface deviation is the presence of an aircraft located on an airport 
and an object for the aircraft to run into, such as another aircraft, an airport vehicle, a 
person, or some other objects located on the airport surface.  ASDs can occur at any 
airport, from the world’s largest and busiest airports to a remote grass strip with a single 
aircraft. 
Runway incursions are a subset of ASDs; specifically, runway incursions involve 
an erroneous movement or a potential collision associated with one or more runways on 
the airport, while ASDs can occur anywhere on the airport, not just the runway.  This 
study has expanded the scope of airport events from runway incursions to ASDs in order 
to encapsulate more events to allow for the determination of additional causal evidence.  
The incidents and accidents selected for this research have been limited to anywhere 
within the airport movement area for towered airports and the analogous area at un-
towered airports.  That is, the movement area generally includes runways and taxiways 
that lead to or from the runways, but excludes the ramp and parking areas.  Airport 
surface incidents of interest in this study are those where the aircraft, vehicle, or person is 
positioned somewhere on the movement area where they should not be located.  In some 
cases, this location error results in an accident or a serious incident.  Accidents that occur 
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in the movement and runway areas tend to be associated with larger dynamic forces; thus, 
these accidents tend to be more serious in nature than those that occur on the ramp or 
parking areas.  Therefore, ramp and parking area incidents are excluded from this study, 
analogous to a fender bender in an automobile parking lot vice an automobile collision on 
a street or highway.  In the same context, runway excursions, where an aircraft departs 
the runway (or a taxiway) unintentionally and collides with another aircraft, an airport 
building, a fence at the perimeter of the airport, or other objects on or near the airport 
surface are also excluded from this analysis, as they are considered a different class of 
airport deviations in terms of causal factors. 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) (2011a) provides the following 
official definitions: 
A runway incursion (RI) is any unauthorized intrusion onto a runway, regardless 
of whether or not an aircraft presents a potential conflict. This is the international 
standard, adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). 
Surface incidents are those events, which did not involve potential aircraft 
conflicts or are low-risk incidents with either no conflict potential or ample time or 
distance to avoid a collision. 
Surface events are ASDs, and represent both RIs and surface incidents. 
There are four categories of runway incursions defined by the FAA and ICAO 
and three additional collection categories that are defined as follows (FAA, 2011a): 
 Category A is a serious incident in which a collision was narrowly avoided. 
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 Category B is an incident in which separation decreases and there is a 
significant potential for collision, which may result in a time critical corrective 
or evasive response to avoid a collision. 
 Category C is a surface event characterized by ample time and/or distance to 
avoid a collision. 
 Category D is an event that meets the definition of runway incursion such as 
incorrect presence of a single vehicle/person/aircraft on the protected area of a 
surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft but with no 
immediate safety consequences. 
 Category E is an event in which insufficient or conflicting evidence precludes 
assigning another category. 
 Category N/A is assigned when, upon further review, the event was found not 
to qualify as a runway incursion event, but the event is still retained in the RI 
database. 
 Category P is assigned when the event has been recorded in the database 
awaiting review.  Only RI category P events can be elevated to higher risk 
levels based upon the pending review (FAA, 2011a). 
For purposes of this research, Category A and B are classified as serious 
incursions, with accidents included in Category A; however, Categories C and D are 
deemed lower risk.  In general, all categories of ASD were included in this investigation. 
The FAA changed its definition of runway incursion starting October 1, 2007 to 
align its terminology with ICAO, as shown in Table 1.  In addition, Table 1 presents a 
description of the definition change in the severity classifications for ASDs and runway 
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incursions both prior to and after the adoption of the ICAO terminology in FY 2008.  
Thus, the original FAA definition is utilized from October 1, 2001 until September 30, 
2007, and the ICAO definition is in use from October 1, 2007 to the present. 
At towered airports, runway incursions and surface deviations can occur due to an 
error committed by one or more controllers, one or more pilots, and/or one or more 
pedestrians or vehicle operators.  Specifically, the FAA categorizes errors as follows 
(FAA, 2011a): 
 Operational error – Action of an Air Traffic Controller that results in: Less than 
required minimum separation between 2 or more aircraft or between an aircraft 
and obstacles, (vehicles, equipment, personnel on runways) or Clearing an aircraft 
to take off or land on a closed runway. 
 Pilot deviation – Action of a pilot that violates any Federal Aviation Regulation. 
For example: a pilot crosses a runway without a clearance while en route to an 
airport gate.   
 Vehicle/pedestrian error – Pedestrians or vehicles entering any portion of the 
airport movement areas (runways/taxiways) without authorization from air traffic 
control. 
 Other - The final classification, other, represents more of an excursion event and 
is not considered in this analysis (FAA, 2011a). 
The sub classifications of runway incursion events into their aforementioned 
categories along with examples of what might constitute such errors are presented in 
Table 2. 
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Table 1. Change in the FAA definition of Runway Incursion severity classifications 
beginning in FY 2008 (October 1, 2007) 
 
 
FAA Definition Prior to FY 2008 Current FAA Definition 
Class Description Class Description 
A 
Separation decreases and 
participants take extreme 
action to narrowly avoid 
a collision, or the event 
results in a collision. 
Accident 
See ICAO Annex 13 for definition 
of an accident. 
A 
A serious incident in which a 
collision was narrowly avoided. 
B 
Separation decreases and 
there is a significant 
potential for a collision. 
B 
An incident in which separation 
decreases and there is a significant 
potential for a collision, which 
may result in a time-critical 
corrective/evasive response to 
avoid a collision. 
C 
Separation decreases, but 
there is ample time and 
distance to avoid a 
potential collision. 
C 
An incident characterized by 
ample time and/or distance to 
avoid a collision. 
D 
Little or no chance of a 
collision but meets the 
definition of a runway 
incursion. 
Other 
Surface 
Incidents 
An event during which 
unauthorized or 
unapproved movement 
occurs within the 
movement area 
associated with the 
operation of an aircraft 
that affects or could 
affect the safety of flight.  
(This subset includes 
only non-conflict events). 
D 
Incident that meets the definition 
of runway incursion such as the 
incorrect presence of a single 
vehicle/person/aircraft on the 
protected area of the surface 
designated for the landing and 
takeoff of aircraft, but with no 
immediate safety consequences. 
Not 
Defined 
FAA non-conflict surface incidents 
include more than just ICAO Class 
“D” events. 
ID 
Insufficient Data, 
inconclusive or 
conflicting evidence 
precludes severity 
assessment. 
E 
Insufficient Information, 
inconclusive or conflicting 
evidence precludes severity 
assessment. 
(Source: Figure adapted from FAA (2008)). 
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Table 2. Further FAA sub classification of Runway Incursions 
 
 
Type of incident (surface or 
airborne) Typical scenario 
Air traffic control surface 
events (surface) 
An aircraft enters an occupied runway after an 
air traffic controller fails to ensure the pilot 
repeats instructions correctly, resulting in a 
runway incursion. 
Pilot deviation (surface) 
A pilot taxis across a departure runway 
without clearance from air traffic control, 
resulting in a runway incursion. 
Pilot deviation (airborne) 
A pilot levels off at an incorrect altitude and flies 
too closely to another aircraft, resulting in a loss of 
separation. 
Operational error (airborne) 
An air traffic controller does not maintain 
separation standards when sequencing two aircraft 
on approach to an airport for landing, resulting in a 
loss of separation. 
Operational deviation 
(airborne) 
An air traffic controller at a TRACON fails to 
coordinate with the tower as an aircraft 
approaches the airport. 
Vehicle/pedestrian 
deviation (surface) 
An aircraft fueling truck crosses a runway 
without authorization from air traffic control, 
resulting in a runway incursion. 
Other airport incidents 
(surface) 
An aircraft slides from a taxiway onto a 
departure runway as the result of an 
accumulation of snow and ice on the ground, 
resulting in a runway incursion. 
Source: Table adapted from FAA (2011a).  
 
 
 
ASDs occur when an aircraft, a vehicle, or a person fails to conform to regulations 
and requirements concerning their appropriate location on the airport surface.  The 
problem of ASDs has existed since early in the development of air transportation; 
moreover, solutions to assure airport surface conformance were also implemented early 
in the history of aviation.  Archie League (Mola, nd), often called the first air traffic 
controller, was positioned on the airport surface at Lambert Field in St. Louis to direct 
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arriving, departing and taxiing aircraft on the airport.  His presence assured a controlled 
movement on the airport surface, and his function was to safely guide taxiing aircraft 
between the runway and their parking location on the airport.  Subsequently, where the 
frequency of operations increased sufficiently, air traffic control towers were erected and 
manned by control personnel to oversee and control airport movements.  In 1948, the 
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Special Committee number 31 
(RTCA SC-31) released a report that contained a concept for a new, modern Air Traffic 
Control (ATC) system (RTCA, 1948).  The RTCA SC-31 report called for the provision 
of an aircraft situation display in the aircraft cockpit as well as on the ground that would 
depict the airport situation to pilots and controllers, respectively.  In addition, after the 
release of the RTCA report, work began on prototypes of aircraft and ground display 
equipment (Jones, Schrader, & Marshall, 1950).   
Unfortunately, the occurrence of ASDs continued long after the RTCA report was 
published.  On March 27, 1977, the worst accident in aviation history occurred when two 
Boeing 747s collided on a runway at Tenerife, Canary Islands, under conditions of 
limited visibility.  Controllers had instructed the Pan American 747 to move down the 
runway toward an assigned taxiway subsequent to ordering the other 747, belonging to 
KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, to wait for takeoff clearance at the end of the same runway. 
In the midst of possible communication interference from simultaneous radio 
transmissions, the KLM flight crew apparently misinterpreted a message from the tower 
as clearance to take off.  Disregarding the doubts of the flight engineer on the KLM, the 
captain began the takeoff roll.  The resulting collision killed all 248 persons aboard the 
KLM 747 and 335 of the 396 persons aboard the Pan American.  An intense fire 
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engulfing both aircraft caused most of the casualties (Kilroy, 2011).  In the years after the 
Tenerife accident, ASDs continued, and the National Transportation Safety Board 
(NTSB) placed runway incursions on its 1990 Most Wanted List (NTSB, 2000). 
Cardosi (2001) indicates that the first runway incursion study was conducted in 
1977, perhaps as a result of the Tenerife accident.  The importance of ASDs was the 
subject of an NTSB Special Report (NTSB, 1986), and a considerable body of research 
has been developed since these earlier investigations.  Hollister (1988) was one of the 
first to publish a survey report on runway safety, the FAA began collecting data for 
runway incursion analysis in 1988, and much of the early research investigation was 
aimed at finding solutions to eliminate runway incursions; however, little effort was 
expended in investigating the causal factors associated with ASDs.  For example, the 
author was associated with a research team including members of the staff of Embry-
Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU) in developing a demonstration of a prototype 
runway incursion solution at Daytona Beach International Airport in 1993 (Klass, 1994).  
This demonstration recreated three actual runway incursion scenarios: the Detroit airport 
collision of two aircraft on the runway in December 1990; the runway collision at Los 
Angeles Airport in February 1991; and the airport collision at Atlanta airport in January 
1990.  Using a GPS-based cockpit display and a ground-based automation system, 
potential runway incursions were predicted by the prototype automation system and alerts 
were transmitted to both the tower controllers and the pilot in the aircraft warning of the 
pending incursion.  While the alerts were presumably valuable in avoiding the fatal 
collisions that occurred in the actual events from which the scenarios were taken, the 
system did not address the human errors that caused the incursions to happen. 
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Research continues on airport surface deviations as the runway incursion rate 
continues to increase (FAA, 2011b).  Many ASDs are reported through either voluntary 
disclosure programs, by air traffic control at airports with active control towers, or 
through formal investigation as they result in serious incidents or accidents; furthermore, 
it is quite possible that many ASDs at uncontrolled airports go undetected and 
unreported.  Several solutions to mitigate runway incursions and ASDs have been 
proposed and several are in operation: AMASS and ASDE-X are two examples of radar-
based airport surface safety systems.  Advanced cockpit-based systems have also been 
proposed, such as reported by Young and Jones (2001); however, as more automation is 
applied to the ASD problem, then the potential for new errors is inserted into the 
equation, and ASD causes could move from solely human error to increased human error, 
automaton error, or some combination of human and automation error.  The causal 
factors need to be explored in the context of adding new tools and devices intended to 
preclude human error that may result in ASDs.  Merely adding new tools to solve the 
problem is analogous to a physician treating the symptom of an illness without a 
thorough understanding of the cause of the disorder.  
Accidents and incidents resulting from runway incursions (RIs), which are a 
subset of the more general class of ASDs, indicate a fairly constant frequency of 
occurrence at towered airports.  The FAA began collecting runway incursion reports from 
tower controllers at towered airports in October 2001, and an examination of the 
frequency of runway incursions indicates a fairly uniform frequency from 2001 to 2012. 
An indication of the total number of runway incursions reported in the FAA Runway 
Incursion Database between its inception in October of 2001 and December 31, 2012 is 
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presented in Table 3.  This data shows a fairly constant level of runway incursions; 
although, a slight increase occurs in 2008, after the FAA adopted the ICAO definition of 
Runway Incursions in Fiscal Year 2008 (beginning October 1, 2007).  Thus, in Table 3, 
the frequency of N/A changes drastically in 2008 from prior years, and the counts for 
categories C and D more than double, while the total counts remain approximately the 
same.  As stated by the FAA, “The initial increase of runway incursions in FY 20081 will 
be reported as a greater number of less serious runway incursions (Category C  and D) 
due to this change in definition” (FAA, 2008, p. 37).  Note that the total operations counts 
for FAA towered airports over the same period is also contained in Table 3 and the rate 
of Category A, B, C, and D runway incursions per million airport operations is shown in 
the right column of Table 3.  Clearly, runway incursions are rare events with respect to 
the number of airport operations.  Additional discussion of runway incursions and the 
FAA Runway Incursion Database can be found in Chapter III of this dissertation.  
While ASDs have been present since the early days of aviation, considerable 
research into ASDs started earnestly in the late 1970s following the Tenerife accident, 
and in spite of all of the attention that ASDs have garnered, they still continue at an 
increasing rate.  The significance of this study is that it utilizes the Human Factors 
Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001) 
methodology to explore ASD causal factors that could lead to a better understanding of 
why ASDs continue to occur and thus interventions aimed at the causal factors will have 
a better chance at success. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Fiscal Year 2008 refers to the period of October 1, 2007 to September 30, 2008. 
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Table 3.  A summary of Runway Incursions derived from the FAA Runway Incursion 
Database for the years 2001 to 2012. 
 
 
Notes:  
1 - The FAA Runway Incursion Database commenced on October 1, 2001, and all years 
in the table are calendar year totals.  In addition, the FAA adopted the ICAO definition of 
Runway Incursion in Fiscal Year 2008 (starting October 1, 2007).   
2 – Runway incursions were developed from the FAA Runway Incursion Database as of 
April 28, 2013, retrieved fromhttp://www.asias.faa.gov/pls/apex/f?p=100:28:0::NO:28:: 
3 - Airport operations were obtained from the FAA Air Traffic Activity System 
(ATADS), retrieved from https://aspm.faa.gov/opsnet/sys/Airport.asp 
 
 
Human Error in Aviation 
According to Dekker (2002a), there are two aspects of human error.  One facet of 
human error is as a cause of failure; conversely, one can see human error as a symptom of 
failure.  These two views have been discriminated as the old view of human error versus 
the new view (Dekker 2002a, Dekker 2002b) and painted as fundamentally opposing 
perspectives on the human contribution to system success and failure.  In the old view of 
human error:  
 Human error is the cause of many accidents.  
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 The system in which people work is basically safe; success is intrinsic. The 
chief threat to safety comes from the inherent unreliability of people.  
 Progress on safety can be made by protecting the system from unreliable 
humans through selection, proceduralization, automation, training and 
discipline.  (Dekker, 2002b, p. 372)  
In the new view of human error:  
 Human error is a symptom of trouble deeper inside the system.  
 Safety is not inherent in systems.  The systems themselves are contradictions 
between multiple goals that people must pursue simultaneously.  People have 
to create safety.  
 Human error is systematically connected to features of people’s tools, tasks 
and operating environment.  Progress on safety comes from understanding and 
influencing these connections.  (Dekker, 2002b, p. 372)  
Within the human factors literature, many recent advocates of the new view can 
be found.  For example:  
...simply writing off aviation accidents merely to pilot error is an overly 
simplistic, if not naive, approach.... After all, it is well established that accidents 
cannot be attributed to a single cause, or in most instances, even a single 
individual. In fact, even the identification of a ‘primary’ cause is fraught with 
problems. Instead, aviation accidents are the result of a number of causes... 
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001, p. 60) 
Whenever humans are involved, error is inevitable because of human limitations.  
These include: limited memory capacity, limited mental processing capacity, negative 
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effects of stress, tunnel vision, and the negative influence of physiological factors such as 
fatigue, hunger and thirst (Helmreich & Davies, 2004).  Unfortunately, in life-critical 
environments such as aviation, errors can sometime have tragic results.  As Dekker 
(2002a) points out, often when investigating accidents using the old view of human error, 
it is often the case where investigators or others will associate the accident with the final 
human error committed in order to determine a cause for the accident and to affix blame 
such that this accident can never happen again.  However, such examinations do not 
always seek the context in which the error was committed or the root cause for the error.  
As in the case of Icarus (Brady, 2000), it was his own fault as he clearly flew too high 
and the temperature of the sun melted his wings.  There may have been other factors in 
context or even higher order factors that caused Icarus to commit the fatal error.  Perhaps 
design error of the wing, organizational error in the lack of a safety culture, pilot decision 
error in attempting to fly too high, and lack of pilot skill due to limited experience: not 
enough time in type.  
According to Shappell and Wiegmann (1996) the number of aviation accidents 
attributable solely to mechanical failure has decreased markedly since the 1940s, while 
those attributable at least in part to human error have declined at a much slower rate.  In 
fact, as will be discussed in detail in subsequent sections, the absolute number of runway 
incursions has remained relatively constant over the past decade in spite of numerous 
interventions intended to prevent them.  Humans, by nature, make mistakes; therefore, 
human error has been implicated in a variety of occupational accidents, including 70% to 
80% of those in civil and military aviation (Wiegmann & Shappell, 1999; O’Hare, 
Wiggins, Batt, & Morrison, 1994; Yacavone, 1993).  
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Given such findings, it appears that interventions aimed at reducing the 
occurrence or consequences of human error have not been as effective as those directed at 
mechanical failures.  Consequently, if accidents are to be reduced further, more emphasis 
must be placed on the genesis of human error as it relates to accident causation, then 
adding intervention at these causal levels should result in a reduction of accidents and 
incidents due to human error. 
Human Error 
Karl and Karl (2012) posit that James Reason, a British professor of psychology, 
is the “widely acknowledged father of human error understanding” (p. 91).  Indeed, 
Reason (1990) described the difference between human error and the systemic conditions 
that either lead to error or fail to catch or mitigate error; thereby, causing accidents.  
Reason has categorized two approaches to human error: the person and the system 
(Reason, 1990).   
In the person approach, the focus is on the human performing an act, such as the 
surgeon leaving a sponge inside of a patient (Karl & Karl, 2012).  Such unsafe acts arise 
from atypical mental processes, such as negligence, forgetfulness, and carelessness.  
Typical solutions to this category of human error are directed at reducing the variability 
in human performance, and typically include intimidation or fear-based interventions, 
along with additional procedures to be followed, or individual retraining.  In contrast, the 
system approach acknowledges that human beings are fallible and will make mistakes; in 
fact, errors should be expected. In this case, Reason (1990) suggests that the errors should 
be viewed as consequences rather than causes, where their origins are systemic factors as 
opposed to human nature.  Intervention strategies should be aimed more at adding 
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defenses to catch and prevent the consequences of the error instead of casting blame on 
the individual who blundered.  Subsequent analyses following the occurrence of adverse 
events focus on why the system failed to detect the event or why the defenses failed, and 
not why the human failed. 
In terms of the systemic view of human error, Reason (1990) described four levels 
of human failure within an organization, each influencing the next in the trajectory 
toward accidents, as is shown in Figure 1.  Reason’s Swiss cheese model of accident 
causation has been widely accepted within the aviation industry; however, his model 
represents a theory with few details on application in accident investigation.  In essence, 
the holes in the Swiss cheese are undefined in Reason’s model, and to achieve a more in 
depth understanding in the domain where this theory is applied, the holes need to be 
defined.  In fact, the identification of the holes is what can lead to intervention strategies, 
where the holes are blocked or removed by interventions to block the accident trajectory 
throughout the system (Shappell &Wiegmann, 2000).   
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Figure 1. The Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) Swiss 
Cheese Systemic Model. (Adapted from Reason (1990)). 
 
 
 
Human Error Classification in Aviation Accidents.   Determining the best 
mechanism to identify and mitigate the causal sequence of events in an accident is a 
major challenge in the analysis of accident information, especially the 70-80 % of causes 
associated with human error.  Analysts who investigate accident causation have a list of 
many investigative schemes at their disposal.  However, a comprehensive framework for 
identifying and analyzing human error is required such that interventions can be 
accurately targeted at specific human causal factors and their effectiveness can be 
objectively measured and assessed (Wiegmann & Shappell, 1997).  To that end, 
(Shappell & Wiegmann, 2001) developed the Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (HFACS) based upon Reason’s(1990) concept of latent and active failures. The 
HFACS tool, described in more detail in the following section, provides a mechanism for 
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coding accident and incident report information to identify causal mechanisms at all 
levels of the hierarchy, not just at the final error that caused the accident or incident.  
Using HFACS, researchers may analyze the organizational and supervisory aspects of 
human error in a systematic manner. 
HFACS.   In their final report, Shappell and Wiegmann (2000) describe the 
background, theoretical basis, and architecture of the HAFCS.  In addition to the first tier 
of analysis, unsafe acts of operators, Shappell and Wiegmann (2000) added three levels, 
each focused on the organizational influences on errors.  As depicted in Figure 2, HFACS 
describes human error at each of these four levels: (a) organizational influences, (b) 
unsafe supervision (i.e., middle management), (c) preconditions for unsafe acts, and (d) 
the unsafe acts of operators (e.g., aircrew, maintainers, and air traffic controllers).  The 
second, third and fourth tiers (preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision and 
organizational influences, respectively) analyze the latent failures or conditions that may 
lie dormant or remain undetected until circumstances are right.  Conditions such as 
fatigue, stress or complacency may lead to a mishap, but they are not specific actions by 
an operator, they are preconditions that set the stage for an accident.  Unsafe supervisory 
errors can prompt unsafe acts by operators; poor crew pairing or matching is an example 
of this failure. The final analytical tier, organizational influences, considers factors such 
as funding and corporate culture to identify latent failures that lead to accidents.  
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Figure 2.  The four levels of human error in HFACS.  
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
 
 
 
Organizational Influences.  Organizational influences are the highest level 
addressed by HFACS, and these effects tend to permeate through the entire organization.  
Consequently, their influence can be considerable and interventions to correct such latent 
errors can be significant. Generally, these influences tend to center around issues related 
to organizational climate, operational process, and resource management, as discussed 
below (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
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 Organizational climate: Prevailing atmosphere/vision within the 
organization, including such things as policies, command structure, and culture. 
 Operational process: Formal process by which the vision of an 
organization is carried out including operations, procedures, and oversight, among others. 
 Resource management: How human, monetary, and equipment resources 
necessary to carry out the vision are managed. 
Unsafe Supervision.  Unsafe supervision represents the next level down in the 
hierarchy.   In this level, the actions or inactions as the case may be, of supervisors can 
directly influence the condition of their team as well as their operational environment.  
There are four categories of unsafe supervision as described below (Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2003).  
 Inadequate supervision: Oversight and management of personnel and 
resources, including training, professional guidance, and operational leadership, among 
other aspects. 
 Planned inappropriate operations: Management and assignment of work, 
including aspects of risk management, crew pairing, operational tempo, etc. Failed to 
correct known problems: Those instances in which deficiencies among individuals, 
equipment, training, or other related safety areas are known to the supervisor yet are 
allowed to continue uncorrected. 
 Supervisory violations: The willful disregard for existing rules, 
regulations, instructions, or standard operating procedures by managers during the course 
of their duties. 
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Preconditions for Unsafe Acts.  The conditions that exist prior to a human unsafe 
act can have a significant influence upon the error committed.    There are three 
categories of preconditions each having several sub factors as described below 
(Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
 Environmental factors 
o Technological environment: This category encompasses a variety of 
issues, including the design of equipment and controls, display/interface 
characteristics, checklist layouts, task factors, and automation. 
o Physical environment: Included are both the operational setting (e.g., 
weather, altitude, terrain) and the ambient environment (e.g., as heat, 
vibration, lighting, toxins). 
 Condition of the operator 
o Adverse mental states: Acute psychological and/or mental conditions that 
negatively affect performance, such as mental fatigue, pernicious attitudes, 
and misplaced motivation. 
o Adverse physiological states: Acute medical and/or physiological 
conditions that preclude safe operations, such as illness, intoxication, and 
the myriad pharmacological and medical abnormalities known to affect 
performance. 
o Physical/mental limitations: Permanent physical/mental disabilities that 
may adversely impact performance, such as poor vision, lack of physical 
strength, mental aptitude, general knowledge, and a variety of other 
chronic mental illnesses. 
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 Personnel factors 
o Crew resource management: Includes a variety of communication, 
coordination, and teamwork issues that impact performance. 
o Personal readiness: Off-duty activities required to perform optimally on 
the job, such as adhering to crew rest requirements, alcohol restrictions, 
and other off-duty mandates. 
Unsafe acts.  This level represents two potential categories of human error and is 
the actual error committed by the human that is often referred to as the last hole in the 
cheese or the error that caused the accident.  There are two categories of unsafe acts: 
errors and violations. An error is a mistake made by the individual, while a violation is 
disregard for a rule or regulation.   
 Errors 
o Decision errors: These thinking errors represent conscious, goal-
intended behavior that proceeds as designed, yet the plan proves inadequate or 
inappropriate for the situation. These errors typically manifest as poorly executed 
procedures, improper choices, or simply the misinterpretation and/or misuse of 
relevant information. 
o Skill-based errors: Highly practiced behavior that occurs with little 
or no conscious thought. These doing errors frequently appear as breakdown in 
visual scan patterns, inadvertent activation/ deactivation of switches, forgotten 
intentions, and omitted items in checklists.  
o Perceptual errors: These errors arise when sensory input is 
degraded, as is often the case when flying at night, in poor weather, or in 
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otherwise visually impoverished environments. Faced with acting on imperfect or 
incomplete information, aircrew run the risk of misjudging distances, altitude, and 
descent rates, as well as of responding incorrectly to a variety of visual/vestibular 
illusions. 
 Violations 
o Routine violations: Often referred to as bending the rules, this type 
of violation tends to be habitual by nature and is often enabled by a system of 
supervision and management that tolerates such departures from the rules. 
o Exceptional violations: Isolated departures from authority, neither 
typical of the individual nor condoned by management (Wiegmann & Shappell, 
2003). 
HFACS use in Aviation.  HFACS has been successfully utilized to study human 
error causation in many applications beyond aviation.  These applications are in 
industries that include medical, mining, shipping, maintenance, oil and gas, and railroads; 
in addition, HFACS has been utilized internationally with success (for example, see: 
Berry, Stringfellow, & Shappell, 2009). 
The FAA has employed HFACS to examine accident causes for both commercial 
and general aviation activities (Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001, 2003; Shappell & 
Wiegmann, 2003, 2004).  Wiegmann and Shappell (2006) report that:  
Principal among the FAA’s findings using HFACS was the observation that, 
while previous safety programs may have impacted other areas of aviation, there 
has been little evidence that they have had a significant impact on any specific 
type of human error. (p. 1)   
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The implication of this finding is that human error continues to cause aviation 
accidents, at least up until the time of the report (2006).   
Study of Human Error in ASDs 
Airport surface deviations and runway incursions are essentially caused by human 
error (FAA, 2010a); moreover, both ASDs and runway incursions continue at 
approximately the same magnitude in spite of continued interventions.  The likely 
conclusion is that the interventions are being ineffective at reducing the frequency and 
rate of ASDs.  Therefore, analysis of human error associated with airport ASDs including 
runway incursions appears warranted.  HFACS was utilized to classify human error 
causes determined from NTSB accident and incident reports associated with historical 
accident investigations of airport surface accidents and incidents.  Since runway 
incursions are a subset of ASDs, runway incursions will be contained in the accident and 
incident reports from the NTSB repository.  Other data sources were used to provide 
corroborating causal evidence as appropriate and the period studied was from January 1, 
2001 through December 31, 2012 to overlap with the FAA Runway Incursion database 
(which began collection of runway incursion events on October 1, 2001). 
The FAA Runway Safety Office produces statistics concerning the number of 
runway incursions detected by Government Fiscal Year (GFY).  For the five-year period, 
GFY 2008-2012 (October 1, 2007 – September 30, 2012), there were a total of 4859 
Runway incursions recorded in the United States (FAA, 2011b).  This equates to 
approximately 1,000 events per year (exactly 971.8 events).   
Human Error in ASDs.   The literature is abundant with studies of ASDs as well 
as a multitude of ASD prevention ideas, devices and systems.  In their study of runway 
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incursions, Torres, Metscher , and Smith (2011) concluded: “Of the human factor 
elements examined, the most common error that led to a runway incursion by both pilots 
and air traffic control (ATC) was due to a loss of situational awareness” (p. 20).  Cardosi, 
Chase, and Eon (2010) note that the FAA describes runway incursions in terms of the 
perpetrator: pilot deviations, controller errors, or vehicle/pedestrian deviations.  
Furthermore, Cardosi, Chase, and Eon (2010) chose to describe runway incursions by the 
activity of the aircraft at the time of the incursion, such as taxi, takeoff, and runway 
crossing.  While their work was limited to runway incursions, ASDs represent a super set 
of possible encounters on the airport surface involving the same players and likely the 
same causes.  However, classification of events by the activity at the time of the event 
does not necessarily point directly to the cause of the deviation or error.  Cardosi (2001, 
2005) and DiFiore and Cardosi (2006) further decomposed causal factors in their 
analysis, bypassing the category of situational awareness as being too general.  
Consequently, Cardosi (2005) cites controller memory loss and pilot loss of positional 
awareness as two examples of causes that would fall under an umbrella of loss of 
situational awareness.  In fact, Cardosi (2005) states that “the most commonly cited cause 
of pilot errors resulting in runway incursions is ‘loss of situational awareness’” (p. 45).  
Cardosi (2005) continues, “Thus, there appears to be accord within the research 
community that ASDs result from a loss of situational awareness, and they result solely 
from human error” (p. 44). 
Endsley (1988) defines Situation Awareness (SA) as a person’s “perception of the 
elements of the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of 
their meaning and the projection of their status in the near future” (p. 97).  Endsley 
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(2000) also defines SA as: “knowing what is going on around you” (p.9).  Thus, if the 
prime cause of an ASD is loss of SA, one might conclude that an ASD is caused by not 
knowing what is going on around you.  To this end, an engineering solution aimed at 
providing an abundance of situational information toward the assurance that SA would 
never be lost might result in the provision of increased volumes of data to the pilots, 
vehicle operators and controllers such that they remain aware of their situation 
continuously.  Alternatively, the provision of copious amounts of available data can lead 
to what Endsley (2000) calls “the information gap” (p.3).  Data provided to maintain SA 
can overload the senses of individuals causing further loss of their SA, an effect exactly 
the opposite of what was intended.  Consequently, the data provided to individuals 
engaged in airport surface movement must be context relevant, meaning that the data is 
processed and tailored to provide the individual with the correct scope of information to 
maintain SA while removing all extraneous information that serves only as a distraction.   
The use of the terminology, loss of situation awareness, may be adequate for 
determining the cause of accidents and incidents; however, it is too high level to 
understand the cause of the SA loss, which will enable engineers and technologists to 
develop solutions to maintain situational awareness.  Endsley (2000) defines several 
components of SA: (1) Perception, (2) Comprehension, and (3) Projection.  When SA is 
lost, the loss occurs in one or more of the levels of SA, and it is at this level where the 
cure must be applied to be effective.  As indicated previously, providing all available data 
to the operators can saturate their ability to perceive what is relevant; consequently, they 
fail to fully comprehend the situation, and fail to correctly project the outcome.  Knowing 
the detailed causes of human error associated with ASDs can lead to successful 
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mitigation solutions, as opposed to providing solutions that might only resolve part of the 
problem or even introduce new error sources.  That is to say, unless one fully understands 
the causal factors associated with the loss of SA, a resulting solution may not be effective 
in all cases.  Solutions that enhance SA certainly would appear to reduce the likelihood of 
ASDs; however, these solutions could mask the actual cause which remains latent only to 
strike again under appropriate circumstances. 
Significance of the Current Study 
To the best of my knowledge, the current study is the first attempt to use HFACS 
as a systematic approach to examine ASD accidents and incidents in order to determine 
detailed causal effects associated with human error during airport operations.  Knowing 
the human error causes of ASDs can enable the development of tools and devices that 
mitigate these causes and therefore do not further aggravate the situation by merely 
addressing the symptom. 
Statement of the Problem 
Without appropriate analysis of ASD causality, any intervention strategy could be 
inadequate, resulting in little reduction in the number of ASD events or the rate of ASD 
events.  Moreover, interventions aimed at symptoms could also have emergent effects 
and consequently result in increases in ASD accidents. 
Purpose Statement 
The current study analyzed NTSB accident and incident reports using the HFACS 
framework to develop an understanding of the human error causal factors associated 
ASDs as they occur during airport operations.  Moreover, the analysis examined the 
nature of the difference in causal factors between commercial and general aviation 
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operations as well as ATC error and pilot error to inform the development of an 
intervention strategy for different classes of operations and different stakeholders in the 
event that different causal factors for these segregations are determined. 
Research Questions 
The current study was designed to address the following research questions: 
1. What are the human error causal factors, their characteristics, and their 
interrelationships discovered from applying the HFACS framework to 
ASD accident and incident reports? 
2. Are the discovered ASD causal factors and their impact dependent upon 
the type of operation: (a) commercial operations (Parts 121 or 129, Parts 
135 or 137, or publically owned aircraft, or (b) general aviation operations 
(Parts 91 or 125). 
Delimitations (Scope) 
The current study examined historical accident and incident data reports that were 
prepared by the NTSB for events within the United States in association with their ASD 
accident and incident investigations.  The period of interest for these data is from January 
1, 2001 through December 31, 2012.  Multiple sources of ASD data were examined, 
including: (1) NTSB Accident Reports, (2) FAA Accident and Incident Data (AIDs) 
Reports, (3) FAA Runway Incursion Database (RWS) Reports, and (4) stakeholder 
reports from the Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS).  The NTSB investigates fatal 
or serious accidents and incidents at both towered and non-towered airports and for all 
aviation operations (air transport, commercial and general aviation).  The FAA AIDs 
Reports pertain to less serious accidents than those investigated by the NTSB; 
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consequently, these two data sources did not contain reports that reference the same 
accident or incident.  The FAA RWS Reports pertain to ASDs that occur at towered 
airports and represent reports that are completed by local tower controllers subsequent to 
an airport accident or incident; consequently, these reports are available for only towered 
airports.  The ASRS data are generally provided by pilots, although controllers or other 
aviation personnel can provide reports, and these reports reflect all classes of operations 
and airports. 
The extraction of accident and incident data from the aforementioned data sources 
varies according to the data source architecture, and all architectures are different.  These 
data sources are under constant update and modification; therefore, this study accessed 
the reports at one time and did not consider preliminary reports or updates to the data 
sources that occurred during or after the preparation of this dissertation.  Further, this 
study examined accident and incident reports; however, no attempt was made to alter the 
official findings regarding the accident or incident.   
Limitations and Assumptions 
This study accessed the full population of all reported ASD accidents and 
incidents during the period of interest from each of the data bases mentioned above.  
Limitations with several of the data bases examined were encountered and are fully 
discussed in Chapter III.  The FAA AIDs contained only four reports for the period, and 
the RWS reports were factual without attributing a cause of the reported ASD. In 
addition, the ASRS data is incomplete, is potentially biased by the involvement of the 
report authors, and all ASRS reports for accidents and incidents investigated by the 
NTSB (and contained in their database) were omitted from ASRS and sent directly to the 
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NTSB for use in their investigation.  NTSB reports that were classified as preliminary 
were eliminated from consideration, and as these reports are completed and the causal 
information made available, the results of this study could change; however, less than 12 
preliminary reports were omitted from the study.  The study was based upon ASDs that 
were officially captured and reported and no consideration was given to any ASD that 
may have gone unreported or that resulted in no official incident or accident or that was 
not covered by an official report.  The frequency and effect of unreported ASDs are 
unknown.   
Definition of Terms 
Air Traffic Control – A service operated by appropriate authority to promote the 
safe, orderly, and expeditious flow of air traffic (14 CFR Part 1). 
Airport Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) – An automation system that 
utilizes airport surface radar sensors to determine position of aircraft and vehicles 
on the airport surface and to alert controllers of impending collision hazards that 
have been projected. 
Airport Surface Detection Equipment, Model X (ASDE-X) – ASDE-X is a traffic 
management system for the airport surface that provides surveillance coverage 
and aircraft identification to air traffic controllers.  
Airport Surface Deviation (ASD) (also called Surface event) – An occurrence at 
an airport involving a pedestrian, vehicle, or aircraft on the defined airport 
movement area that involves either an incorrect presence, unauthorized movement 
or occurrence that affects or could affect the safety of flight of an aircraft. (See 
FAA Order 7050.1A 9/16/2010). 
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Non-towered airport – An airport that does not have an operational control tower 
and where all airport surface movements are under the purview of pilots and 
vehicle operators. 
Part 91 Operations – Refers to FAA Regulations, 14 CFR Part 91, which contains 
rules governing the operation of aircraft within the United States, including the 
waters within 3 nautical miles of the U.S. coast.  Often references as general 
aviation operations (large general aviation aircraft are also operated under 14 CFR 
Part 125). 
Part 121 Operations – Refers to FAA Regulations, 14 CFR Part 121, which 
contains rules governing domestic, flag, and supplemental operations of each 
person who holds or is required to hold an Air Carrier Certificate or Operating 
Certificate under 14 CFR Part 119.  
Part 135 Operations – Refers to FAA Regulations, 14 CFR Part 135, which 
contains rules governing commuter or on-demand operations, as well as certain 
air tours and charter flights.  
Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) – RTCA, Inc. 
(http://www.rtca.org/aboutrtca.asp) is a private, not-for-profit corporation that 
develops consensus-based recommendations regarding communications, 
navigation, surveillance, and air traffic management (CNS/ATM) system issues.  
RTCA functions as a Federal Advisory Committee.  Its recommendations are used 
by the FAA as the basis for policy, program, and regulatory decisions and by the 
private sector as the basis for development, investment and other business 
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decisions. Organized in 1935, RTCA today includes roughly 400 government, 
industry and academic organizations from the United States and around the world.   
Runway Incursion - Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect 
presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface 
designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft. 
State of the Art - refers to the highest level of general development, as of a device, 
technique, or scientific field achieved at a particular time. 
Surface Incident - Unauthorized or unapproved movement within the designated 
movement area (excluding runway incursions) or an occurrence in that same area 
associated with the operation of an aircraft that affects or could affect the safety of 
flight. 
Towered airport – An airport having an operational control tower from which all 
airport movements are controlled and monitored by air traffic controllers located 
in the tower. 
List of Acronyms 
ADMS Aviation Data Management System (owned by the NTSB) 
AIDS FAA Accident/Incident Data System 
AMASS Airport Movement Area Safety System 
ATC Air Traffic Control 
ASD Airport Surface Deviation/Airport Surface Event 
ASDE-X Airport Surface Detection Equipment – Model X 
ASIAS Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing 
ASRS Aviation Safety Reporting System 
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CRM Crew (cockpit) resource management 
CNS/ATM Communications, navigation, surveillance, and air traffic 
management 
eADMS Enhanced ADMS (Aviation Data Management System ( owned by 
the NTSB)) 
ERAU Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FOD Foreign Object Damage 
FY Fiscal Year (generally used interchangeably with GFY)  
GA General Aviation 
GFY Government Fiscal Year 
HFACS Human Factors Analysis and Classification System 
ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
LAHSO Land and Hold Short Operations 
NAS National Airspace System 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
OE Operational Error 
PD Pilot Deviation 
PUBU Publically owned aircraft 
RTCA RTCA, Inc. (Formed in 1935 as Radio Technical Commission for 
Aeronautics). 
RI Runway Incursion 
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RWS FAA Runway Incursion Data Base 
SA Situation Awareness 
VFR Visual Flight Rules 
VMC Visual Meteorological Conditions 
VPD Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviation 
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CHAPTER II      
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
This review of the pertinent literature is segmented into two sections.  The first 
section describes the literature related to airport surface deviations (ASDs) and runway 
incursions (RIs).  The purpose of this section is to establish the baseline in terms of ASD 
knowledge and to determine if the interventions that have been attempted have changed 
any of the basic causal factors as reported in the literature.  The second section of this 
review concentrates on the use of the categorization for evaluating ASD causal factors: 
the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) and its use in aviation 
research.   
ASDs 
The Federal Aviation Administration’s (FAA’s) Runway Safety Plan states: 
Our desired outcome is zero runway incursions.  By reducing frequency, 
incursions of any type will become extremely rare occurrences.  Corrective 
actions will aim to reduce the potential for human error through awareness, 
outreach, training, technological aids and infrastructure improvements that 
enhance situational awareness.  By reducing severity, incursions will more likely 
be minor rule infractions instead of near collisions.  The emphasis will be to 
complete actions that reduce the opportunity for collision risk in the high-energy 
segment of the runway.  Activities include revisions to procedures, changes to 
airport geometry and installation of technology and infrastructure that will help to 
eliminate the opportunity for human error and collisions in the high-energy 
segment. (FAA, 2009, p5.)  
35 
 
 
 
The FAA’s Runway Safety Plan (FAA, 2009) looks toward reducing the severity 
of RIs by taking actions to reduce the opportunity for collision risk in the high energy 
segment of the runway through revising “procedures, changes to airport geometry, and 
installation of technology and infrastructure” (p.5).  These interventions are aimed at 
causal factors for RIs, yet there has been no complete study of RIs causal factors that was 
discovered in this literature review.  Consequently, without an understanding of the 
causal factors, interventions may fail to achieve the desired goal. 
ASD literature.  The potential for ASDs and RIs has been present since the early 
days of aviation. As soon as aircraft were involved with ground operations, the risk of an 
aircraft hitting another aircraft, a ground vehicle, or a person on the airport surface 
became real, and the probability of such incidents increased as more aircraft were 
introduced into operation. 
One of the early studies of airport operations was reported by Dowe (1966), 
where his objective was to isolate, identify, and define the problems associated with 
surface traffic movements at airports.  As Dowe (1966) observed: “The taxi operation 
requires that the pilot first, know which taxiway route he is to use, second, guide the 
aircraft safely along the taxiway, and third, avoid contact with other aircraft and ground 
vehicles” (Dowe, 1966, p. 3-2).  Dowe further stated: “the pilot is responsible for 
maintaining a safe longitudinal separation from aircraft or ground vehicles proceeding 
ahead of him on taxiways” (Dowe, 1966, p. 3-2), an adage that is still valid today. 
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) performed a special 
investigation of RIs (NTSB, 1986).  The NTSB selected 26 incidents on the basis of 
preliminary information and availability of investigative personnel.  Although, admittedly 
36 
 
 
 
this investigation lacks statistical rigor and does not necessarily represent all RI incidents, 
the NTSB believed: “the factors involved in these incidents were indicative of the causal 
factors in other incidents” (NTSB, 1986, p. 1). 
According to the NTSB (NTSB, 1986), the FAA had identified 17 of the incidents 
as controller-induced incursions and nine as pilot-induced incursions.  Despite the FAA 
categorization of incursions, the NTSB determined that many incursions actually 
involved combinations of pilot and controller factors.  The NTSB investigation included 
interviews with controllers, pilots, airport managers, airline management staff, and 
personnel from the FAA’s Air Traffic and Flight Standards Services.  Of the 17 incidents 
attributed to controller error, six involved incomplete or misunderstood coordination 
between two controllers and 11 resulted from the actions of individual controllers.  In 
seven incidents controllers stated they had forgotten about an aircraft or about previously 
effected coordination with other controllers.  Six of the incidents involved a 
runway/taxiway crossing, four involved a single runway, three involved crossing 
runways, three involved an aircraft that had been given a position and hold clearance, and 
one involved a helicopter that started to cross a runway and conflicted with a fixed-wing 
aircraft.  Of the nine incidents attributed to pilot error, seven involved unauthorized 
runway crossing or entry for takeoff and two involved unauthorized takeoffs.  In several 
of these incidents, runway and taxiway signs were missing or inadequate.  In at least two 
incidents, pilots did not comply with controller clearances that the pilots had 
acknowledged receiving and understanding.  The pilots contributed to some incursions by 
failing to communicate properly with ATC and failing to be vigilant and to scan runways 
and taxiways before moving their aircraft. 
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The NTSB found that runway incursions which involved operational errors 
involved controllers from all levels of experience, including controller supervisors who 
were working a control position (NTSB, 1986).  In each case where the supervisor was 
working a control position, the NTSB found that there was no other supervisor or 
controller in charge appointed to monitor or to assist other controllers.   
Another problem that appeared in several RIs involved coordination of runway 
crossings by ground and local controllers.  Facilities used a variety of coordination 
procedures-verbal and nonverbal, communicating directly or indirectly (through another 
controller), using interphones, and using flight progress strips.  In those facilities where 
there was inadequate coordination, there frequently was no specified or standard 
procedure for coordination between controllers.  
In one of the RIs, the controller issued a clearance involving a runway that the 
controller had forgotten was closed.  In six of the RIs, the controllers involved said that 
they forgot about an aircraft or vehicle to which they had given either a direction to hold 
or a clearance to take off or to cross a runway.  Controllers also reported forgetting to 
follow what they admitted were standard or commonly practiced procedures.  In the 
seven incidents in which the controllers involved forgot something, there were additional 
factors that the NTSB believes contributed to the incidents.  For example, in four of the 
seven incidents, the NTSB determined that inadequate scanning of the runways and/or 
the Bright Radar Indicator Tower Equipment (BRITE) displays probably contributed to 
the error. 
In the seven incidents in which the controllers involved forgot something, the 
assigned tower cab supervisor or, in the absence of the supervisor, the assigned controller 
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in charge either was working an active position or was in another part of the tower.  A 
supervisor was not able in any of these cases to serve as a monitor or extra pair of eyes to 
evaluate controller performance continuously and perhaps to catch a controller’s 
oversight before a runway incursion. 
Lack of or incomplete coordination between local and ground controllers was a 
significant factor in nine of the incidents investigated.  In some incidents, no coordination 
was effected because the facility had established local procedures that facility managers 
believed precluded the need for coordination.  In other incidents, coordination was not 
accomplished because one controller did not perceive the situation correctly, and did not 
believe coordination was necessary.  In still other incidents, one controller believed 
coordination was effected, but another controller misunderstood, and coordination was 
not complete. 
Those RIs attributed solely to pilot factors usually involved either 
communications problems, such as misunderstanding clearances or inadvertent entry of a 
runway because of disorientation.  Some of the incursions might have been averted if 
pilots (and controllers) had been more attentive to radio communications, had used 
proper radio phraseology, had read back clearances, or had scanned more effectively 
before entering an active runway. 
The objective a study reported by Hollister (1988) was to determine the functions 
that would be performed by an automated airport surface control system, to establish the 
cost and benefits that would result from such a system, and to outline a modular design 
which could be simulated during a following phase of the development process. 
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Hollister (1988) states: “Airport surface control is an important element of the 
overall ATC system since its effectiveness can be a limiting factor in airport capacity as 
well as a critical component of aviation safety” (p. 1). 
At the time of his study, and also valid today, the control of airport surface traffic 
is a manual activity.  Surveillance of the airport is predominantly visual with occasional 
help from Airport Surface Detection Equipment (ASDE) radar.  Sequencing, spacing, 
routing, and monitoring are done mentally by the tower controllers.  Communication is 
by voice over Very High Frequency (VHF) radio.  Guidance of individual aircraft is 
achieved entirely through the pilot's visual perception (Hollister, 1988).  
According to Hollister’s (1988) study of accidents on the airport surface in the 
United States over a 19-year period (1962-1980), there were an average of 11 accidents 
annually resulting in about one fatality and one serious injury per year; albeit, fatalities 
and serious injuries were associated with only a very few of the accidents.  In his study of 
(then) more recent data, Hollister (1988) determined that the number of runway 
incursions rose from 77 in 1984 to 102 in 1985 and 115 in 1986.  
Tarrel (1985) utilized ASRS data to further study RIs, or “runway transgressions” 
as he referenced them.  His study used a search strategy by specific text phrases, such as 
“runway incursion” and “occupied runway takeoff” to search ASRS reports over the 
period of May 1, 1978 to September 1983.  The search yielded 1210 reports of potential 
runway transgressions and the ASRS database at that time contained 23,291 reports.  
Tarrel (1985) analytically determined causal factors using the ASRS reports, and 
classified them according to the type of error.  He discovered that flight crew errors 
(63.3%) and tower controller errors (27.4%) were the two largest causes of runway 
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transgressions and most (72.6%) of the transgressions occurred in visual (VFR) 
conditions, while only 9.9% occurred in instrument meteorological conditions (IMC). 
The frequency of the type of runway transgression determined by Tarrel (1985) 
his study of ASRS data indicated that the greatest frequency of pilot error is classified as 
unauthorized landings, followed by unauthorized runway crossing, unauthorized runway 
entry, and unauthorized runway takeoff.  Controller errors in frequency order are 
improper clearances for takeoff, runway crossing, landing, and position and hold, 
respectively.  
Causal factors for pilot-induced arrival transgressions are listed by Tarrel (1985) 
and at the top of the list are pilot distractions, pilot forgetting to contact the tower during 
approach and communication problems.  In the case of pilot-at-fault taxi transgressions, 
Tarrel (1985) indicates that these events result from problems with clearances.  In 
addition, when combined with pilot disorientation at complex airports, these two factors 
account for a clear majority of these incident types.  Tarrel (1985) attributes clearance 
issues as the predominant causal factor for departure transgressions when attributed to 
pilot error. 
Adam, Lentz, and Bair (1992) examined causal factors for RIs and related 
incidents.  Their results appear to confirm that usually, RIs and related incidents take 
place because of multiple factors that occur in an uninterrupted sequence.  In many cases, 
these factors taken individually appear insignificant; in combination, they can create a 
critical chain of events culminating in the incident.  In more detail, their study discovered 
that many factors are contributors to the human errors that produce RIs.  These factors 
include the following: 
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 The ways in which pilots and vehicle drivers navigate on the airport 
surface 
 The means for identifying runways and taxiways-the signs, lights, and 
painted markings 
 Communications-both the message content and the means of delivery 
 Memory 
 Situation awareness and distractions 
 The effects of various rules and procedures-on both pilots and controllers 
 The lack of standardization of equipment and procedures 
 Variability in the effectiveness of training for pilots, controllers, and 
vehicle drivers across the system 
The above study concludes that no single intervention will solve the runway 
incursion problem as the cause is multifaceted. Each solution addresses a single facet; 
consequently, only a complex combination of solutions integrated together as a system 
will enable a complete solution to the RI problem. 
Harrison (1991) identified the cause of all RIs as “human error” (p. 1).  He 
elaborated further: “runway incursions caused by human error, either by the controller, 
the pilot, or a vehicle operator” (p.1).  In addition, Harrison (1991) cited more detailed RI 
causal factors as being one or a combination of four primary factors: (a) Improper 
Clearances, (b) Incomplete Communications, (c) Poor Ground Navigation, and (d) Lack 
of Situation Awareness. 
Using RI data collected for the period 1988 through November 1990, Harrison 
(1991) provides some relevant statistics: 
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 Approximately 94 percent (612 of 651) of RIs involved conflicts between 
two or more aircraft or an aircraft and a vehicle. 
 Incursions involving air transportation operations (commercial operators) 
accounted for 46 percent (281 of 612) of the total incursions involving two 
or more aircraft or aircraft and vehicles. 
 Operational errors by controllers accounted for 40 percent of total system 
RIs with pilot deviations and vehicle-pedestrian deviations accounting for 
the remainder of these reported incidents. 
Another interesting observation concerns visibility at the time of the incursion.  In 
cases where visibility was reported, Harrison (1991) indicates that as the visibility 
decreased, the number of RIs also decreased; however, the issue is that under reduced 
visibility conditions, RIs become more hazardous as neither pilots or controllers can see 
to avert a collision. 
The Office of the Inspector General provided an update on the FAA’s RIS 
Program in the Department of Transportation (1999), citing that in its analysis of 1998 
data, the primary causes for the increase in RIs were attributed to pilot deviations, which 
accounted for 56 percent of the 325 runway incursions.  Further, 65 % of the pilot 
deviations were attributed to general aviation aircraft.  The Department of Transportation 
(1999) indicates that over the period 1993 through 1998 the range of pilot deviations 
attributed to general aviation ranged between 61 and 76 % of the total RIs caused by pilot 
deviations.   
A later study of RIs (ASRS, 2002) provided an analysis of ASRS data from 
January 1, 2000 to June 30, 2002, which contained a total of 1,639 RI incidents.  Of those 
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incidents, the ASRS analyst team coded a total of 363 RI events that met their scoping 
criteria. The following data is derived from those 363 RI incidents:  
 Of the 363 RI incidents, approximately 32 % (113) of the RI incidents 
involved aircraft that crossed the hold line only.  
 Another 31 % (111) involved aircraft that penetrated or occupied an active 
runway without authorization.  
 Seventy-two percent (262) of the RI incidents were analyzed as pilot 
deviations.  Twenty-four percent (87) of the RI incidents were analyzed as 
controller errors.  
 A conflict between two aircraft occurred during 50 percent (182) of the RI 
incidents. During 26 % (94) of the RI incidents a conflict between aircraft 
did not occur.  Those non-conflict incidents involved aircraft that either 
crossed a hold line or penetrated a runway where another aircraft was not 
involved.  The remaining 24 % (87) of the RI incidents lacked sufficient 
information in the report to determine if a conflict between aircraft had 
occurred. 
 Approximately 32 % (116) of the RIs involved conflicts that occurred 
between two air carrier aircraft.  Eight percent (30) of the RIs involved 
conflicts that occurred between an air carrier aircraft and a general 
aviation aircraft.  RIs occurred at a runway and taxiway intersection in 
over 75 % (270) of the incidents. RI incidents occurred at the intersection 
of two runways in 12 % (43) of the incidents. 
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 Fifty-eight percent (210) of the incidents occurred during daylight 
conditions. Twenty-one percent (76) occurred during nighttime conditions.  
The following human factor causes were cited or assessed as contributory to the 
RIs.  Pilot confusion was cited during 39 % (140) of the RIs; Read back or hear back of 
the clearance was cited in 32 % (116) of the RIs; Lack of Positional Awareness was cited 
in 10 % (105) of the RI incidents; and Pilot Distraction was cited in 10 % (104) of the RI 
incidents. 
The purpose of the Cardosi and Yost (2001) study was to provide a 
comprehensive review of relevant literature and to analyze (then) current safety data with 
the objective of identifying gaps in airport surface operations that led to ASDs.  In the 
first part of their report, Cardosi and Yost (2001) provide an examination of research on 
the causes of human errors involved in operations on the airport surface.  
Cardosi and Yost (2001) recapitulate the airport surface studies performed prior to 
their 2001 report.  Many of these studies are discussed earlier in this section as they were 
drawn directly from the literature representing the original study.  Studies not generally 
available in the open literature but reported by Cardosi and Yost (2001) are presented.   
A study by Alaris, Co. Inc. from 1992 was reported by Cardosi and Yost (2001).  
In this study, 235 surface incidents that occurred between 1988 and 1990 at 12 major 
airports in the United States were analyzed.  Fifty-five percent of these incidents were 
pilot deviations, 26 % were operational errors/deviations, 17 % were vehicle/pedestrian 
deviations and 2 % were incident reports from NTSB files.  Half of the 235 surface 
incidents were classified as RIs.  Of these, 49 % were attributed to controller operational 
errors, 32 % were pilot deviations, and 19 % were vehicle/ pedestrian deviations.  
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Unfortunately, the analysis of the human errors in this study consisted solely of a 
classification of the type of error (e.g., pilot crossed an active runway rather than holding 
short as instructed); it did not attempt to identify the factors that contributed to the errors. 
A pilot surface incident safety study from 1993 was reported by Cardosi and Yost 
(2001).  This study was also originally published by Kelly and Steinbacher (1993) and 75 
reports submitted by pilots to the ASRS associated with RIs were examined.  The 
analysis showed that radio frequency congestion contributed to numerous incidents, 
resulting in blocked transmissions, incomplete messages, repeated communications, and 
misunderstood instructions.   
In another study reported by Cardosi and Yost (2001) and originally published as 
a MITRE report by Kelly and Jacobs (1998), a survey of 1,111controllers and managers 
at 63 Level2 3, 4 and 5 towers was conducted.  As a result of this survey, several topics 
of concern associated with ASDs were identified.  This list of topics includes: 
 Install automatic stop lights on runways that are activated by surface 
surveillance systems. 
 Install improvements to the airport surface radar system (ASDE-3): 
o Add tags to the displayed targets that depict the aircraft identifier.  
o Reduce the number of false targets.  
o Reduce the interference caused by rain. 
 Provide relief from airport radio frequency congestion. 
 Provide relief from tower cab features that interfere with the controllers' 
scan of the airport surface, such as 
                                                 
2 Levels are assigned to air traffic control towers based upon the frequency of operations being conducted 
with higher numerical levels representing more operations. 
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o Placement of displays on top of the consoles that obstruct vision. 
o The use of tower shades that hinder controllers' ability to see the 
airport surface. 
 Improve the use of memory aids for controllers. 
In reviewing the ASD studies prior to 2001, Cardosi and Yost (2001) summarize 
the findings in terms of synergy across the reports.  In terms of controller causal effects, 
the following are concluded: 
 Forgetting about the presence of aircraft on a runway, the closure of a 
runway or a clearance that he/she had issued (includes failure to verify the 
location of the aircraft). 
 Failure to anticipate the required separation or miscalculation of the 
impending separation. 
 Communication errors -readback/hearback errors, or issuing an instruction 
other than the one the controller intended to issue. 
 Lack of, or incomplete, coordination between controllers. 
 Absence of a supervisor (who was not working a control position). 
(Cardosi & Yost, 2001, p. 22)  
The second part of Cardosi and Yost (2001) describes the results of an analysis of 
safety data that includes: 
 FAA reports of tower operational errors and deviations.  
 NTSB accident and incident reports (and recommendations to the FAA). 
 Reports filed by tower controllers to the Aviation Safety Reporting System 
(ASRS). 
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 ASRS reports filed by pilots involving runway transgressions. 
 FAA pilot deviations in tower airspace.  
These accidents and incidents were analyzed in an attempt to determine the types 
of errors made in the airport environment and to identify significant factors associated 
with these errors.  In terms of controller errors (operational errors), Cardosi and Yost 
(2001) attempted to determine a correlation with their summary of their literature review 
to date.  In their examination of the data, they discovered that 27 % of the applicable 
events were related to controller’s forgetting something, miscommunication between 
pilots and controllers (i.e., readback/hearback error) was found to be a factor in 19 % of 
the incidents, coordination between tower controllers was noted in 18 % of the reports, 
and finally, the absence of a supervisor was noted in 11 % of the operational errors and 
deviations examined.  In addition, Cardosi and Yost (2001) found other issues that were 
contributing, including: (a) peripheral duties imposed by traffic management 
requirements, (b) Land and Hold Short Operations (LAHSO), (c) effects of working 
combined positions, (d) situation awareness at the onset of assuming a position, and (e) 
intersection departures. 
Cardosi and Yost (2001) examined ASRS data submitted by controllers.  Many of 
these reports were not specific to an airport surface incident; however, for those reports 
that were associated with airport surface deviations, controller errors fell into three 
distinct categories: (a) memory lapses, (b) failure in judging or predicting separation, and 
(c) inadequate controller-controller coordination.  Although most of these reports did not 
identify causal factors, 16 % stated that the controller was working combined positions at 
the time, 6 % identified a poor position relief briefing as contributing to the error, 4 % 
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identify fatigue as a contributing factor, and 4 % mentioned controller-pilot 
communication errors.   
In addition, ASRS data from pilots were also examined by Cardosi and Yost 
(2001).  The results of the pilot data indicated 76 incidents of which 19 were runway 
incursions and the remaining 57 were classified as other surface incidents.  Contributing 
factors associated with the 76 incidents were categorized as follows: 39 were attributed to 
poor airport markings/signage and 27 involved miscommunications, including 5 instances 
in which an aircraft accepted a clearance intended for another aircraft with a similar call 
sign. 
Cardosi and Yost (2001) also analyzed NTSB accident reports covering the 
period of December 1983 to July 1995. In total, 24 reports reflecting 6 accidents and 18 
incidents, were analyzed for causal factors and potential remedies.  The largest common 
factor, occurring in 70 % of the reports, was the failure to verify that the runway was 
clear before allowing an aircraft to takeoff or land.  Twenty-two percent of the cases 
involved miscommunications between pilots and controllers; in three of these cases an 
aircraft accepted a clearance intended for another aircraft.  Thirteen percent of the cases 
involved a memory lapse on the part of the controller; moreover, one case involved a 
controller who was working combined position.  Only one report mentioned that the 
supervisor was working a control position.  Two of the reports cite poor airport markings. 
Pilot deviations were also examined by Cardosi and Yost (2001).  In their 
analysis, of the 65 reported deviations, 33 (51 %) involved pilots entering controlled 
airspace without authorization.  Fifty-two percent of the 33 deviations resulted in Near 
Mid-Air Collisions, 6 percent resulted in RIs and the rest were classified as "other.” 
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In summary, Cardosi and Yost (2001) found general agreement between the data 
they analyzed and the prior analyses retrieved from their literature review.  Specifically, 
the most common controller-related factors identified in the surface incidents examined 
in their study were the same as those identified in previous studies: 
 Forgetting about an aircraft, the closure of a runway, a vehicle on the 
runway, and/or a clearance that he/she had issued. 
 Communication errors -readback/hearback errors, issuing an instruction 
other than the one the controller intended to issue. 
 Lack of, or incomplete, coordination between controllers. 
Pounds and Scarborough (2002) describe a review study that examined the human 
factors issues of runway incursions using the Human Factors Analysis and Classification 
System (HFACS), which was adapted for Air Traffic Control (ATC).   
The purpose of the study by Pounds and Scarborough (2002) was to: 
 Test the classification method to replicate other findings, 
 Examine results for added value, and 
 Develop a human factors technique for analyzing incidents so that better 
information will be available. 
Data from 347 events were obtained from narrative reports taken from the FAA 
Operational Error database for the period CY 1996 through June 2000.  The reports were 
analyzed by ATC subject matter experts with experience in terminal operations. With 
respect to the four HFACS tiers (Controller, Preconditions, Supervision, Organization), 
over 90% of the critical points had causal factors associated with the controller tier, 
approximately 8% of the critical factors were associated with preconditions, and 
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approximately 2% of the critical factors were associated with supervision.  Within the 
controller tier, approximately 88% of the critical points were identified as deficiencies 
and about 7% of the critical points were identified with procedure-following.  Pounds and 
Scarborough (2002) illustrated the causal factors at the ATC task level for the top three 
tasks associated with the operational errors studied as is reproduced in Figure 3.  Causal 
factors are: decision-based errors, skill-based errors, and misconceptions.  Note that 
skill-based errors dominate all three tasks.  Pounds and Scarborough (2002) concluded 
that their results successfully replicated the findings of earlier studies, but felt that the 
study was limited due to the use of archival data. 
 
 
Figure 3. Personal causal factors at the task level taken from Pounds and Scarborough 
(2002) 
(Taken from Pounds and Scarborough (2002)). 
 
 
 
Cardosi, Chase, and Eon (2010) attempt to “explore what is known about the 
human errors and other factors that have been identified as contributing to runway 
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incursions, and offers some error mitigation strategies” (p. 1).  Based upon their analysis, 
Cardosi, Chase, and Eon (2010) describe RI causal factors with the largest frequency 
being aircraft and/or vehicles crossing an active runway in front of landing or departing 
aircraft traffic accounted for approximately 80% of the incursions involving a conflict 
with another aircraft and for 33% of all of the runway incursions in FY2008.  The 
remaining incursions were associated with:  
 Operations on intersecting runways (9%),  
 Two aircraft or vehicles operating on the same runway in the same 
direction (8%),  
 Two aircraft or vehicles operating on the same runway in an opposite 
direction (1%), and  
 The final 1% involved a conflict with a stationary aircraft or vehicle on the 
runway. 
Cardosi, Chase, and Eon (2010) reported that in GFY 2008, an aircraft or a 
vehicle taxiing onto an active runway in front of a landing aircraft represented 44% of all 
runway incursions that involved a conflict and 18 % of all RIs.  Note that 63% of these 
incursions were attributed to pilot deviations, 18% were attributed to controller errors, 
and 19% to vehicle/pedestrian deviations.  The researchers further elaborated that an 
aircraft taking off in conflict with either another aircraft or a vehicle accounted for 37% 
of the total number of runway incursions involving a conflict, and 40% of these 
incursions were attributed to controller error, 49% were attributed to pilot error, and 11% 
were attributed to vehicle or pedestrian deviations.   
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The purpose of the research described by Biernbaum and Hagemann (2012) was 
to examine the underlying factors that contribute to the severity of RIs.  The goal of this 
research was to use statistical methods to identify trends in RI severity.  The study did not 
seek to explain the causes of particular events, but rather focused on broader trends in 
incursion severity.  The basis of their research was the set of all incursions that occurred 
between January 1, 2001 and September 30, 2010 and was extracted from the FAA: (a) 
Runway Incursion Database, (b) Air Traffic Controller Operational Error Database, and 
(c) the Air Traffic Quality Assurance Pilot Deviation Database.  The first part of their 
analysis was focused on one-way and two-way descriptive statistics and analyzing cross-
tabulations of variables.  To counteract some of the limitations of the cross tabulation 
approach, a modeling effort was undertaken in the second part of their analysis.  This 
allowed multiple variables to be included at once and their interactions to be understood.  
The cross tabulations examine many more variables across and broader array of incursion 
types while the modeling effort attempts to delve deeper into the relationship between 
these variables and severity within a limited sample.  Multinomial logistic regression 
models were employed to capture a more nuanced look at the impacts on severity. 
Biernbaum and Hagemann (2012) categorized incursion events along two major 
axes: incident severity and incident type.  The top of Table 4 presents the cross tabulation 
of these two categories and the results of Pearson’s Chi-Squared test along with the 
expected frequency in the lower half of the table.  The researchers reached several 
conclusions from their analysis.  First, incidents involving controller error tend to be 
more severe than other incident types.  Second, both incident type and severity vary 
systematically between regions. Biernbaum and Hagemann (2012) suggest that 
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differences in pilot populations as well as traffic levels may explain this nuance. Third, 
commercial carriers tend to be involved in less severe incidents; however, commercial 
carriers are more likely to be involved in conflict events. Four, incursions during takeoff 
appear to be more likely to be severe than those when the aircraft at fault is taxiing or 
landing. 
 
 
Table 4. The cross tabulation of results from Biernbaum and Hagemann (2012), indicating 
severity of runway incursion against source of error. 
 
 
Incursion Type OE PD V/PD Total 
Results of Pearson’s Chi-Squared 
A 53 63 16 132 
B 45 77 23 145 
C 943 1,822 543 3,308 
D 227 3,340 1,660 5,227 
Total 1,268 5,302 2,242 8,812 
Expected Frequency 
A 19 79 34 132 
B 21 87 37 145 
C 476 1,990 842 3,308 
D 752 3,145 1,330 5,227 
Total 1,268 5,302 2,242 8,812 
Notes:  
(1) Adapted from Biernbaum and Hagemann (2012) 
(2) Tables contain rounded numbers for convenience, consequently row and column 
totals may not be the same as the sum of the displayed cells. The totals are accurate.  
 
 
 
Controller workload appears to affect severity, where it was determined that 
increased workload is associated with higher probabilities of severe events.  Airport 
layout also appears to influence severity; moreover, evidence indicates that more runway 
intersections are associated with higher probabilities for severe events.  There is also 
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evidence that more runways reduce the probability of severe events.  Biernbaum and 
Hagemann (2012) discovered that these two results combined indicate that more parallel 
runways may have the potential to reduce severe runway incursion events. 
Biernbaum and Hagemann (2012) drew several conclusions from the research, which 
include: 
 Controller incidents are approximately three times more likely to be severe 
than other incident types. 
 Controller workload – the number of aircraft a controller is responsible for 
plays a significant role in severity. Increased workload is associated with 
higher probabilities of severe events. 
 Incident type and severity distributions statistically significantly vary by 
region, indicating policy impacts will also vary by region. 
 Evidence suggests controller age does not impact severity. 
 Commercial carriers are 60% less likely to be involved in severe conflict 
incursions but are more likely to be involved in conflict incursions overall.  
 Additional RIs increase the likelihood of a severe event, but more total 
runways decreases the likelihood of a severe event. 
 Incidents during takeoff are 2.5 times more likely to be severe when compared 
with taxiing.  Incidents during landing are 1.7 times as likely to be severe 
when compared with taxiing. 
 Increased daily operations appear to increase the likelihood of conflict events, 
but do not affect severity.  
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 Pilot incursions are the most common type of incursion occurring more than 
four times as often as controller errors and approximately twice as often as 
V/PDs. 
 Incursions during Land and Hold Short Operations (LAHSO) are very rare. 
 No severe incidents (category A or B) have occurred during a LAHSO. 
 No pilot having more than 5,000 hours in a make and model has committed a 
severe incursion. (Biernbaum & Hagemann, 2012, p. 179)  
DiFiore and Cardosi (2006) examined 300 reports filed by pilots or co-pilots from 
the ASRS at the 34 busiest airports in the United States, during the period May 2001 until 
August 2002.  The reports selected for inclusion were those filed by a captain or first 
officer who was operating the aircraft under FAA Part 121, 135,or 91, and who was 
directly involved in the incident.  Of the 300 sampled reports, 50 were excluded because 
they failed to meet study criteria (e.g., described an error of a pilot in another aircraft).  
Of the remaining reports, 14 % were filed by pilots and co-pilots describing the same 
incident; the information from these duplicate reports was combined yielding 231 unique 
incidents.  The majority of reports were filed by pilots operating under Commercial rules 
(Part 121 – 73% and Part 135 – 5%).  DiFiore and Cardosi (2006) performed a separate 
analysis comparing reports filed by pilots operating under Commercial rules (121/135) 
and General Aviation rules (91) with the revelation that no remarkable differences were 
present in the type of incidents or factors cited by the pilots.  Their study revealed that 
communications were the most frequently reported factor category, cited in 55 % of the 
reports examined.  Inadequate position awareness was the second prevailing category, 
cited in 40 % of the reports.  Automatic processing (skill-based errors) and airport 
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surface issues were each cited in 25 % and 23 %, respectively.  Other human 
performance factors, such as fatigue, distraction, and a sense of being rushed, were cited 
in 20 % of the reports and environmental factors were cited in 18 % of the reports.  Ten 
percent of the reports identified weather as a contributing factor, and 75 % of the 231 
incidents occurred during Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC).  Ten percent of the 
reports listed the conditions as Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) or marginal 
VMC as prevailing at the time of the incident. 
DiFiore and Cardosi (2006) also categorized the incidents into four operations:  
(a) crossing the hold-short lines (but did not cross the runway edge); (b) entered the 
runway (crossed the runway edge but not to hold in position, and did not completely 
cross the runway); (c) taxi into position and hold (entered the runway to hold in position 
for takeoff); and (d) crossed the runway.  They further attempted to classify the causal 
factors of each of the operational event categories, and the results are presented in Table 
5.  
 
 
Table 5. Percentage of causal factors mentioned in reports under each operational 
category. 
 
 
Causal Factor 
Cross hold short 
Line 
Enter 
runway 
Position and 
Hold 
Cross 
Runway 
Position Awareness 43% 63% 29% 44% 
Surface Issues 38% 26% 0% 18% 
Communications 33% 38% 94% 53% 
Automatic Processing 31% 21% 26% 27% 
Adapted from DiFiore and Cardosi (2006). 
Note: Percentages reflect the frequency that causal factors were mentioned relative to the 
total frequency of each operational event category.  Since any event could have multiple 
causal factors, percentages do not add up to 100%. 
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Quilty (2008) conducted survey research of targeted airports with the purpose of 
determining causal factors associated with vehicle deviations.  A cross section of airports 
that included: large-hub, medium-hub, small-hub, non-hub, and general aviation were 
solicited and thirty-six responses to the questionnaire were received.  The categories of 
the responding airports were: large-hub (6), medium-hub (4), small-hub (8), non-hub and 
commercial service (10), and general aviation (8).  In addition, 20 responses were from 
airports with full-time towers, 12 from airports with part-time towers, and 4 from airports 
without towers. The study provides a thorough exploration of factors contributing to 
vehicle-aircraft incidents during winter operations.  The report groups factors into several 
broad categories, including: 
 Communication, 
 Environment, 
 Human performance, 
 Situational awareness, 
 Time pressures, 
 Personnel, vehicles, and equipment resources, and 
 Operational factors. 
Quilty (2008) cited poor communication (e.g., using the incorrect radio frequency, 
equipment mishaps, and frequency congestion), poor visibility, fatigue, time pressures (to 
clear the runway as quickly as possible to resume aircraft operations), and several 
operating factors as major causes of runway incursions during winter operation.  While 
the report focused on winter operations, it provides insight into ground operations in 
general.  The results of the study identified factors that had been experienced by the 
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surveyed airport operators.  The most common factors identified by respondents were: 
poor communication, poor visibility, and fatigue (of vehicle operators, tower controllers, 
and pilots). 
One of the findings of this study is indicated by: “It is not clear that there is a 
higher risk of vehicle and/or aircraft incidents at airports without an operating control 
tower, because no reliable or mandatory reporting and tracking system exists to date” 
(Quilty, 2008, p. 6).  While his statement is correct, it should not be taken as an indication 
of the complete lack of data for non-towered airports; the ASRS houses reports of 
incidents at non-towered airports and the NTSB investigates airport surface deviation 
accidents and incidents at non-towered airports. 
Wilke, Majumdar, and Ochieng (2012) introduced a new holistic taxonomy of 
critical factors of airport surface safety occurrences.  The taxonomy incorporates the 
perspectives of all aviation stakeholders and uses a global data set.  The researchers 
utilized a global data set covering the period of 2000 – 2010 with representation from the 
Northeast and Southwest United States, New Zealand, Europe, Norway, and the United 
Kingdom.  A total of 2,906 accidents and incidents were analyzed by examining the 
narrative of each occurrence.  Then, either an existing code from the template was 
assigned or a new one was created.  In the event that multiple critical factors were 
present, the factors were organized chronologically.  One aspect of their analysis was to 
determine if a correlation exists between characteristics of an airport and ASDs.  The 
characteristics include: airport geometry (such as number of taxiways and intersections), 
and number of communication devices and frequencies.  Their analysis indicated that in 
the northeast and southwest regions of the United States, airfield design has an influence 
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on the number of ASD occurrences; however, in other parts of the world there is no 
apparent relationship between airfield architecture and ASDs.  Wilke, Majumdar, and 
Ochieng (2012) also developed taxonomy as depicted in Figure 4, which shows the first 
three levels of detail, and there are 512 detailed criteria in the entire taxonomy.  In their 
study, 2,906 occurrences were analyzed and a total of 5,059 critical factors were 
extracted.   
 
 
 
Figure 4. A depiction of the top levels of the taxonomy developed by Wilke, Majumdar, 
and Ochieng (2012).  
(Adapted from Wilke, Majumdar, and Ochieng (2012))  
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Wilke, Majumdar, and Ochieng (2012) listed their findings by region/country for 
the top two levels of the taxonomy as is reproduced in Table 6.  Note that their study 
included collisions and incursions, excursions, and Foreign Object Damage (FOD), thus 
accounting for the possibility of “aircraft operations –technical” criteria events in all 
countries.  Also, aircraft operations are the highest category in every country, followed by 
airport operations in Europe, Norway, U.S. Northeast, U.S. Southwest, and United 
Kingdom and by ATC-related factors in New Zealand.  ATC-related factors and airport 
operations for New Zealand, respectively, are ranked third.  The environment is 
significant only in New Zealand and the United Kingdom, and Airport operations – 
physical includes the airport layout.  The researchers found a correlation between airport 
layout complexities and ASDs, however, in Table 6, very few criteria are present in the 
data set studied.  Wilke, Majumdar, and Ochieng (2012)  attribute this to the fact that 
airfield layout or airport complexity are not attributes of the accident and incident data in 
the United States, and therefore the absence of substantial representation under this 
criteria is a reflection of no data as opposed to no influence from the criteria.  
 
 
Table 6. The results of the study by Wilke, Majumdar, and Ochieng (2012) for all countries 
and the top two levels of their taxonomy.   
 
                                         
 Country or Region 
 
Critical Factor E
uropeur
ope 
N
Z 
N
orway 
U
S-NE 
 
U
S-SW 
 
U
K 
T
otal 
 
(1) Aircraft 
operations 
1
12 
59
9 
31
8 
88
2 
54
0 
6
45 
3
,096 
(2) Aircraft ops-
technical 
0 18
1 
6 4 4 5
8 
2
53 
(2) Aircraft ops-
human 
1
12 
41
9 
31
2 
87
8 
53
5 
5
87 
2
,843 
(1) ATC 1
4 
47
0 
57 14
9 
73 4
3 
8
06 
(2) ATC-
technical 
1 10 1 0 1 0 1
3 
(2) ATC-human 1
3 
46
0 
56 14
9 
72 4
3 
7
93 
(1) Airport 
operations 
9
8 
45 24
8 
25
9 
23
4 
1
58 
1
,042 
(2) Airport ops-
technical 
1 2 15 0 2 3 2
3 
(2) Airport ops-
human 
7 14 18
0 
25
8 
22
8 
1
06 
7
93 
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(2) Airport ops-
physical 
9
0 
29 53 1 4 4
9 
2
26 
(1) Environment 2 44 4 0 1 6
2 
1
13 
(2) Weather 2 43 4 0 1 6
1 
1
11 
(2) Geological 
disturbances 
0 1 0 0 0 1 2
. 
(1) Regulatory 
system 
0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
(2) Regs. - 
inadequate 
0 2 0 0 0 0 2 
Notes:  
(1) Critical factor code: (1) = critical factors on the first taxonomy level; (2) = 
critical factors on the second taxonomy level. 
(2) Country/Region abbreviations (in order): E=Europe, N=New Zealand, 
N=Norway, U=US Northeast, U=US Southwest, U=United Kingdom.  
(3) Taken from (Wilke, Majumdar, & Ochieng, 2012, p. 9). 
 
 
 
Hudson (2005) provided a fairly simple view of runway incursions.  He stated that 
basically runway incursions result when there is a failure to understand where the plane 
is, where the runway or taxiway is, or where the vehicle is on the airport surface.  Of 
course, who fails to understand can be a combination of the pilots, vehicle operators, and 
controllers associated with the airport operations.  Further, he makes the point that these 
failures involve three different organizations: Airlines - Pilots, ATC providers -Air traffic 
controllers, and Airports - Airside vehicle operators.  While these individuals are the 
ultimate perpetrator of the mistakes, the real causes are most often at the organizational 
level, and quite often the airports.  Hudson (2005) reiterates that classic solutions are 
typically framed as (a) technical solutions to ensure nothing goes wrong; (b) pay more 
attention to those causing the problems and develop procedures to stop error; (c) the 
addition of more training for controllers, pilots, and vehicle operators; and (d) the 
addition of system-level solutions to collect more data and to analyze existing incidents.  
However, Hudson (2005) points out that these solutions are aimed at what he calls the 
“sharp end” meaning at the point where the accident or incident occurs, effectively 
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ignoring all of the precursors to an accident or incident.  His conclusions are presented 
below: 
 Runway incursions appear to be due to individual errors 
 Those individual errors are caused by system weaknesses 
 Look at driving wrong-way accidents on roads 
 Most major incidents have minor precursors 
 Technical improvements may reduce low potential incidents – but these 
incidents would have been easily prevented by doing what already should 
have been done 
 Most problems can be avoided by the application of the following safety 
management principles (c.f. ICAO Annexes 11 & 14): 
o Risk assessment 
o Audit programs 
o Reporting systems 
o Continuous improvement learning from errors (Hudson, 2005, p. 
47)  
Hooey and Foyle (2006) conducted an experiment to study errors in taxiing 
aircraft using an aircraft simulator with airline flight crew subjects.  They developed an 
error taxonomy for the taxi phase of flight that consisted of three error categories: 
planning error, decision error, and execution error.  In their taxonomy, planning errors 
occur when the flight crew formulates an erroneous plan or intention, but correctly carries 
out the plan.  According to Hooey and Foyle (2006), these planning errors are analogous 
to Reason’s (1990) knowledge-based mistakes or failure to formulate the correct 
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intentions.  Under HFACS, these errors are decision errors, where an erroneous plan is 
prepared but executed correctly.  Hooey and Foyle (2006) classify a decision error as 
having correctly received the taxi clearance, but the pilot makes an erroneous choice at a 
decision point along the route.  These errors are analogous to Reason’s (1990) rule-based 
mistakes, such as an error that occurs when an incorrect action or consequence is chosen.  
Under HFACS, this type of error would also be classified as a decision error, but one 
where the error is in “incorrect choice.”  The third class of error in the Hooey and Foyle 
(2006) taxonomy is called execution error, defined as an error where the planning and 
decision are correct; however, an error is made during the execution of the plan.  Such 
errors, according to Hooey and Foyle (2006) are like Reason’s (1990) classification of 
“slips” in which the precise intention is carried out incorrectly.  Under HFACS, this 
would be classified as a skill-based error.  Clearly the mapping of the Hooey and Foyle 
(2006) taxonomy to either Reason or HFACS is not necessarily one-to-one. 
During their simulation, Hooey and Foyle (2006) utilized a glass cockpit 
simulator at the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Ames Research 
Center and during their tests they also analyzed intervention strategies.  At this juncture, 
the interest in their work if aimed more at the causal factors they discovered.  Hooey and 
Foyle (2006) utilized data from two separately reported experiments: (1) McCann et al. 
(1998) where 16 two-pilot commercial crews completed 18 land and taxi-to-the-gate 
scenarios at the simulated Chicago O’Hare Airport; and, (2) Hooey et al. (2000) where 18 
two-pilot commercial crews completed nine nominal land and taxi-to-the-gate scenarios 
at O’Hare Airport in 1,000-foot RVR conditions.  Each trial from both simulation studies 
was analyzed for the occurrence of a taxiway navigation error, defined as: (a) taxiing on a 
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portion of the airport surface for which the flight had not been cleared, or (b) deviating 
from the cleared taxiway center line by at least 50-feet.  Subject matter experts reviewed 
and analyzed each scenario and unanimous agreement among reviewers was achieved 
with respect to the occurrence of navigation errors, the taxi clearance as issued by the 
tower controller, and the location of the error on the airport surface.   
Hooey and Foyle (2006) reported that of the 150 scenarios within the two 
simulation studies, 26 (17.3%) contained a single navigation error and none contained 
more than one error.  Using the defined error taxonomy, each of the 26 errors was 
classified as: planning, decision, or execution.  In their results, planning errors accounted 
for 23% (6 of 26) of all errors made in the simulation scenarios.  In these instances, pilots 
formulated and verbalized an erroneous taxi plan, or inadvertently modified a taxi plan, 
and then made navigation decisions based on the incorrect plan.  There were 11 
occurrences of decision errors accounting for 42% of all errors observed in the study.  
Frequently the error was manifested as a turn in the wrong direction, such as turning left 
when the aircraft should have turned right.  In these cases, pilots formulated and 
verbalized the correct taxi plan, but failed to make the correct navigation decision to 
accomplish their plan.  There were nine execution errors that accounted for 35% of all 
errors in the two studies.  A summary of their results along with examples of the errors 
that were committed under each of the three categories is presented in Table 7. 
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Table 7.  A summary of the error results from Hooey and Foyle (2006) with examples of 
the actual errors committed. 
 
 
Error Type 
 
Planning (23% of 
Errors) 
Decision (37% of 
Errors) 
Execution (31% of 
Errors) 
Examples 
No or partial 
clearance 
Failed to turn 
Followed wrong 
sign 
 
No or partial 
readback 
Turned wrong 
direction 
Followed wrong 
taxiway centerline 
    
 
Forgot or 
inadvertently 
changed clearance 
Turned where not 
required 
 
 
Received clearance 
late 
  
Main causes Miscommunication 
Excessive 
workload 
Complex geometry 
 
Erroneous 
expectations 
Poor global 
awareness 
Confusing signage 
  
Poor local 
guidance 
Poor visibility 
 
Notes: 
(1) Extracted from Hooey & Foyle, 2006, Table 5, p. 68 
(2) Percentages in table heading were taken from the table in paper, but do not agree with 
what was contained in the text nor was any explanation of the discrepancy provided. 
 
 
 
The purpose of the study described by Torres, Metscher, and Smith (2011) was to 
determine the causes and circumstances associated with runway incursions.  Their 
research focused on the human and environmental elements that comprise the causal 
factors of RIs.  In detail, their research attempted to discover the root causes of RIs based 
upon occurrence at four specific airports (Boston Logan, Chicago O’Hare, Philadelphia, 
and Los Angeles International).  Torres, Metscher, and Smith (2011) hypothesized that an 
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analysis of NTSB and ASRS reports of RIs would reveal a statistically significant 
relationship between RIs and human factor errors.  
Torres, Metscher, and Smith (2011) examined 300 ASRS and NTSB reports of 
RIs for the period between January 2005 and March 2009 at the four airports cited above.  
The reports selected involved either pilot deviations or operational errors, and vehicle or 
pedestrian deviations were excluded from their study.  A score card was used to record 
the appropriate event characteristics from the ASRS or NTSB report, and a total of 12 
human factors contributory factors were included on the score card.  Each contributing 
factor received a binary score if the factor was present or not present in the event, and 
each factor was assumed equal in weight.  The score cards were then tabularized and 
analyzed. 
Torres, Metscher, and Smith (2011) filtered out unsuitable events and evaluated 
274 unique events.  The results revealed an operational categorization of 124 FAR Part 
121 operations, 129 FAR Part 91 operations, and 21 FAR Part 135 operations.  The 64% 
of the RIs occurred with aircraft containing two pilots, 35% of the RIs occurred with a 
single pilot, and 1% of the RIs occurred in aircraft having a three-person flight crew.  
Eighty-eight percent of the sampled RIs occurred in Visual Meteorological Conditions 
(VMC) while only 5% occurred in Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC).  Seven 
percent of the reports did not identify the weather conditions at the time of the incident.  
Pilot deviations accounted for 83.9% (230) of the RIs while 16.1% (44) of the RIs were 
caused by ATC operational errors. 
Torres, Metscher, and Smith (2011) determined the frequency of human factor 
conditions present in the set of events studies.  Figure 5 replicates their results and 
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indicates that situational awareness was the top ranking factor, followed by 
miscommunication, distraction, and airport markings.  As depicted, the occurrence of a 
RI due to human factor issues was 90% higher than the occurrence of a RI due to non-
human factor issues.  There is no attempt to determine a correlation between factors, such 
that recognizing miscommunication might cause a distraction.  
 
 
 
Figure 5. Frequency plot of contributing factors.   
(Extracted from Torres, Metscher, & Smith (2011), Figure 5). 
 
 
 
The report from the Canadian Department of National Defence (2005) examines 
RIs in Canada for the period of 2000 to 2004.  Data was taken from the Canadian Flight 
Safety Information System (FSIS) data archive and for January 1, 2000 to December 31, 
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2004, a total of 116 runway incursions were identified.  They utilized a version of 
HFACS, called the CF-HFACS, to analyze causal factors for the identified RIs.  Figure 6 
presents their resulting depiction of the HFACS causal results, with attention/memory, 
mental states, and decision errors as the top three causal factor categories. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Analysis of Canadian Runway incursions using the CF-HFACS. 
(Taken from Canadian Department of National Defence (2005), Figure 7)  
 
 
Summary of ASD Literature.   In summary of the ASD literature, Table 8 
presents an encapsulated view of the study conditions and causal factors that resulted 
from each of the studies.  In general, there is some variation in the distribution of ASDs 
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across participants: Controllers (Operational Errors (OEs)), Pilot Deviations (PDs), and 
Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations (VPDs).  Some of the variation can be explained by the 
source of the data used in the study.  For example, use of the FAA OE database contains 
errors from only towered airports and these are predominantly controller errors, so the 
collection is biased.  Similarly, use of the ASRS database is primarily pilot responses 
given the fact that the FAA offers some immunity from prosecution for pilots who report 
incidents to ASRS.  Thus, ASRS would be expected to reflect more pilot-oriented 
incidents.  In addition, the literature exists a period of approximately 30-years and 
multiple interventions for ASDs were implemented during that period.  It is impossible to 
determine from the literature what effect, if any, these interventions had on the frequency 
of ASDs. 
 
 
Table 8.  A summary of the quantitative findings from the ASD literature review. 
 
 
Study 
Author and 
Year of 
Publication 
Data and source Study Results 
NTSB 
(1986) 
Period: 1985 
and 1986 
No of cases: 26 
1 - 65 percent of the incursions are controller 
error 
     a - 65 % of these errors resulted from the 
actions of individual controllers and 
     b - 35 % of these errors resulted from 
"incomplete or misunderstood coordination 
between two controllers." 
     c - 44 % of these errors involved the controller 
forgetting something significant, e.g., the 
presence of aircraft on a runway, the closure of a 
runway, or a clearance that he/she had issued. 
     d - In almost all runway incursions classified 
as operational errors, the supervisor either was 
not in the tower cab or was working at least one 
control position. 
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Study 
Author and 
Year of 
Publication 
Data and source Study Results 
2 - 35 % of the incursions are due to pilot error 
     a - all of these errors were attributable to a 
pilot entering, crossing, or taking off from a 
runway without a clearance. 
   
Tarrel 
(1985) 
Period of 
Interest: 
December 1983 
- November 
1984 
104 cases from 
the ASRS 
database 
1 - Controller-enabled transgressions were 
reported as failures in traffic separation, traffic 
sighting, and intra-tower coordination.  
2 - Pilot-enabled transgressions were reported as 
difficulties with clearances, communications, 
orientation, and preoccupation. 
3 - Restricted visibility and intersecting runway 
operations regularly appeared as factors in both 
pilot- and controller-enabled runway 
transgressions. 
   
Adam, 
Lentz, and 
Bair (1992)  
Period of 
Interest: Pre 
1992 
Unknown 
number of cases 
from ASRS with 
a special 
callback form 
designed for the 
MITRE study 
Runway incursions and related incidents take 
place because of multiple factors that occur in an 
uninterrupted sequence. 
   
Harrison 
(1991)  
Period of 
Interest: 1988 - 
November 1990 
651 cases from 
the FAA 
database 
Operational Errors: 40.2%;  
Pilot Deviations: 38.4% 
VPD: 24.4% 
Runway incursions are primarily caused by one or 
a combination of four primary factors: 
1 - Improper Clearances, 
2 - Incomplete Communications, 
3 - Poor Ground Navigation, and 
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Study 
Author and 
Year of 
Publication 
Data and source Study Results 
4 - Lack of Situational Awareness 
   
ASRS 
(2002) 
Period of 
Interest: January 
1, 2000 to June 
30, 2002 
363 coded cases 
from 1639 
events reported 
in the ASRS 
database 
Pilot Deviations: 72%    
Controller errors: 24% 
1 - Pilot confusion was cited during 39% (140) of 
the runway incursion incidents;  
2 - Readback/Hearback was cited in 32% (116) of 
the runway incursion incidents; 
3 - Lack of Positional Awareness was cited in 
10% (105) of the runway incursion incidents; and  
4 - Pilot Distraction was cited in 10% (104) of the 
runway incursion incidents. 
   
OIG (1999) 
Period of 
Interest: 
October 1993 - 
June 1999 
1518 runway 
incursion cases 
from the FAA 
database 
1 - pilot deviations accounted for 56 percent of 
the 325 runway incursions.   
2 - 65 percent of the pilot deviations were 
attributed to general aviation aircraft. 
   
Cardosi and 
Yost (2001)  
Period of 
Interest: January 
1997 - June 
1999 
256 Operational 
Error Cases:  89 
from Level 3 
towers, 68 from 
Level 4 , 99 
from Level 5 
Summary of Causal Factor Results (per cent of 
256 cases citing causal factor): 
 1 - Aircraft Observation - 60% 
2 - Controller Coordination - 44% 
3 - Communication - 41% 
4 - Visual Data - 36% 
5 - Ground Operations - 33% 
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Study 
Author and 
Year of 
Publication 
Data and source Study Results 
Bellatoni 
and Kodis 
(1981) 
(Reported 
by Cardosi 
and Yost 
(2001)) 
Cases: 161 
ASRS reports, 
77 NTSB 
accidents, and 
49 ATC system 
error reports; 
Interviewed 
tower personnel 
from the New 
England, Great 
Lakes, and 
Western 
Regions 
Five percent of these transgressions were 
attributable to "airport, equipment, and other" and 
95 percent were attributable to human error. 
Human error: roughly 50 percent were 
attributable to pilot errors and 50 percent were 
attributable to controller errors. 
The most prominent types of errors in runway 
transgressions were pilots proceeding without a 
clearance and controllers issuing conflicting 
clearances. 
Bales, 
Gilligan, 
and King, 
1989 
(Reported 
by Cardosi 
and Yost 
(2001)) 
Period of 
Interest: 1985 - 
1986  
Cases: all that 
resulted from an 
operational error 
and either 
occurred at a 
major airport or 
involved a 
commercial air 
carrier 
Forgetting about an aircraft, an instruction, or the 
traffic or runway situation (34 percent). 
Failure to anticipate the required separation or 
miscalculation of the impeding separation  
(19 percent). 
• Failure to coordinate with another controller (13 
percent). 
• Communication errors - readback/hearback 
errors, issuing wrong instruction or issuing 
instruction to wrong aircraft (11 percent). 
• Supervisor working a position or engaged in 
activities other than directly supervising staff (9 
percent). 
Steinbacher, 
1991 
(Reported 
by Cardosi 
and Yost 
(2001)) 
Period of 
Interest: January 
1987 - October 
1989 
Cases: 109 
runway 
incursions due 
to operational 
errors. 
"Failure to verify the location of the aircraft or 
vehicle" (identified in 37 percent of the incidents) 
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Study 
Author and 
Year of 
Publication 
Data and source Study Results 
Alaris, Co. 
Inc. from 
1992  
(Reported 
by Cardosi 
and Yost 
(2001)) 
Period of 
Interest: 1988-
1990 
Cases: 235 
"surface 
incidents" that 
occurred at 12 
selected airports 
(Atlanta, 
Boston, 
Cincinnati, 
Denver, 
Dallas/Ft.Worth, 
New York - 
JFK, Los 
Angeles, 
Chicago O'Hare, 
Pittsburgh, 
Phoenix, San 
Antonio, and 
Seattle). 
1 - 55% percent were pilot deviations, 
2 - 26 % were operational errors/deviations,  
3 - 19% were vehicle/pedestrian deviations 
Kelly and 
Steinbacher 
(1993)  
(Reported 
by Cardosi 
and Yost 
(2001)) 
Period of 
Interest: Pre 
1993 
Cases: 75 
reports 
submitted to the 
Aviation Safety 
Reporting 
System (ASRS) 
and structured 
callback forms 
(used for 
interviews) 
"radio frequency congestion contributed to 
numerous incidents" 
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Study 
Author and 
Year of 
Publication 
Data and source Study Results 
Kelly and 
Jacobs 
(1998) 
(Reported 
by Cardosi 
and Yost 
(2001)) 
Period of 
Interest: N/A 
Cases: survey of 
1111 controllers 
and managers at 
63 Level 3,4 and 
5 towers 
Survey results: 
1 - Stop lights on runways activated by surface 
surveillance systems. 
2 - Improvements to ASDE-3: 
     - Tag the targets with the aircraft ID. 
     - Reduce the number of false targets. 
     - Reduce the interference caused by rain. 
3 - Relief from radio frequency congestion. 
4 - Relief from tower cab features that interfere 
with the controllers' scan of the airport surface. 
     - Placement of displays on top of the consoles 
obstructs vision. 
     - Inadequate tower shades hinder controllers' 
ability to see the airport surface. 
5 - Improving the use of "memory aids." 
   
Pounds and 
Scarborough 
(2002)  
Period of 
Interest: 1996 - 
June 2000 
Cases: 
Narratives from 
347 FAA OE 
reports 
Results: 
Skill-based errors: 
     - Controller/Pilot Communication - 42% 
     - Tower Observation - 13% 
     - Intra-tower Coordination - 5% 
Decision errors: 
     - C/P Communication: 13% 
     - Tower Observation: 1% 
     - Intra-tower Coordination: <1% 
Perception errors: 
     - C/P Communications: 4% 
     - Tower Observation: <1% 
     - Intra-tower Coordination: <1% 
   
DiFiore and 
Cardosi 
(2006)  
Period of 
Interest: May 
2001 - August 
2002;  
Cases: 231 
ASRS Reports 
from the 34 
busiest airports 
in the US 
1 - 73% reports were commercial, 20% were GA 
2 - No "remarkable" differences in types of 
incidents or factors cited 
3 - Causal Factors cited 
     1 - Controller/Pilot Communications - 55% 
     2 - Positional Awareness - 40% 
     3 - "Automatic Processing" (Skill-based 
errors) - 25% 
     4 - Airport Surface Issues - 22% 
     5 - "Other" Performance Issues 
(Preconditions) - 20% 
     6 - Environmental Factors - 18% 
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Study 
Author and 
Year of 
Publication 
Data and source Study Results 
   
Cardosi, 
Chase, and 
Eon (2010) 
Period of 
Interest: FY 
2008  
Cases: retrieved 
from the FAA 
OE Database 
Landing Aircraft 
63% of the incursions involving taxiing in front 
of a landing aircrafts were attributed to PDs,  
18% were attributed to OEs, and  
19% to VPDs 
Departing Aircraft 
37% of the total number of runway incursions 
involving a conflict.  
40% were attributed to controller error 
49% attributed to pilot error  
11% to vehicle or pedestrian deviations. 
 
Controller Error 
Temporarily forgetting about an aircraft, vehicle, 
or a runway closure was associated with 22% of 
the OEs that resulted in runway incursions  
15% inadequate (i.e., erroneous or lack of) 
coordination among controllers. 
readback/hearback errors were associated with 
20% of the runway incursions attributed to OEs 
   
Biernbaum 
and 
Hagemann 
(2012)  
Period of 
Interest: 2001 - 
2010 
Cases: retrieved 
from:  
     - FAA’s Air 
Traffic Quality 
Assurance 
(ATQA) 
database,  
     - FAA RI 
database,  and  
     - FAA 
Operational 
Network 
(OPSNET) 
database 
1 - Pilot incursions are the most common type of 
incursion occurring more than four times as often 
as controller errors and approximately twice as 
often as V/PDs. 
2 - Increased daily operations appear to increase 
the likelihood of conflict events, but do not affect 
severity.  
3 - Commercial carriers are 60% less likely to be 
involved in severe conflict incursions but are 
more likely to be involved in conflict incursions 
overall.  
4 - Controller incidents are approximately three 
times more likely to be severe than other incident 
types. 
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Study 
Author and 
Year of 
Publication 
Data and source Study Results 
Wilke, 
Majumdar, 
and Ochieng 
(2012)  
Period of 
Interest:  2000 – 
2010;  
Cases: Total of 
2,906 accidents 
and incidents 
from sites in the 
Northeast and 
Southwest 
United States, 
New Zealand, 
Europe, 
Norway, and the 
United 
Kingdom. 
US cases: 
1 - Top critical factor: Aircraft operations— 
human reliability >51% 
2 - Second critical factor: Airport operations - 
human reliability 26% - 50% 
   
Hooey and 
Foyle 
(2006)  
Period of 
Interest: N/A 
Cases: 150 
scenarios in 
simulation 
1 - Planning errors (HFACS Decision Errors): 
23%  
2 - Decision errors (HFACS Decision errors): 
42% 
3 - Execution Errors (HFACS Skill-based 
Errors): 31% 
   
Torres, 
Metscher, 
and Smith 
(2011)  
Period of 
Interest: January 
2005 - March 
2009 
Cases:300 
ASRS and 
NTSB cases 
from 4 airport 
sites (BOS, 
ORD,PHL, 
LAX);  
 
1 - Pilot deviations: 83.9% 
2 - Controller error: 16.1% 
3 - Causal factors: 
    -  situational awareness: 34%  
     - miscommunication: 27% 
     - distraction: 16% 
   
77 
 
 
 
Study 
Author and 
Year of 
Publication 
Data and source Study Results 
Canadian 
Department 
of National 
Defence 
(2005)  
Period of 
Interest: 1 
January 2000 to 
31 December 
2004 
Cases: 116 
runway 
incursions  
Database: Flight 
Safety 
Information 
System 
(Canadian) 
Results: 
1 - OE (Controller): 23% 
2 - Pilot: 22% 
3 - VPD: 53% 
Errors (percent of all unsafe act factors): 
    - Perceptual: 1% 
    - Skill-Based: 47% 
    - Decision: 48% 
 
 
 
There are some common threads with respect to causal factors.  In the case of 
controller error, one sees failure to sight traffic from the tower, failure to maintain traffic 
separation, and a lack of coordination between controllers in the tower.  In the case of 
pilots, controller/pilot communication errors, preoccupation and distraction, and failure to 
sight aircraft or other airport surface hazards as being common elements in many of the 
studies.  Finally, environmental factors appear in several studies and include poor 
visibility, airport surface contamination, and in some cases, cockpit or tower designs that 
prevent adequate visibility of the pilot or controller. 
The study results are further discussed and compared and contrasted with the 
results of this study in Chapter V. 
Human Error Frameworks 
As presented in Chapter I, Dekker (2002) discusses the re-invention of human 
error in the sense that there are two views on human error: the old view and the new view.  
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The key point from Dekker (2002) in the context of this study is that under the new view, 
human errors that cause an accident are symptomatic of errors that are latent or hidden 
somewhere within the system.  Thus, one must seek to determine all causal factors that 
contribute to accidents and incidents in order to design appropriate intervention 
mechanisms to prevent these errors and hence these accidents from occurring. 
Several human error taxonomies have been used to study causal factors associated 
with RIs and ASDs, and many of them have been discussed in that context in the 
previous section.   
Scarborough, Bailey, and Pounds (2005) performed an analysis of several 
taxonomies and frameworks that have the potential for use in the analysis of human error 
in aviation operations.  Their study involved three phases: (1) a literature search to 
identify aviation-related human error models and taxonomies; (2) candidate error models 
and taxonomies were evaluated to determine their relative strengths and weaknesses 
regarding their application to ATC operational errors (OEs); and, (3) the selected 
candidate was used to examine the items reported as causal factors on archival OE 
reports.  Parts 1 and 2 are of particular interest to the current research.  In part 1 of their 
study, Scarborough, Bailey, and Pounds (2005) , selected ten candidate 
taxonomies/models, based upon the completeness with which they addressed each of the 
three categories: (1) cognitive process, (2) task-related behaviors, and (3) environmental 
conditions (i.e., organizational context).  The ten candidates were rated on eight 
dimensions including: comprehensiveness, accuracy, consistency, theoretical validity, 
auditability, resource usage, utility, and acceptability.  The ten taxonomies/models 
studied are summarized in Table 9, which was extracted from Scarborough, Bailey, and 
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Pounds (2005).  The study initially selected two models that were best suited for the 
analysis of ATC OEs: HFACS and ASHRAM (see Table 9 for additional details on the 
models); however, after a second round of analysis, HFACS was selected based upon its 
readiness for use in the intended domain. 
 
 
Table 9. Ten taxonomies/models studied by Scarborough, Bailey, and Pounds (2005) for 
use in the analysis of air traffic control operational errors. 
 
 
Name Source Description 
Error Taxonomy   
Human Factors  
Analysis and  
Classification 
System  
(HFACS) 
Wiegmann & 
Shappell (2003) 
Identifies and organizes latent errors using a 
hierarchical structure involving organizational 
influences, unsafe supervisory actions, 
preconditions for unsafe acts, and unsafe acts. 
 
Violation 
Taxonomy 
Mason (1997) 
Identifies the main organizational factors which 
might promote violations, and management 
strategies that could help to eliminate or reduce 
these factors by addressing the motives behind 
them. 
 
A Human Error  
Taxonomy 
based on  
Cognitive 
Engineering  & 
Social 
&Occupational  
Psychology 
Bagnara et al. 
(1991) 
Identifies four categories of conditions affecting 
the state of a human system:  human 
performances, decision making, socio-
organizational conditions, and external 
situations. 
 
Latent Error 
Model of  
Accident 
Causation 
Reason (1990) 
Identifies four fundamental elements of all 
organizations that must work together 
harmoniously if efficient and safe operations are 
to occur:  corporate decision makers, line 
management, psychological precursors of unsafe 
acts, and unsafe acts.  
 Within each of the elements are latent (hidden) 
and active failures that represent vulnerability 
points for the creation of unsafe acts. 
Taxonomy for  
Describing 
Rasmussen 
(1986) 
Identifies factors that shape performance, the 
contextual factors associated with error, 
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Name Source Description 
Error Taxonomy   
Human 
Malfunctions 
characteristics of the task being performed, and 
the classification of error modes. 
 
Pyramid Model Isaac (1995) 
Classifies human error within an air traffic 
management environment, composed of three 
levels: the top level (representing individual 
factors), the middle level (representing task 
characteristics), and the bottom level 
(representing the organizational influences). 
Error Model   
Aviation Safety 
and  Human 
Reliability  
Analysis 
Method   
(ASHRAM) 
Miller and 
Forester (2000) 
Allows aviation researchers to analyze aviation 
mishaps that involve human errors in ways that 
account for the operational context, crew 
expectations, training, airframe-related human-
system interfaces, and crew resource 
management. 
 
A Technique for 
Human Error 
Analysis 
(ATHEANA) 
Cooper et al. 
(1996) 
Performs a human reliability analysis in the 
context of probabilistic risk assessment.  
ATHEANA is based on an understanding of 
why human-system interaction failures occur as 
opposed to behavioral and phenomenological 
description of operator responses. 
 
A Technique for 
Human Error 
Assessment 
(THEA) 
Pocock, Wright, 
& Harrison 
(1999) 
Used by interactive system designers and 
engineers to help anticipate human-machine 
interaction failures. The technique employs a 
cognitive error analysis based on an underlying 
model of human information processing. 
 
A Dynamic 
Reliability 
Technique for 
Error 
Assessment in 
Man-Machine 
System 
(DREAMS) 
Cacciabue 
(1993) 
Identifies the origin of human errors in the 
dynamic interaction of the operator and the plant 
control system. Human error probabilities are 
combined with the probabilities of system 
failures in order to obtain an overall probabilistic 
safety assessment (PSA) for the whole plant. 
Taken from Scarborough, Bailey, & Pounds, 2005, Table 1. 
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In order to code the ATC OEs into the HFACS taxonomy, Scarborough, Bailey, 
and Pounds (2005) developed a mapping between the OEs reported on FAA Form 7210-3 
to the HFACS error categories.  While this mapping is appropriate for coding FAA OEs, 
it is not used by the NTSB in coding causal criteria in their accident and incident reports; 
thus, the mapping will not be of direct use in the current research activity.  It is replicated 
in Appendix N for reference and because of the possibility that some synergy might exist 
with the NTSB reporting taxonomy. 
Pape, Wiegmann, and Shappell (2001) performed a study of using HFACS for 
ATC error analysis to determine the feasibility of ATC error analysis.  Prior to that study, 
HFACS had been utilized for only aircraft-crew-related errors.  The study was conducted 
using accident and incident records maintained by the NTSB from January 1985 to 
December 1997.  After filtering records that were not associated with any ATC error, a 
total of 110 accidents and 69 incidents were retained for their study.  The results of the 
analysis indicated a striking difference between GA and Commercial accidents and 
incidents with respect to ATC-related error:  There were more ATC-related accidents 
associated with GA operations (81%, n = 89), but there were more ATC-related incidents 
associated commercial operations (65%, n = 45).  In terms of the HFACS classifications, 
within the Unsafe Acts level of the HFACS framework, skill-based errors by ATC 
personnel were associated with the largest percentage of accidents and incidents (82%, n 
= 147), followed by violations (33%, n = 59), decision errors (2.2%, n = 4) and 
perceptual errors (1.1%, n = 2).  However, a larger percentage of ATC-related accidents 
were associated with skill-based errors (90%, n = 99) than incidents (70%, n = 48), χ2 (1, 
N = 179) = 12.06, p < .001.  A larger percentage of incidents involved violations (48%, n 
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= 33) than accidents (24%, n = 26), χ2 (1, N = 179) = 11.23, p < .001.  Within the 
Preconditions of Unsafe Acts level, only Crew Resource Management (CRM) was cited 
in more than 10% of the events (17%, n = 30), with a slightly larger percentage of 
incidents involving CRM failures (23.2%, n = 16) than accidents (13%, n = 14), χ2 (1, N 
= 179) = 3.33, p = .068.  Within the Unsafe Supervisory level, only inadequate 
supervision was cited in more than two reports (n = 25, 14%), and within the 
Organizational Influences level, only operational process was cited in greater than three 
reports (n = 15, 8%).  There were no differences in the percentage of ATC-related 
accidents and incidents associated with supervisory or organizational factors.   
Based upon this study, Pape, Wiegmann, and Shappell (2001) noted that few of 
the ATC-related accidents and incidents cited supervisory or organizational factors as 
contributing to the unsafe acts committed by ATC personnel.  This finding is similar to 
the results of another study of commercial aviation accidents associated with aircrew 
errors (Shappell, Detwiler, Hackworth, Boquet, & Wiegmann, 2007).  Specifically, in an 
analysis of all commercial aviation accidents occurring between 1990 and 2002, 
approximately 70% were associated with some manner of organizational, supervisory, or 
aircrew failure; however, few were associated with organizational and/or supervisory 
causal factors.  One explanation for the relative scarcity of such factors offered by Pape, 
Wiegmann, and Shappell (2001), is the possibility that contrary to Reason’s (1990) model 
of latent and active failures, such supervisory and organizational factors simply do not 
play as large of a role in the cause of ATC-related accidents and incidents as once 
expected.  Another explanation offered by Pape, Wiegmann, and Shappell (2001) is that 
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while these factors contribute to most accidents, they are rarely identified using the 
current accident investigation processes. 
Summary 
There has been considerable research of ASDs over the past 30-years, and Table 8 
provides a summary of the literature reviewed in this study.  In addition, there has also 
been considerable research performed in human error, and the use of human error 
frameworks, such as HFACS, in aviation research is also widespread.  The combination 
of the two research areas appears to be fairly sparse.  In the literature review performed, 
there were only two ASD studies that utilized HFACS as a framework for their study: (1) 
Canadian Department of National Defence (2005) and (2) Pounds and Scarborough 
(2002).  Unfortunately, the latter study was not formally published and the Canadian 
study covered many smaller and remote airports with mainly military traffic, while the 
current study focused on commercial aviation and GA.  HFACS has seen considerable 
use in aviation, for example, the study of frameworks associated with aviation human 
error studies (Scarborough, Bailey, & Pounds, 2005).  Studies using HFACS that analyze 
NTSB accident reports have been described for ATC errors, commercial aviation, and 
general aviation operations in Pape, Wiegmann, and Shappell (2001), Shappell, et al. 
(2007), and Wiegmann, et al. (2005), respectively.  The scope of these studies included 
all categories of flight operation: airport taxi out, departure, en route, arrival, and airport 
taxi in. 
  
84 
 
 
 
CHAPTER III      
METHODOLOGY 
The current study conducted a human factors analysis of ASD accident and 
incident reports using the HFACS.  Following the definition of the problem and the 
review of the relevant literature described in Chapters I and II, respectively, the research 
methodology consists of two phases: (1) ASD and RI Data Collection and (2) HFACS 
Coding and Analysis.  A high level flow of the research methodology is presented in 
Figure 7, and the process is described in detail in the subsequent sections. 
 
 
Figure 7. The research methodology process flow 
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Phase 1: ASD Data Collection 
The objective of Phase 1of the research study is to create a list of events that 
occurred during the period of interest that reflect the occurrence of ASDs as defined by 
FAA Order 7050.1A (FAA, 2010b) as follows: 
Runway Incursion. Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect 
presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface 
designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft. 
Surface Event. An occurrence at an airport involving a pedestrian, vehicle, or 
aircraft on the defined airport movement area that involves either an incorrect 
presence, unauthorized movement or occurrence that affects or could affect the 
safety of flight of an aircraft. 
Surface Incident. Unauthorized or unapproved movement within the designated 
movement area (excluding runway incursions) or an occurrence in that same area 
associated with the operation of an aircraft that affects or could affect the safety of 
flight (FAA, 2010b, pp. 2-3). 
Period of Interest Definition.   The period of data collection for this study was 
January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2012.  This period coincides with the commencement 
of the FAA Runway Incursion data collection activity in GFY 2001 (October 1, 2001) 
and ends with the calendar year 2012.  Given that the reporting can lag the initial event 
by a period of months to years in some cases, stopping at the end of 2012 provided some 
86 
 
 
 
assurance that many recent events would be represented with either a factual or final 
report.   
The period selected also offered a rich source of publically available data and 
covered a long enough period to determine any effects of ongoing interventions.  That is, 
the accident and incident data reflect a 12-year period over which RIs and ASD 
interventions were being utilized; therefore, it may be possible to detect changes in 
patterns or causal factors coincident with the application of interventions. 
Sources of ASD Data for the US.   There are four publically accessible databases 
that contain information on ASDs and RIs as described as follows. 
FAA Runway Incursion Database (RWS).    RWS is a collection of RIs and 
surface incidents that have been reported at towered airports within the United States.  
Tower controllers following specific FAA guidelines (FAA, 2010b) observe events and 
report ASDs to the FAA Runway Safety Office.  These reports are reviewed and entered 
into the data repository grouped by the category of the event.  The reports represent the 
controller’s factual description of the event and events are not investigated independently 
unless an accident or severe incident resulted, in which case a subsequent NTSB or FAA 
investigation would occur and be reported independently. 
NTSB accident/incident database.   The NTSB database is the official U.S. 
government repository of aviation accident data and causal factors representing NTSB 
investigations.  An event is classified as an accident or an incident.  Aircraft accident 
means an occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place 
between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight and all such 
persons have disembarked, and in which any person suffers death or serious injury, or in 
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which the aircraft receives substantial damage.  The NTSB defines incident to mean an 
occurrence other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft, which 
affects or could affect the safety of operations (NTSB, 2013).   
During an investigation, the NTSB populates the database with information as the 
accident investigation progresses.  A Preliminary Report is generally available within five 
working days of the event and a Factual Report with additional information concerning 
the occurrence is available within a few months.  A Final Report, which includes a 
statement of the probable cause, may not be completed for months or years after the 
investigation has been completed (NTSB, 2013).  
FAA Accident/Incident Data System (AIDS).    The AIDS database contains 
incident data records for all categories of civil aviation. Incidents are events that do not 
meet the aircraft damage or personal injury thresholds contained in the NTSB definition 
of an accident.  That is: “An Aircraft Incident is an occurrence, other than an accident, 
associated with the operation of an aircraft that affects or could affect the safety of 
operations and that is investigated and reported” (NTSB, 2013).   
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS).   ASRS is a voluntary, confidential, 
and non-punitive incident reporting system.  It is a cooperative program established under 
FAA Advisory Circular No. 00-46D, funded by the FAA and administered by NASA.  
ASRS does not process reports containing information regarding aviation accidents.  Any 
reports received containing information regarding aviation accidents are forwarded to the 
NTSB. 
Database Overlap.   There may be some overlap for reporting a given event 
where an accident or incident is recorded in multiple databases.  For example, ASDs that 
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result in an accident or incident that was investigated by the NTSB are reported in the 
NTSB database.  If an ASD occurs at a towered airport one would expect to see an RWS 
report for the event, and there could be a corresponding report for the same event in the 
NTSB repository, if the NTSB investigated the event.  That is not to say that all RWS 
events are investigated and reported by the NTSB.  RWS events that are not investigated 
by the NTSB will not have an NTSB report; however, there may be a report in the FAA 
AIDS repository, if the FAA investigated the event.  While the FAA AIDS database 
could also contain ASD reports, since the FAA and NTSB investigations are mutually 
exclusive, there should not be overlap between NTSB and FAA AIDS reports for ASDs.  
The NTSB and FAA AIDS databases may also have ASD reports from non-towered 
airports or airports where the tower was closed that would not be contained in RWS.  
Thus, RWS alone is not the comprehensive source of ASD information. 
The ASRS does not contain reports where an accident has occurred, as these 
reports are forwarded to the NTSB as part of their investigation; thus, any ASRS reports 
associated with an ASD should not be replicated in the NTSB database.  Furthermore, 
only about 20% of the ASRS reports submitted are contained in the ASRS database 
(FAA, 2013), rendering the ASRS as a non-comprehensive source of ASD data.   
Data Selection Criteria.   FAA Order 7050.1A (FAA 2010b) defines the criteria 
that were utilized as a guideline for collecting events to be included in the ASD list.  
Specifically, Appendix A (FAA, 2010b) stipulates that only events that occur at an 
airport having an active control tower constitute RIs and surface incidents; however, for 
purposes of this study the FAA definition was expanded to include non-towered airports 
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where NTSB reports are provided.  Other criteria for ASDs that were utilized in selecting 
or rejecting cases during the collection process are listed below: 
1. Criteria for Inclusion: 
a. Any operations within the US. 
b. Any operation intended to take place on a runway surface, such as 
takeoff or landing that is conducted on a taxiway or ramp (FAA, 
2010b, p16).  
c. Aircraft need not be touching the ground to be involved in an 
ASD.  For example, an aircraft that taxis onto the active runway 
for departure and is overtaken by a landing aircraft on final 
approach constitutes a runway incursion even though the landing 
aircraft was airborne at the time that the incursion occurred. 
2. Criteria for exclusion: 
a. Events involving wildlife on the airport surface are not classified 
as runway incursions or surface incidents (FAA, 2010b, p16). 
b. Runway excursions are not classified as ASDs.  For example, an 
aircraft that aborts a takeoff and runs off the end of the runway is 
not considered an ASD. 
c. Surface events which cannot clearly be attributed to a mistake or 
incorrect action by an air traffic controller, pilot, driver or 
pedestrian are classified by the FAA as “other” (FAA, 2010b); 
therefore, such events are not considered ASDs for purposes of this 
analysis. 
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d. Mid-air collisions are not considered unless they occur directly 
above the runway.  For example, one aircraft that lands on top of 
another aircraft is considered an ASD; however, two aircraft that 
collide on the turn from base to final approach would not be 
considered an ASD. 
e. Helicopter traffic on an airport surface is capable of participating 
in ASDs; however, only conventional aircraft were considered in 
this study. 
f. Gliders, powered gliders, ultra-light aircraft, and powered 
parachutes were not considered in this study. 
The process and mechanism to select appropriate data varies according to the data 
repository housing the data.  Available web-based tools for each repository were utilized 
to search and extract pertinent data and information.  Each data repository and collection 
methodology is described in detail below. 
FAA Runway Incursion Database (RWS).  The RWS database serves as a 
repository for all known and reported airport surface incident and runway incursion 
events at towered airports.  At airports with an operational control tower, the tower air 
traffic controllers are responsible to complete reports of any event that meets FAA RI or 
surface incident guidelines.  However, the FAA Office of Runway Safety has the 
responsibility to determine if a reported event is a RI and/or surface incident.  Since 
tower controllers initiate the report of an event, only surface events at airports with an 
operating ATC tower are recorded and classified as RIs and surface incidents.  
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The RI reports entered by the controller are processed through the FAA Runway 
Safety Office as follows: 
The Office of Runway Safety will analyze all surface events when initially 
reported and make a preliminary determination of whether the event is a runway 
incursion or surface incident. The surface incident or runway incursion will then 
be classified as an operational error, pilot deviation, or vehicle pedestrian 
deviation. The determination and classification of runway incursions will be 
confirmed and made final by the Director of Runway Safety at the same time the 
severity ranking is finalized. The preliminary determination and classification of 
surface incidents will become final after 90 days unless data is received which 
justifies a second review. 
(http://www.asias.faa.gov/pls/apex/f?p=100:32:0::NO::P32_REGION_VAR:2)   
Consequently, the reports stored in this database represent events that were 
generated by the tower controllers and approved by the Director of the FAA Runway 
Safety Office, subject to receipt of other data that justifies another review.  This process 
implies several filters for events:  
1. Events at only towered airports while controllers are present and on duty 
are captured; non-towered airports and towered airports where controllers 
are not present (on duty) are excluded.  
2. The controllers, who could be associated with a causal factor of the event, 
are responsible to provide the incident report. 
3. The FAA Director of Runway Safety has classification and approval 
authority for each event. 
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Additionally, the reports are limited in their content because only the viewpoint of 
the controller is considered and no investigation and gathering of associated facts and 
corroborating evidence, other than that performed by the Director of the Office of 
Runway Safety is present.  As such, little causal information is contained in the report 
and the report serves as a limited factual accounting of the incident from the controller’s 
perspective.  The categorization of the event represents the classification of severity that 
was in force at the time of the incident’s entry into the database and is not updated if the 
scheme changes.   
The Runway Incursion Database began in GFY 2001 (starting October 1, 2001) 
and continues to the present.  In order to utilize the Runway Incursion Database as a 
guide to the reports analyzed in this study, the period of January 1, 2001 to December 31, 
2012 was selected for collection of runway incursion and airport surface deviation 
accidents and incident reports to be used for analysis. 
An analysis of the FAA Runway Incursion database is presented in Table 10 and 
provides the indicated event counts (N) for the period 1/1/20013 to 12/31/2012.  Note that 
the event categories have been grouped further into Severe, representing Categories A and 
B; Low Risk, representing Categories C and D; and Unclassified, representing Categories 
E, P, and N/A.  In the latter classification, Category E is a collection of events that were 
deemed to be a runway incursion, but there was not enough information available at the 
time of the event to further classify the event.  Category P refers to a condition that the 
event is pending a severity assessment from the Director of the Office of Runway Safety, 
and N/A is assigned when, upon further review, the event was found not to qualify as a RI 
                                                 
3 Note RWS collection did not commence until FY 2001, starting 10/1/2001 
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event, but the event is still retained in the RI database.  A total of 12,132 runway 
incursions and surface incidents were reported over the period. 
 
 
Table 10.  Runway Incursion and Surface Incident Totals by Category and Group for the 
period of study 01/01/2001 through 12/31/2012 
 
 
Category N Total 
Severe 
A 124  
B 125 249 
Low-Risk 
C 2631  
D 4433 7064 
Unclassified 
E 2  
P 0 2 
Not Qualified 
N/A 4817 4817 
Total 12132 12132 
 
 
 
An annual summary of the FAA runway incursion database contents by Category 
is presented in Table 11.  As described in Chapter I, the FAA adopted the ICAO 
definition for a runway incursion as well as the ICAO severity category definitions in FY 
2008 (beginning October 1, 2007).  Thus, in Table 11, the frequency of N/A changes 
drastically in 2008 from prior years, and the counts for categories C and D more than 
double, while the total counts remain approximately the same.  As stated by the FAA, 
“The initial increase of runway incursions in FY 2008 will be reported as a greater 
number of less serious runway incursions (Category C  and D) due to this change in 
definition” (FAA, 2008, p. 37) . 
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The FAA runway incursion data were utilized to provide overall ASD statistics 
and is used as an indicator of the magnitude and span of the runway incursion problem in 
the United States.  Since the detailed causal information necessary to complete an 
HFACS analysis is not present in the runway incursion reports, the runway incursion 
reports will only provide corroborating evidence for the NTSB reports. 
 
 
Table 11.  Airport surface incidents and runway incursions by severity category and year 
for the period of collection 01/01/2001 through 12/31/2012. 
 
 
 
Notes:  
1 - The FAA Runway Incursion Database commenced on October 1, 2001, and all years 
in the table are calendar year totals.  In addition, the FAA adopted the ICAO definition of 
Runway Incursion in Fiscal Year 2008 (starting October 1, 2007).   
2 – Runway incursions were developed from the FAA Runway Incursion Database as of 
April 28, 2013 (http://www.asias.faa.gov/pls/apex/f?p=100:28:0::NO:28::), and airport 
operations were obtained from the FAA Air Traffic Activity System (ATADS) Retrieved 
from https://aspm.faa.gov/opsnet/sys/Airport.asp 
 
 
 
NTSB Accident and Incident Data. The NTSB accident and incident database is 
used as the master source of causal information for airport surface deviations and runway 
Year
Category 
A
Category 
B
Category 
C
Category 
D
Category 
E
Category 
P
Category 
N/A
Total  Total Airport 
Operations
Cat. A,B,C, & 
D per Million 
ops
2001 3 10 21 48 0 0 170 252 15,307,236 5.4
2002 8 21 106 201 0 0 651 987 64,995,217 5.2
2003 14 23 111 182 0 0 536 866 62,598,686 5.3
2004 11 15 108 176 0 0 525 835 63,042,268 4.9
2005 15 11 92 218 0 0 573 909 62,664,540 5.4
2006 20 8 68 245 0 0 630 971 61,274,959 5.6
2007 22 10 120 354 0 0 599 1105 60,838,256 8.3
2008 6 9 383 608 1 0 190 1197 57,257,475 17.6
2009 11 3 346 559 0 0 166 1085 52,239,072 17.6
2010 2 3 398 586 0 0 227 1216 51,278,629 19.3
2011 8 4 366 587 0 0 349 1314 50,598,454 19.1
2012 4 8 512 669 1 0 201 1395 50,264,308 23.7
Total 124 125 2631 4433 2 0 4817 12132 652,359,100 11.2
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incursions in this study.  Access to the NTSB accident data is available through public 
web access via the NTSB web site, and there are several web-based tools available for 
searching the NTSB data.  Two different search interfaces are available at the NTSB web 
site, a third web-based access is provided by the Aviation Safety Information Analysis 
and Sharing (ASIAS) system accessed through the FAA ASIAS web page.  The NTSB 
web page has provisions to download a Microsoft® ACCESS database containing all 
NTSB accident synopses as well as coded information fields, which can be further 
processed off line.  Finally, there is another NTSB database access mechanism arising 
from requesting the assistance of NTSB personnel who assist in fulfilling public requests 
for publically available data.  To that extent, all paths were investigated, and the most 
fruitful access came by virtue of NTSB personnel assistance.  A brief description of the 
information available from the NTSB aviation accident database follows to illustrate the 
potential of the information that can be gleaned.   
The NTSB Aviation Accident Database is used to store information obtained 
during the investigation and subsequent analysis of aviation accidents and incidents.  The 
Aviation Accident Database contains data that includes a description of the aircraft, 
operations, personnel, environmental conditions, consequences, the probable cause, and 
contributing factors of civil aviation accidents within the United States, its territories and 
possessions, and in international waters.  The NTSB also investigates selected incidents, 
which are contained within the database in the same format as accidents.  Incidents do not 
involve the level of injury or damage distinguishing an accident.   
NTSB Reports.   There are essentially five types of records and reports within the 
NTSB accident archives that are of interest to this research activity.  They are as follows: 
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1. The NTSB Preliminary Report - A preliminary report includes a brief 
narrative and data fields describing the basic facts of the accident as they 
are understood at the time.  Generally, a preliminary report is available on 
line within a few days of an accident.  
2. The NTSB Factual Report - The factual report consists of documents 
created or acquired by the Safety Board or supplied by parties to the 
investigation. 
3. The NTSB Probable Cause Report - When the investigation is completed, 
the preliminary report is replaced with a final description of the accident 
and its probable cause.  
4. The NTSB Docket - Accident Investigation Dockets are maintained for 
each accident investigated. They are composed of the preliminary report, 
factual report and brief of the accident report. The brief becomes available 
only after official approval by the Board. 
5. The NTSB coded data and brief - The brief is a condensed summary of 
basic facts about the accident. It includes a sequence of events, a narrative 
and probable cause.  It also contains other demographic data associated 
with the operations that were being conducted and the accident or incident. 
NTSB Database Architecture and Search.   The NTSB database comprises three 
distinct sub-databases, spanning three time periods: (a) 1962 through 1981, (b) 1982, and 
(c) 1983 to the present.  Most data fields, though similar in purpose among the three sub-
databases, are incompatible.  In all three databases, many fields contain coded value(s) 
representing selection(s) from a menu of valid choices.  Some important fields contain 
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direct entry data and are not standardized, making their use difficult.  The oldest database 
contains only one data set.  The two newest databases are each composed of a core data 
set and several related data sets.  These data sets include one that contains a short 
narrative description of the accident and another in which the accident sequence of events 
is encoded using a menu of aircraft components, environmental factors, human actions 
and conditions, etc.  Beginning with accidents that occurred in 1989, there is a data set 
that contains a narrative description of the probable cause of the accident.  The database 
contains more than 135,000 accidents and incidents. 
The period of interest for this study is January 01, 2001 through December 31, 
2012, and the intent of the collection activity is to retrieve all NTSB reports that pertain 
to airport surface deviations and runway incursions during this period.  The available 
reports include: preliminary (the NTSB requested that we not utilize these reports as they 
are not NTSB-approved (C. Floyd, personal communication, April 12, 2013)), factual, 
final (Probable Cause), and coded with narrative from the Microsoft® ACCESS database.   
There are several available search mechanisms for retrieving information from the 
NTSB database.  The NTSB has an accident database web search engine 
(http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/index.aspx ) that will retrieve available reports and it 
allows a search using keys that include: date range, broad phase of flight, airport, NTSB 
Accident Number, and location, as well as a text string search.  This form was utilized 
initially in the study; however, the category of broad phase of flight (that is, landing, 
standing, takeoff, taxi, etc.) proved to be too wide-ranging and resulted in numerous 
occurrences that were outside of the range of ASDs and Runway Incursions.  The ASIAS 
web interface also allows a limited version of the NTSB accident database to be searched.  
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Additional search keys that focus the phase of flight exist; for example, in the case of 
takeoff, there are modifiers of: none, aborted, initial climb, and roll/run.  These modifiers 
can concentrate the search; however, the results still included non ASD and Runway 
Incursion events.   
The ASIAS database was searched using the parameters indicated in Table 12 and 
resulting in the event counts indicated; however, at the time of the search4, the search 
engine did not retrieve any events beyond 2008, in spite of the 12-year period of interest 
that had been specified in the search. 
 
 
Table 12.  ASIAS search of NTSB Accident database for specified phases of flight for the 
period 01 January 2001 through 31 December 2012 
 
 
Phase of Flight Event Count 
Taxi to Takeoff 114 
Taxi from Landing 149 
Taxi 125 
Takeoff Roll 326 
Takeoff Aborted 177 
Total Event Count 891 
Note that at the time the search was performed, the search engine did not return any 
results that were beyond 2008.  Also, these events are not necessarily ASDs, they were 
accidents or incidents during the indicated phase of flight. 
 
 
 
A third approach was to search the NTSB Microsoft® ACCESS database directly.  
Initially, the NTSB staff performed the search under the following filter limits: 
1. Date Range: 01 January 2001 to 31 December 2012 
2. Event: Runway Incursion 
                                                 
4 The ASIAS search was performed on January 26, 2013. 
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3. Location: United States 
The response to the NTSB staff query was a list of approximately 60 events, 
which appeared to be considerably shorter than the approximately 12,000 Runway 
Incursions over the 12-year period determined from the FAA RWS.  Although not all 
ASDs are investigated by the NTSB, the NTSB investigations also include ASDs from 
non-towered airports; thus, the expectation was for a search result somewhat greater than 
60.  An investigation of this apparent discrepancy was performed and updated searches 
were conducted as is described in the following sections.      
Validation of initial NTSB case list.   Each of the 60 events contained in the first 
case search was examined using the NTSB accident number through the NTSB web 
interface to obtain the available reports for each case.  These reports were downloaded 
and analyzed, and each of the 60 cases was validated as an ASD (or runway incursion).  
However, to determine if this initial list of 60 cases contained all of the NTSB 
investigation of ASDs for the 12-year period, a web search, using the NTSB web search 
engine was executed using three specific filters for phase of flight: landing, takeoff, and 
taxi, which would contain all ASDs as well as other non ASD cases.  Thus, this search 
represented a superset that contained all ASDs and other airport-related accidents over 
the period of interest.  The resulting list was downloaded into an Excel spread sheet and 
contained over 23,000 events for the 12-year period.   
Another search was initiated that added the filter runway incursion to the text 
search field in the NTSB web-based search.  This search resulted in a list of events that 
was considerably less than the 23,000 events generated by the phase of flight criteria, 
with approximately 60 events where runway incursion was specifically mentioned in the 
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text of the report.  The second list of 60 runway incursion events was compared with the 
first NTSB list (also having 60 events) and many of the events were common; however, 
the first NTSB list was missing several events that were captured in the second search 
using runway incursion in the text filter during the search.   
The second list was also validated as ASDs by using the NTSB event number to 
download the NTSB reports which were manually read to filter out any non ASD events.  
The two NTSB lists were combined, removing redundant entries and filtering any non 
ASD events.  The resulting list became the master list of ASDs.   
During this process, the author had numerous discussions with the NTSB staff, 
which resulted in the development of a more detailed understanding of the architecture of 
the NTSB ACCESS database.  The deeper understanding provided the information 
required to develop a database search process that would assure capture of all available 
NTSB ASD events leading to access of the appropriate reports for this comprehensive list 
of events. 
NTSB database extraction process.   The NTSB web-based search engine and the 
ASIAS web-based search engine do not have search key parameters that conform to the 
occurrence of airport surface events; that is, neither search interface will search directly 
for surface events, under the definition: Surface events = surface incidents + runway 
incursions.  The use of the web-based search mechanism using phase of flight filters 
and/or report text keys either produced too many events that contained excursions from 
the desired set of ASDs, or too few results that were missing valid ASDs from the search 
results.  After several web-based searches were performed where filter parameters were 
varied, it was noted that slight variations in filter parameters resulted in differences in the 
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obtained event results.  In examining the event differences, it became clear that there 
must be other filter parameters available that are not utilized by the web based search 
mechanisms.  In fact, there are a considerable number of metrics contained in the 
ACCESS database that can be used as search parameters.   
During the early investigation of the NTSB Aviation Data Management System 
(ADMS) and in discussions with the NTSB staff, it was noted that in 2008, the NTSB 
staff completed work on a major revision to the NTSB’s ADMS, now called the 
enhanced ADMS (eADMS; NTSB, 2009).  Key to this database architecture is the fact 
that event codes and phase of flight codes were also enhanced; however, this created a 
bifurcation of the database with codes for pre- 2008 events being different than post-
2008.  Consequently, the search for our period of interest was split into two periods: 
Period 1, from January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2007; and Period 2, from January 1, 
2008 to December 31, 2012.   
Subsequently, several experimental searches of both periods were conducted with 
assistance from the NTSB staff to determine the variation in ASD event lists resulting 
from variation in occurrence and phase of flight codes.  These initial searches revealed 
other phenomena associated with NTSB phase of flight and occurrence coding.  For 
example, another artifact of the initial search results was that the pre-2008 period 
(1/1/2001 to 12/31/2007: 7-year period) was showing an order of magnitude more events 
than the post-2008 period (1/1/2008 to 12/31/2012: 5-year period) using the same phases 
of flight and occurrence codes.  Granted the 1st period is 2 years longer, but as discussed 
earlier, the number of runway incursions is fairly uniform over the whole period and is 
around 1,000 per year.  Consequently, one would have expected the totals for each period 
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to be closer.  Upon further investigation, the codes for phase of flight and occurrences in 
the pre-2008 and post 2008 periods were changed during the ADMS upgrade.  Table 13 
presents the phase of flight codes segregated by pre 2008 and post 2008 periods.  As can 
be seen, there are numerous phases of flight indicated; however, a quick scan of the list 
indicates several differences in codes between periods. 
Another coding anomaly was discovered by examining the case of an accident or 
incident where there were multiple occurrences, such as a runway incursion at a towered 
airport that resulted in a collision of an aircraft with a ground vehicle, there would be two 
or more occurrence codes.  In this circumstance, using the post-2008 terminology as 
depicted in Table 13: Code 200 could be used to indicate the ground collision, code 320 
could be used to indicate the runway incursion, and code 100 could be used to indicate 
that presence of an air traffic event.  In this case, there would be three occurrence code 
entries in the database; however, if the event search is conducted such that only the first 
code is examined, and runway incursion is not listed first, it is possible to miss runway 
incursion events in cases where the investigator decided to enter another code in the first 
entry slot.   
In the example cited, which is taken from an actual runway incursion event, the 
investigator entered the code 200 first, followed by 320 and then 100.  Thus, while 
searching for runway incursions, code 320, this event was not captured even though it 
represents a classic runway incursion.  To overcome this situation, the NTSB data search 
was modified to examine all occurrence and phase of flight codes entered for the event 
and if any code in the event matched any of the desired codes, then the event was selected 
as a possible ASD. 
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Table 13. Phase of Flight codes from the NTSB eADMS for pre and post 2008 events. 
 
 
Post 2008  Pre 2008 
100xxx Prior to Flight 500 Standing 
150xxx Standing 501 Standing - pre-flight 
151xxx Standing-Engine(s) Not 
Oper 
502 Standing - starting engine(s) 
152xxx Standing-Engine(s) 
Start-up 
503 Standing - engine(s) operating 
153xxx Standing-Engine(s) 
Operating 
504 Standing - engine(s) not operating 
154xxx Standing-Engine(s) 
Shutdown 
505 Standing - idling rotors 
200xxx Pushback/Towing 510 Taxi 
201xxx Pushback/Tow-Engine 
Not Oper 
511 Taxi - pushback/tow 
202xxx Pushback/Tow-Engine 
Start-up 
512 Taxi - to takeoff 
203xxx Pushback/Tow-Engine 
Oper 
513 Taxi - from landing 
204xxx Pushback/Tow-Engine 
Shutdown 
514 Taxi - aerial 
250xxx Taxi 520 Takeoff 
251xxx Taxi-to Runway 521 Takeoff - roll/run 
252xxx Taxi-into Takeoff 
Position 
522 Takeoff - initial climb 
253xxx Taxi-from Runway 523 Takeoff - aborted 
300xxx Takeoff 530 Climb 
301xxx Takeoff-Rejected 
Takeoff 
531 Climb - to cruise 
350xxx Initial Climb 540 Cruise 
400xxx En route 541 Cruise - normal 
401xxx En route-Climb to cruise 542 Maneuvering - holding (IFR) 
402xxx En route-Cruise 550 Descent 
403xxx En route-Change of 
cruise level 
551 Descent - normal 
404xxx En route-Descent 552 Descent - emergency 
405xxx En route-Holding (IFR) 553 Descent - uncontrolled 
450xxx Maneuvering 560 Approach 
451xxx Maneuvering-Aerobatics 561 Approach - VFR pattern - downwind 
452xxx Maneuvering-Low-alt 
flying 
562 Approach - VFR pattern - turn to base 
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Post 2008  Pre 2008 
453xxx Maneuvering-Hover 563 Approach - VFR pattern - base leg/base to 
final 
500xxx Approach 564 Approach - VFR pattern - final approach 
501xxx Approach-IFR Initial 
Approach 
565 Go-around (VFR) 
502xxx Approach-IFR Final 
Approach 
566 Approach - Initial approach fix (IAF) to 
final approach fix (FAF)/outer marker (IFR) 
503xxx Approach-Circling 
(IFR) 
567 Approach - final approach fix (FAF)/outer 
marker to threshold (IFR) 
504xxx Approach-IFR Missed 
Approach 
568 Approach - circling (IFR) 
505xxx Approach-VFR Pattern 
Crosswind 
569 Missed approach (IFR) 
506xxx Approach-VFR Pattern 
Downwind 
570 Landing 
507xxx Approach-VFR Pattern 
Base 
571 Landing - flare/touchdown 
508xxx Approach-VFR Pattern 
Final 
572 Landing - roll 
509xxx Approach-VFR Go-
Around 
573 Landing - aborted 
550xxx Landing 574 Emergency landing 
551xxx Landing-
Flare/Touchdown 
575 Emergency landing after takeoff 
552xxx Landing-Landing Roll 576 Emergency descent/landing 
600xxx Emergency Descent 580 Maneuvering 
650xxx Uncontrolled Descent 581 Maneuvering - aerial application 
700xxx Post-Impact 582 Maneuvering - turn to reverse direction 
750xxx After Landing 583 Maneuvering - turn to landing area 
(emergency) 
800xxx Other 590 Hover 
990xxx Unknown 591 Hover - in ground effect 
    592 Hover - out of ground effect 
    600 Other 
    610 Unknown 
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Similarly, the codes for occurrence of flight are presented in Table 14 for pre- and 
post- 2008 periods.  Note that in the pre-2008 case, there are no codes for runway 
incursions, and the code numbers, which are used as search keys, are replicated but with 
different meanings across periods 1 and 2.  This is one factor that explains the 
discrepancy in the number of ASDs discovered between Period 1 and Period 2. 
 
 
Table 14. Occurrence codes for NTSB eADMS for pre-2008 and post 2008 periods. 
 
 
Pre 2008 Post 2008 
Code Code Meaning Code Code Meaning 
100 Abrupt maneuver xxx000 Unknown or undetermined 
110 Altitude deviation, uncontrolled xxx010 Aircraft loading event 
120 Cargo shift xxx020 Aircraft servicing event 
130 Airframe/component/system 
failure/malfunction 
xxx030 Preflight or dispatch event 
131 Propeller failure/malfunction xxx040 Aircraft maintenance 
event 
132 Rotor failure/malfunction xxx050 Aircraft inspection event 
140 Decompression xxx060 Attempted 
remediation/recovery 
150 Ditching xxx070 Airport occurrence 
160 Dragged wing, rotor, pod, float or 
tail/skid 
xxx080 Ground handling event 
170 Fire/explosion xxx081 AC/prop/rotor contact w 
person 
171 Fire xxx082 Prop/jet/rotor blast/suction 
172 Explosion xxx090 Abnormal runway contact 
180 Forced landing xxx091 Tailstrike 
190 Gear collapsed xxx092 Hard landing 
191 Main gear collapsed xxx093 Dragged 
wing/rotor/float/other 
192 Nose gear collapsed xxx094 Landing gear collapse 
193 Tail gear collapsed xxx095 Landing gear not 
configured 
194 Complete gear collapsed xxx096 Nose over/nose down 
195 Other gear collapsed xxx097 Roll over 
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Pre 2008 Post 2008 
Code Code Meaning Code Code Meaning 
196 Gear not extended xxx100 Air traffic event 
197 Gear not retracted xxx110 Cabin safety event 
198 Gear retraction on ground xxx120 Control flight into terr/obj 
200 Hard landing xxx130 Emergency descent 
initiated 
210 Hazardous materials leak/spill xxx140 Engine shutdown 
220 In flight collision with object xxx150 Fire/smoke (non-impact) 
230 In flight collision with terrain/water xxx160 Explosion (non-impact) 
231 Wheels down landing in water xxx170 Fire/smoke (post-impact) 
232 Wheels up landing xxx180 Explosion (post-impact) 
240 In flight encounter with weather xxx190 Fuel related 
250 Loss of control - in flight xxx191 Fuel starvation 
260 Loss of control - on ground/water xxx192 Fuel exhaustion 
270 Midair collision xxx193 Fuel contamination 
271 Collision between aircraft (other than 
midair) 
xxx194 Wrong fuel 
280 Near collision between aircraft xxx200 Ground collision 
290 Nose down xxx210 Icing encounter 
300 Nose over xxx220 Low altitude operations 
310 On ground/water collision with object xxx230 Loss of control on ground 
320 On ground/water collision with 
terrain/water 
xxx231 Dynamic Rollover 
330 On ground/water encounter with weather xxx232 Ground resonance 
340 Overrun xxx240 Loss of control in flight 
350 Loss of engine power xxx241 Aerodynamic stall/spin 
351 Loss of engine power (total) - 
mechanical failure/malfunction 
xxx242 VFR encounter with IMC 
352 Loss of engine power (partial) - 
mechanical failure/malfunction 
xxx243 Retreating blade stall 
353 Loss of engine power (total) - 
nonmechanical 
xxx244 Settling with power/vortex 
ring state 
354 Loss of engine power (partial) - 
nonmechanical 
xxx245 Mast bumping 
355 Engine tearaway xxx250 Midair collision 
360 Propeller blast or jet exhaust/suction xxx260 Near midair collision 
370 Propeller/rotor contact to person xxx270 Abrupt maneuver 
380 Roll over xxx271 Inflight upset 
390 Undershoot xxx280 Course deviation 
400 Undetermined xxx290 Altitude deviation 
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Pre 2008 Post 2008 
Code Code Meaning Code Code Meaning 
410 Vortex turbulence encountered xxx300 Runway excursion 
420 Missing aircraft xxx310 Runway incursion animal 
430 Miscellaneous/other xxx320 Runway incursion 
veh/AC/person 
  xxx330 Sys/Comp malf/fail (non-
power) 
  xxx331 Pressure/environ sys 
malf/fail 
  xxx332 Electrical system 
malf/failure 
  xxx333 Flight control sys malf/fail 
  xxx334 Flight instrument malf/fail 
  xxx335 Nav system 
malfunction/failure 
  xxx336 Comm system malf/failure 
  xxx337 Aircraft structural failure 
  xxx338 Part(s) separation from 
AC 
  xxx340 Powerplant sys/comp 
malf/fail 
  xxx341 Loss of engine power 
(total) 
  xxx342 Loss of engine power 
(partial) 
  xxx343 Uncontained engine 
failure 
  xxx350 Security/criminal event 
  xxx360 Turbulence encounter 
  xxx361 Aircraft wake turb 
encounter 
  xxx362 Clear air turbulence 
encounter 
  xxx370 Landing area undershoot 
  xxx380 Landing area overshoot 
  xxx390 Windshear or 
thunderstorm 
  xxx400 Other weather encounter 
  xxx401 VFR encounter with IMC 
  xxx402 Loss of visual reference 
  xxx410 Terrain avoidance alert 
  xxx420 Collision avoidance alert 
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Pre 2008 Post 2008 
Code Code Meaning Code Code Meaning 
  xxx430 Stall warn/stick-
shaker/pusher 
  xxx440 Off-field or emergency 
landing 
  xxx441 Ditching 
  xxx450 Hazardous material 
leak/spill 
  xxx460 Evacuation 
  xxx470 Collision with terr/obj 
(non-CFIT) 
  xxx480 External load event 
(Rotorcraft) 
  xxx490 Collision during 
takeoff/land 
  xxx500 Loss of lift 
  xxx510 Glider tow event 
  xxx600 Simulated/training event 
  xxx900 Miscellaneous/other 
  xxx901 Birdstrike 
  xxx990 Missing aircraft 
 
 
 
There are additional nuances that were discovered in how the codes are applied 
during entry into the eADMS.  Each aircraft involved in an accident or incident is 
assigned a separate report identification number by the NTSB; although, a single event 
number is used in the cases where multiple aircraft are involved.  Further, the NTSB 
report numbers are identical with the appendage of an A, B, C, etc. to designate more 
than one aircraft.  For example, a runway incursion accident involving two aircraft took 
place at the Lehigh Valley International Airport in Allentown, PA on September 19, 
2008.  The event ID was 20080922X01509, and there were two report identification 
numbers: OPS08IA015A associated with the Canadair Challenger, and OPS08IA015B 
associated with the Cessna.    
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Each aircraft involved has a unique record in the eADMS, and the phase of flight 
or occurrence codes can be different for each of two aircraft involved in a single incident 
or accident.  For example, if there are two flights that are taxiing from the ramp to the 
runway, they are in the taxi phase of flight while in motion.  If the lead aircraft stops, and 
the trailing aircraft runs into it (similar to a rear-end automobile collision), then the 
accident investigator may use a taxi phase of flight code for the trailing aircraft (in 
motion), but standing with engines running phase of flight code may be used for the for 
the lead aircraft (stopped).  Thus, a search with a phase of flight code = taxi would not 
capture the record for the aircraft that was hit (code = standing with engines running).  
While technically correct, one aircraft was taxiing and the other was standing, the search 
code space requires the use of a larger set of codes to extract all of the aircraft reports 
associated with ASDs.  In fact, “this is the way we do it at the NTSB, start with a larger 
set and narrow it down” was stated during the NTSB collaboration (D. Broadwater, 
personal communication, February 15, 2013).   
In collaboration with the NTSB staff, the ACCESS database architecture was 
examined to develop a search strategy to extract ASDs for the period of interest.  Since 
the NTSB made the change to its database in 2008, two search strategies had to be 
developed to cover the period of interest: one for the 2001 – 2007 period, and a second 
for the 2008 – 2012 period.  The ultimate selection of occurrence codes and codes for the 
phase of flight was accomplished through a process of trial-and-error.  That is, a set of 
codes was selected for each period, a database query was run, and the resulting event list 
was examined and compared with a master list which, as described earlier, began as the 
60 event list and was accumulated as a running list of ASDs.   
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Each entry on the new query list was checked against the master list.  If the new 
event was already on the master list, then the occurrence and phase of flight codes were 
noted as being present for a valid ASD event.  If the new event was missing from the 
master list, then the new entry was examined by reading through the narrative brief to 
determine if the event met the ASD criteria.  If it met the criteria, then it was added to the 
master list and the occurrence and phase of flight codes were recorded as having been 
present for a valid ASD.  Finally, if the event was not a valid ASD, then it was removed 
from the query and the occurrence and phase of flight codes were noted as being present 
for an invalid ASD.  Unfortunately, some of the codes were present for both valid and 
invalid ASDs.   
After several iterations of performing the search under the strategy described, the 
search converged on a list of events that numbered approximately 3,500 for the period of 
interest.  However, many of these events are duplicate records.  That is, in the case where 
an event has multiple codes, each code match generates an event listing, so where there 
are two or more codes utilized for a single event, two or more events are listed.  In 
addition, if the accident or incident involves two or more aircraft, then there are two (or 
more) records generated for the same event.  Each of those records can have multiple 
codes, so there could be multiple duplicate list entries.  In this study all reports pertaining 
to a single accident or incident were collected and utilized for the HFACS analysis.  
The final list of occurrence and phase of flight codes for Period 1 and Period 2 of 
the period of interest that were used to extract the list of ASDs to be further studied in 
this research activity are contained in Table 15.  The resulting master list has been 
reduced to events and NTSB report numbers, and all NTSB reports for each aircraft 
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associated with an event were collected along with the other demographic information 
associated with the aircraft event record in the eADMS.  This information forms the basis 
for the HFACS analysis described in subsequent sections of Chapter III. 
 
 
Table 15.  Final selection of Occurrence and Phase of Flight Codes for Periods 1 and 2 of 
the NTSB database search 
 
 
Period 1 Period 2 
January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2007 January 1, 2008 to December 31, 2012 
Occurrence: Occurrence: 
Code Code Description Code Code Description 
100 Abrupt Maneuver 70 Airport Occurrence 
220 
IN FLIGHT COLLISION WITH OBJECT 
(object modifiers, 20200 series) 
100 Air Traffic Event 
271 
COLLISION BETWEEN AIRCRAFT 
(OTHER THAN MIDAIR) (excludes 
unoccupied acft) 
200 Ground Collision 
280 NEAR COLLISION BETWEEN AIRCRAFT 270 Abrupt Maneuver 
310 
ON GROUND/WATER COLLISION WITH 
OBJECT (obj mod, 20200 series) 
320 
RUNWAY INCURSION – 
VEHICLE, AIRCRAFT OR PERSON 
(RI–VAP) 
430 MISCELLANEOUS/OTHER 470 collision with terrain/object 
  490 Collision during takeoff/land 
   900 Miscellaneous/other 
Phase of Flight: Phase of Flight: 
Code Code Description Code Code Description 
  100 Prior to Flight 
502 STANDING - STARTING ENGINE(S) 150 STANDING 
503 STANDING - ENGINE(S) OPERATING 151 
STANDING -  ENGINE(S) NOT 
OPERATING 
504 
STANDING - ENGINE(S) NOT 
OPERATING 
152 STANDING - Engine(s) start up 
510 
TAXI (includes runaway while hand-
propping) 
153 
STANDING - ENGINE(S) 
OPERATING 
512 TAXI - TO TAKEOFF 250 
TAXI (includes runaway while hand-
propping) 
513 TAXI - FROM LANDING 251 Taxi TO runway 
520 
TAKEOFF (modify with operational code 
24563, if on touch-&-go) 
252 Taxi into position 
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521 TAKEOFF - ROLL/RUN (ground or water) 253 TAXI - FROM runway 
523 TAKEOFF - ABORTED 300 
TAKEOFF (modify with operational 
code 24563, if on touch-&-go) 
570 
LANDING (modify with operational code 
24563, if touch-&-go) 
301 TAKEOFF - ABORTED 
571 LANDING - FLARE/TOUCHDOWN 550 
LANDING (modify with operational 
code 24563, if touch-&-go) 
572 LANDING – ROLL 551 LANDING - FLARE/TOUCHDOWN 
573 
LANDING - ABORTED (balked - after 
touchdown) 
552 LANDING – ROLL 
 
 
 
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) Data.   The ASRS database is a 
repository of voluntary, confidential safety information provided by aviation operational 
personnel, including pilots, controllers, mechanics, flight attendants, and dispatchers. The 
database includes the narratives submitted by reporters (after they have been sanitized for 
identifying details) as well as coded information provided by expert analysts from the 
original report which is used for data retrieval and analyses. 
More than 975,000 reports have been submitted and ASRS de-identifies reports 
before entering them into the incident database, including all personal and organizational 
names, dates, times, and related information (ASRS, 2013). 
Multiple reports from separate participants that describe a single incident are 
combined into a single record by ASRS.  These additional reports and their included 
information are coded as supplemental or secondary to the primary report; the primary 
report is often the report from the individual who is most directly involved in the event, 
or the report with the most illustrative narrative; the ASRS pilot and controller expert 
analysts assess this situation on a case-by-case basis.  
Reports submitted to ASRS can be augmented through contact with the individual 
who submitted the report; however, the information provided by the reporter is not 
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investigated further.  Therefore, the reported information represents the perception of a 
specific individual involved in or witnessing an incident. 
The ASRS Database Online includes report records from 1988 until present and is 
architected as an Oracle relational database that is updated monthly.  A search of the 
ASRS database was performed on 10 May 2013 at 09:30 AM EDT using the web-based 
search provided by the ASRS Program (ASRS, 2013).  Available keys applied to the 
search were date range (January 2001 to December 2012) and event type (Incursion: 
runway, taxiway).  The search resulted in 4,721 event records which were downloaded in 
Excel format.  These records were coded with date and time, location (airport), aircraft 
type, and a brief synopsis of the reporters.  Other data included weather, passengers, and 
other factors that were not considered important for this analysis.   
An objective of using the ASRS data would be to extend the realm of the NTSB 
ASD reports; however, since ASRS reports that are associated with events investigated 
by the NTSB are deliberately removed from the ASRS database, then there will not be 
any corroboration of the NTSB reports from ASRS data.  Thus, ASRS could supplement 
the event cases contained in the NTSB database.  Given that ASRS does not contain all of 
the submitted reports, and the rules for including or excluding submitted reports are 
unclear, it was determined that use of the ASRS data to supplement the NTSB reports in 
this study would be abandoned. 
FAA Accident/Incident Data Systems (AIDS).   Only five (5) events resulted 
from a search of the period of interest, using a text key words search for runway 
incursion, and one of the five events had the text “not a runway incursion”; consequently, 
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there were only four potential ASDs contained in the FAA AIDS.  This database did not 
provide any insight into this research activity and was not utilized. 
Data Collection and Archiving.   The primary source of accident and incident 
information for this research activity will be the NTSB accident and incident reports and 
associated demographic data contained in the eADMS and the NTSB docket management 
system. 
The final step in the NTSB data collection resulted in the creation of a master list 
of ASD events in spread sheet form that includes the NTSB case number as well as a 
summary of facts associated with the event.  The NTSB case number is used to retrieve 
the available NTSB reports for the event, by using the NTSB web search query with the 
NTSB number as the key.  This search returns a link to the available reports for the event, 
which are then manually retrieved and downloaded into a separate file for each event.  
The final data collection procedure for NTSB data is to assemble the full docket 
information and download it into the archive file for the event.  The Docket information 
for the second collection period, from 2009 through December 31, 2012, is available 
through another NTSB web-based search page using the event number as a key.  The 
docket information consists of all information collected by the NTSB during the 
investigation, and upon which the NTSB reports were written.  Examples of docket 
information include photos of the scene, airport diagrams with trajectories of the event 
drawn on the map, and transcripts of testimony from witnesses and participants in the 
event or other interested parties.  The purpose of the docket information is to supplement 
and add detail to the event report, not to critique or alter the NTSB findings or probable 
cause.  The additional information may provide insight into the levels of the human error 
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hierarchy that will be of use in assessing these components.  For example, a runway 
incursion event took place at Reading, Pennsylvania on August 3, 20085.  The air traffic 
controller received a pop up request to land from a Citation and he cleared the Citation to 
land.  Meanwhile, a ground mowing tractor requested permission to cross the active 
runway, and the controller granted permission to the tractor to cross the active runway 
(for which the controller had previously cleared the Citation to land).  The controller was 
distracted with another aircraft, and the Citation touched down on the active runway, 
while the tractor was crossing the runway around the middle of the runway, and the left 
wing of the Citation hit the tractor near the runway centerline.  The NTSB Official Report 
(NTSB, 2010a) cited the probable cause of the accident as: “The air traffic controller’s 
failure to properly monitor the runway environment.  Contributing to the accident was the 
tractor operator’s failure to scan the active runway prior to crossing, and the Federal 
Aviation Administration’s inadequate emphasis on vehicle operator visual vigilance 
when crossing active runways with air traffic control clearance” (NTSB, 2010a p2).  Note 
that the first aspect of the probable cause states that the controller failed to monitor the 
runway, which is correct.  However, why did the controller fail to monitor the runway, 
what was the underlying cause and are there any other latent causes that contributed to 
his failure?  Examination of the transcript from the other controllers who were in the 
tower at the time of the accident makes it clear that the local controller forgot that he had 
cleared the Citation to land, as witness testimony quoted the local controller as stating 
“…expletive deleted…” when he received a radio call from the Citation after the 
collision.  Thus, in this case, the controller forgot about the Citation until he received a 
                                                 
5 NTSB Report NYC08FA265, dated March 12, 2010 
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radio call after the collision.  One could assess several potential latent causal factors, 
including a lack of a memory aid for the controller when receiving pop up calls and 
issuing clearances.  Nevertheless, the docket information can be used to enhance the 
NTSB reports enabling the potential discovery of latent causal factors. 
Unfortunately, the docket information for Period 1, January 1, 2001 through 
December 31, 2007, is not available through the NTSB public web interface, and will 
require assistance from the NTSB staff for retrieval.  
Phase 2: HFACS Coding and Analysis 
This section describes the process of coding and analyzing the ASD data using 
HFACS.  Figure 7 presents the steps involved in the HFACS process, and each of the 
steps is discussed in detail in the subsections below. 
HFACS coding and analysis requires an initial preprocessing of the collected data 
and organizing it for subsequent use in HFACS coding and analysis.  The basis of the 
data collected consists of NTSB accident and incident reports for the period January 1, 
2001 through December 31, 2012.  The NTSB reports provide the primary source of 
causal information for the HFACS analysis, and it was intended to supplement the NTSB 
reports where possible with ASRS, RWS, and AIDS.  However, as described in this 
chapter, after investigation of the ASRS, RWS, and FAA AIDS databases during this 
study, the ASD information content in these databases was extremely limited.  For 
example, the FAA AIDS contained only 4 ASD reports over the period of interest.   
Consequently, the NTSB Probable Cause Report was utilized as the source of HFACS 
coding in order to preserve the official cause as determined by the NTSB. 
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A causal summary (called the narrative) was extracted from each NTSB report.  
The narrative is a free form description that presents a summary of the event, background 
information, the NTSB determined causes, and other supporting information depending 
upon the nature and complexity of the ASD event under investigation.  These narratives 
were the basis for coding the HFACS framework by an independent coding staff. 
HFACS Coding.   HFACS coding was performed by a team of five human 
factors graduate students each being a certified HFACS expert having been trained and 
certified as HFACS professionals through the HFACS, Inc. process (HFACS, 2012).  The 
team met regularly over a three-month period, and at least three members were present 
for each session.  The coding process used consensus coding, which means that the team 
reviewed each NTSB narrative and determined HFACS causal factors at all four tiers of 
the HFACS hierarchy (if possible) based upon the narrative contained in the NTSB 
Probable Cause report.  This process allowed the team to ensure there were enough 
people providing their interpretations and viewpoints on each report.  If a disagreement 
arose, each person stated the case for their decision and the group then came to a 
conclusion by the majority vote.  If a particular report proved to be difficult for the team 
to code, then the team consulted with Dr. Scott Shappell and Dr. Albert Boquet for their 
guidance, but the group made the final decision through consensus.  Event reports were 
classified using the traditional HFACS taxonomy and framework, and this method has 
continuously produced high inter-rater reliability (Shappell et al., 2007a; Wiegmann et 
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al., 2005; Shappell & Wiegmann, 2004; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003; Wiegmann & 
Shappell, 2001).  
For each event, the presence or absence of each HFACS causal category was 
determined based upon the NTSB probable cause and the supporting description 
contained in the narrative.  The use of a binary method allows for the percentage of cases 
associated with each HFACS causal category to be determined.  Analysis of the event 
was performed by the coding team to determine and explain the causal factors associated 
with the event.  Each coded result for each event has a brief notation entered by the 
coding team providing rationale for their selection.  Note that HFACS causal categories 
at each HFACS tier are not mutually exclusive.  For example, one event could include 
both a decision error and a perceptual error. 
A quality assurance check was conducted by the team at the completion of the 
initial coding activity.  The team used a random number generator to create a list of 25 
case numbers that were validated using the same consensus coding process that was used 
for the initial coding.  That is, the team recoded the random selection of 25 (out of 289) 
cases and of those 25 cases, the team disagreed on two of them, but changed only one 
code as a result of their extended deliberations.  As a further quality check, Drs. Shappell 
and Boquet further reviewed the results to assure compliance with the HFACS process, 
and the author also made a final, independent review of the team’s results and rationale 
for HFACS coding based upon the NTSB narrative report for each event.  In this final 
review, the author concurred with the team’s results in all cases, except for: (1) four new 
codes were added for four different events based upon a review of the NTSB narratives 
where several contributing factors cited organizational issues and (2) two codes for two 
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events were changed based upon an understanding of the detailed facts presented in the 
NTSB report.  In all cases where additions or code changes were evident, the author met 
with Dr. Shappell for an extensive discussion of the rationale for change and concurrence 
was achieved.   
HFACS Coding Example.   An example of HFACS coding is provided in this 
section.  An ASD scenario from the NTSB is utilized to illustrate the process of coding 
HFACS from the information contained in the NTSB report.  
Airport Surface Deviation (Runway Incursion) Scenario.   The following 
summary pertains to an actual NTSB report (NTSB, 2010a) of an accident that took place 
at Reading Regional Airport, General Carl A. Spatz Field, located in Reading, 
Pennsylvania.  The accident date was August 3, 2008, and a summary of the accident 
report extracted from the NTSB report is presented below: 
The air traffic controller, with both ground and local (tower) responsibilities, 
cleared the accident airplane to land when it was about 8 miles from the runway. 
Another airplane landed in front of the accident flight, and the controller cleared 
that pilot to taxi to the hangar.  The controller subsequently cleared a tractor with 
retractable (bat wing) mowers, one on each side, and both in the “up” position, to 
proceed from the terminal ramp and across the 6,350-foot active runway at an 
intersection about 2,600 feet from the threshold.  The controller then shifted his 
attention back to the airplane taxiing to its hangar, and did not see the accident 
airplane land.  During the landing rollout, the airplane’s left wing collided with 
the right side of the tractor when the tractor was “slightly” left of runway 
centerline.  Calculations estimated that the airplane was about 1,000 feet from the 
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collision point when the tractor emerged from the taxiway, and skid marks 
confirmed that the airplane had been steered to the right to avoid impact.  Prior to 
the crossing attempt, the tractor operator did not scan the runway, and was 
concentrating on the left side bat wing. Federal Aviation Administration 
publications do not adequately address the need for ground vehicle operators to 
visually confirm that active runways/approaches are clear, prior to crossing with 
air traffic control authorization, thus overlooking an additional means to avoid a 
collision. (NTSB, 2010a, p1) 
The NTSB determines the probable cause(s) of this accident to be: 
The air traffic controller’s failure to properly monitor the runway environment.  
Contributing to the accident was the tractor operator’s failure to scan the active 
runway prior to crossing, and the Federal Aviation Administration’s inadequate 
emphasis on vehicle operator visual vigilance when crossing active runways with 
air traffic control clearance. (NTSB, 2010a, p.1) 
HFACS Analysis Example.  Figure 8 presents a three step process for HFACS 
causal identification.  Using the NTSB probable cause data from the example scenario 
(NTSB, 2010a), and following the flow of Figure 8, one cause and two additional 
contributors to the accident are identified and analyzed.  As stated in the NTSB report, 
the: 
 Probable cause is: “The air traffic controller’s failure to properly monitor 
the runway environment” (p.1),  
 Contributing factor # 1 is: “the tractor operator’s failure to scan the active 
runway prior to crossing” (p.1), and  
121 
 
 
 
 Contributing factor #2 is: “the Federal Aviation Administration’s 
inadequate emphasis on vehicle operator visual vigilance when crossing 
active runways with air traffic control clearance” (p.1).   
The first step in the HFACS coding process, as shown in Figure 8, is to examine 
the probable cause and to determine its appropriate causal category.  Each of the three 
items identified in the NTSB report above is analyzed using the flow represented in 
Figure 8.   
 
 
Figure 8. A three-step process for coding HFACS using accident causal factors.  
(Adapted from Wiegmann & Shappell, 2003). 
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First, the controller’s failure to monitor the active runway was the unsafe act that 
caused the aircraft to collide with the tractor.  The controller’s role is to maintain 
cognizance of the active runway and he is primarily responsible for operations on the 
runway (FAA, 2012).  His failure to maintain separation between the Cessna Citation and 
the tractor is an unsafe act.  Using Figure 8, identifying the unsafe act (failure to monitor 
the runway) is the first step in the analysis.  The second step is to determine if this act 
was an error or a violation.  According to the FAA Order 7110.65: “The local controller 
has primary responsibility for operations conducted on the active runway and must 
control the use of those runways” (FAA, 2012, p.3-1).  In this case the local controller 
position and ground controller positions were combined; therefore, the individual on duty 
at the time had control of the runway and taxi way operations.  While order 7110.65 
assigns responsibility to the local controller, in this case it was not an intentional 
violation of the rule by the controller; therefore, this act was an error committed by the 
controller, as depicted in Step 2 of Figure 8.  Step 3 determines the type of error 
committed.  In this case, the controller’s attention was diverted to the taxiing aircraft 
when he cleared the tractor across the active runway.  Given that this controller was 
experienced, and was near the beginning of his shift, he did not intentionally place the 
tractor in front of a landing aircraft; consequently, due to his attention being diverted, he 
likely forgot about the landing aircraft, and this event represents a skill-based error.  
Examining contributing factor #1, the tractor operator’s failure to scan the active 
runway prior to crossing, this was also an unsafe act, as it placed the tractor and the 
operator in front of a high-speed landing aircraft.  If the operator had scanned the runway 
and seen the landing aircraft, it is unlikely that he would have pulled out onto the runway 
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in front of the aircraft.  If the operator was required to scan the runway prior to crossing, 
such as stop, look, and listen at a railroad crossing, then this could be a violation.  
However, the NTSB report states that there is no FAA rule that requires an operator to 
scan the runway for conflicting traffic prior to crossing.  As was the case with the 
controller, the NTSB report states that the operator was preoccupied with a malfunction 
of the hydraulic lift mechanism on the mower; thus, his attention was also diverted and he 
did not see the conflicting aircraft until it hit him.  Consequently, there is no violation, 
and the error committed by the operator is a skill-based error.   
Analyzing contributing factor #2 from the NTSB report, “the Federal Aviation 
Administration’s inadequate emphasis on vehicle operator visual vigilance when crossing 
active runways with air traffic control clearance,” reveals that it is not an unsafe act.  In 
addition, since the FAA has regulatory authority over airport operations, this act of 
omission by the FAA is also not a precondition for an unsafe act.  In fact, there is nothing 
reported in the NTSB report that would imply the existence of any precondition for the 
unsafe act on the part of the controller, the tractor operator or the Citation flight crew.  
Likewise, there is no causal discussion in the NTSB report about unsafe supervision; 
consequently, this causal factor does not lead down that path.  Finally, the path along 
organizational influences appears appropriate as the FAA policy provided no guidance to 
the operator about crossing a runway at airport where there is an active control tower in 
operation.  In fact, the FAA regulations at the time of the accident place the primary 
responsibility for runway operation on the local controller and the tractor operator had 
approval from the local controller to cross the runway, so it should have been clear.  
However, if the tractor operator had been required to scan the runway prior to crossing, 
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then that factor would have prevented the accident even if the local controller had erred.  
Thus, following this path downward, this causal factor is a failure of FAA organizational 
policy to have established more complete guidelines for vehicle operators at towered 
airports.   
In summary, an HFACS analysis of this scenario yields three HFACS causes: (1) 
a skill-based error for the controller; (2) a skill-based error for the tractor operator; and 
(3) an organizational process failure for the FAA airport regulatory organization.  This 
example represents an actual case that took place on August 3, 2008, and was therefore 
coded by the team.  Their coding results for this case agree with the results provided in 
the example. 
HFACS Analysis.    The period of interest for this study produced 289 ASD cases 
from the NTSB database, and the coding team attached 569 HFACS codes to the cases.  
The resulting HFACS causal information was analyzed, a determination of differences in 
causal factors associated with ASDs was obtained, and the results are reported and 
discussed in Chapters IV and V, respectively. 
The coding of an event was represented as a binary (Yes or No) indication for 
each potential causal factor in the HFACS framework.  For each event, the causal factors 
were tabulated in an ACCESS database along with the demographic information from the 
NTSB ACCESS database.  Subsequently, the pertinent information was tabulated on an 
Excel Spread Sheet, enabling computation of the statistics for causal factors and their 
properties for each event, for all events, and for multiple categories of events.  
Comparison of the distribution segregated by any or all of the demographic categories 
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present in the NTSB data will be achieved in order to fully understand the nature of the 
causal factors relative to ASDs. 
As the causal factors were tabulated in the database, the corresponding NTSB 
demographics associated with the event were preserved.  As such, for a given causal 
factor, the type of operation, actor committing the error, the airport where the event 
occurred, and other pertinent demographic information were preserved for each causal 
factor. 
Five classes of actor were defined during the coding process and based upon the 
NTSB assignment of probable cause in all of the cases studies: ATC, Pilot, Vehicle, 
Airport, and Environment.  These classes are fairly broad and their context implies the 
actual individual involved.  For example, as used in the context of Unsafe Acts, ATC 
means an air traffic controller in the control tower at a towered airport.  It is not 
necessarily a specific position in the tower; it can mean the local controller, the ground 
controller, or even a supervising controller in the tower environment, all of whom may 
have contributed to the event as determined by the NTSB.   
The term ATC is broadened as the HFACS hierarchy is traversed upwards to 
indicate the ATC supervisory level (above the local tower supervisor) and to the FAA in 
the HFACS organizational tier.  In terms of the Pilot, the context can include an aircraft 
pilot or co-pilot if the aircraft requires multiple flight crew members, and it can refer to 
flight crews of different aircraft if multiple aircraft are involved.  As was the case for 
ATC, moving upward in the HFACS tiers, pilot assumes the more general aircraft 
operator context, which may be the aircraft owner/pilot in the case of some general 
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aviation operations or a large corporate organization in the case of large general aviation 
fleets or airline operations.  
The classification of vehicle includes both vehicle operators and pedestrians; that 
is, vehicle includes vehicle drivers or personnel located on the airport surface.  Airport 
refers to other personnel who have functions performed on behalf of the airport 
operation; however, if they were operating vehicles, their actions were captured under the 
vehicle category.  The airport category refers more to ground marshallers, baggage 
handlers, airport engineers or maintenance personnel, and in the higher HFACS tiers, the 
airport organization.   
Finally the term “environment”, used in terms of an actor committing an unsafe 
act, refers to an environmental event that caused an accident or incident to occur.  In all 
case studies, there were no unsafe acts performed by an environmental actor, in all cases 
the environmental actor became synonymous with the environmental precondition.   
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CHAPTER IV      
RESULTS 
This section presents and discusses the results from the analysis of ASD events 
for the period of January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2012.  The results address the research 
questions posed earlier, specifically: (1) what are the causal factors associated with ASDs 
based upon the analysis of NTSB data and the HFACS framework, and (2) what 
differences in ASD causal factors exist between commercial flight operations CFR Title 
14 Parts 121/129 and 135/137, general aviation flight operations CFR Title 14 Part 
91/125.   
The causal factor data in this study were analyzed by determining the frequency 
of occurrence for each causal factor, determining the frequency of accidents that had at 
least one causal factor present, and by filtering and organizing the causal factor 
frequencies by several categories.  Note that this study has accessed the entire population 
of ASD reports from the NTSB database for the period of interest.  Consequently, all 
results are developed from the population and no attempt is made to infer information 
outside of the period of interest represented by the population sample.  A chi-squared 
analysis was performed on various cross tabulations of the counts; however, there were 
numerous cells with frequency counts less than five, rendering the analysis void. 
ASD cases over the 12-year period 
Searching the NTSB database for the 12-year period of interest produced 289 
cases that were identified as ASDs.  These events represented a cross section of airports 
from large, high-traffic, and towered airports to remote, low-traffic, and non-towered 
airports.  Classes of operations included commercial, general, and public use aviation 
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categories.  The annual frequency of NTSB accident and incident investigations for the 
period are illustrated in Figure 9, which also presents the annual frequency of Category A 
and B runway incursions reported in the FAA runway incursion (RI) database.  Note that 
Category C and D data were omitted from the Figure 9 due to their considerably larger 
annual frequency.  In addition, the FAA data for 2001 represents a partial year, since data 
collection commenced on October 1, 2001.   
 
 
Figure 9. Annual frequency of reported ASDs from the NTSB database and Category A 
and B ASDs from FAA Runway Incursion database. 
Notes:  
(1) Data obtained from FAA ASIAS database, January 26, 2014; 
http://www.asias.faa.gov/pls/apex/f?p=100:29:0::NO::: 
(2) The 2001 FAA Runway Incursion database represents a partial year, containing data 
from October 1-December 31, 2001. 
(3) The 2012 and 2011 NTSB report totals reflect only completed reports (issuance of a 
final “Probable Cause”) and additional investigations of ASDs for 2011 and 2012 are 
currently in progress and were not used in this study. Thus, the annual counts for NTSB 
incidents and accidents for 2011 and 2012 are understated in this figure. 
 
 
At the request of the NTSB, reports and data from ongoing investigations were 
omitted from this study, which excludes approximately 15 reports from 2012 and less 
than 5 reports from 2011.  Accordingly, the NTSB data for 2011 and 2012 is also partial-
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year data due to the fact that many recent investigations are ongoing and have not been 
completed.  
Examination of the curves for the NTSB, the FAA Category A, Category B, and 
the sum of Category A+B in Figure 9 indicates a similar shape for all curves over the 
period from 2002 to 2011, ignoring the partial data years.  Note that the NTSB does not 
investigate all RIs, which are reported and contained in the FAA Runway Incursion 
database; moreover, the FAA Runway Incursion database contains only RIs that occur at 
towered airports when the tower was in operation.  The NTSB is also selective about 
which ASDs are investigated, and not all FAA category A or B incursions are 
investigated by the NTSB. Likewise, NTSB has investigated several FAA category C and 
category D runway incursions, particularly if the incursion occurred at a major airport 
and involved air transport category aircraft.   
There is an intrinsic relationship between the NTSB and FAA Runway Incursion 
archives in that some of the reported ASDs were the same event; nevertheless, there is 
not a one-to-one mapping or a direct correlation of all events in both databases.  If the 
NTSB investigates an ASD at an airport where there is an operational control tower then 
that incident is also reported in the FAA Runway Incursion database, but the two reports 
are prepared independently by each respective agency.  Since the FAA Runway Incursion 
data does not identify probable cause, its use in this study is limited to quantifying the 
magnitude of ASDs that occurred over the 12-year period at towered airports. 
Based upon the FAA Runway Incursion Database for the 12-year period, recalling 
that data collection began on October 1, 2001, hence the year 2001 is condensed as a 
partial year data period, Category C and D ASD annual averages are 219.3 and 369.4, 
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respectively.  The average annual total for all categories, including the “N/A”6 category, 
was 1,011 over the full 12-year period.  During the same period, the average annual 
airport operations for FAA towered airports were approximately 58 million.  
Consequently, the average annual RI rate is equal to 10.4 incursions per million airport 
operations for Categories A, B, C and D.  The annual RI rate when the Category “N/A” is 
included averages 17.8 incursions per million airport operations.  Finally, the average 
annual rate of the sum of Categories A and B RIs over the period is 0.35 per million 
airport operations. 
The frequency of Category A, Category B, and the Total (all categories) of RIs 
over the period taken from the FAA Runway Incursion database are presented in Figure 
10 with the linear trend line for each category.  Clearly, there is a downward trend in both 
Category A and B runway incursions from 2002 through the 2012.  While the Category A 
and B runway incursions appeared to decline, the total frequency of runway incursions 
for all categories increased with time as shown.  This irony is due to the fact that the 
frequency of Categories C and D were significantly larger than those of Categories A and 
B, and both Categories C and D increased over time, which causes the total of all 
categories to increase.  
 
 
                                                 
6 Category “N/A” is assigned when, upon further review, the event was found not to qualify as a runway 
incursion event, but the event is still retained in the RI database.   
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Figure 10. Frequency of Category A, B, C, D and Total runway incursions over the 12-
year period of interest.  
Note: The data collection began on October 1, 2007; thus, 2001 represents a partial year. 
 
 
 
 The rate of the sum of Category A and Category B runway incursions per million 
airport operations over the each year for the period is presented in Figure 11, and this rate 
of Category A and B runway incursions also decreased over the period.  
In contrast, Figure 12 presents the rate per million airport operations of all 
categories of runway incursions and the frequency (in hundreds) of all categories of 
runway incursions on an annual basis.  In this case, the rate of all categories of runway 
incursions appears to be increasing over the years as did the frequency of runway 
incursions.  Figure 12 indicates an overall increasing trend in the total of all categories of 
RIs, presumably due to an increase in Categories C and D runway incursions.   
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Figure 11.  The annual rate per million airport operations of the sum of Category A and B 
runway incursions over the 12-year period. 
 
 
 
Figure 12. The rate of all categories of runway incursions per million airport operations 
for the 12-year period of interest. 
 
 
 
Also note that there is an increase in the rate of runway incursions from 2007 to 
2008 presumably due to the change in definition to the ICAO runway incursion definition 
on October 1, 2007, which had the effect of adding all airport surface incidents to runway 
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incursion C and D categories, thereby increasing the totals for Categories C and D.  The 
total runway incursion rate per million airport operations and the runway incursion 
frequency continue to increase before and after the ICAO definition was instantiated over 
the period of interest.  The runway incursion frequency increases from 2002 until 2012 in 
a range from 987 to 1395 incursions per year with an average of 10807 per year, while the 
rate per million airport operations increases from about 15 to 28 total incursions per 
million airport operations.  
HFACS Causal Factors for ASDs 
To address the first research question, the HFACS causal factors were coded 
based upon the 289 NTSB cases analyzed in this study.  The coding activity identified 
569 unique human causal factors associated with the 289 NTSB cases, indicating an 
approximate average of two human causal factors per accident/incident.   
The 569 unique human causal factors were further analyzed using the HFACS 
framework. A summary of the causal factors determined for each of the four HFACS 
tiers is presented in Table 16.  The majority of causal factors were classified within in the 
Unsafe Acts tier, which is expected since these are related to the final action prior to the 
accident, and generally represent the focus of most accident investigations.  Preconditions 
for Unsafe Acts were the second most populated tier and they can represent contributing 
factors to an accident although not exclusively, as contributing factors can also be unsafe 
acts committed by one or more participants in the event.  The two higher-level HFACS 
tiers, Organizational Influences and Unsafe Supervision were not populated heavily, 
                                                 
7 This average excludes the partial year data from October 1, 2001 through December 31, 2001; including 
the data for this partial year changes the 12-year average to 1011 incursions, as reported earlier in this 
chapter. 
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having 20 and 8 factors assigned, respectively.  The lack of organizational and 
supervisory factors was twofold: (1) The NTSB investigations are focused on the 
determination of probable cause and contributing factors, which is generally concentrated 
on the lower-level tiers where more evidence is available, and (2) in many cases, the 
ASD investigations were for owner-operator general aviation accidents and incidents, 
where and organizational and supervisory levels for the pilot did not exist. 
 
 
Table 16. A summary of ASD causal factors for each HFACS tier. 
 
 
HFACS Category N %  
Organizational Influences   
Resource Management 1 0% 
Organizational Process 19 3% 
Organizational Climate 0 0% 
Unsafe Supervision   
Inadequate Supervision 5 1% 
Planned Inappropriate Operations 1 0% 
Failure to correct known problem 2 0% 
Supervisory Violation 0 0% 
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts   
Physical Environment 74 13% 
Technological Environment 12 2% 
Adverse Mental State 21 4% 
Adverse Physiological State 1 0% 
Physical-Mental Limitations 3 1% 
Communication/Coordination/Planning 56 10% 
Fitness for Duty 0 0% 
Unsafe Acts   
Decision Error 39 7% 
Skill-Based Error 278 49% 
Perceptual Error 26 5% 
Routine Violation 31 5% 
Exceptional Violation 0 0% 
  Note: The table includes all causal factors and the percentage is expressed based upon 
the total of all factors (569). 
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As shown in Table 16, the unsafe act of skill-based errors accounts for 49% of all 
of the codes developed from the 289 cases studied, while decision errors accounts for 7% 
of all factors.  Preconditions of unsafe acts such as physical environment and 
communication/coordination/planning were the second and third highest occurring codes 
in this study, accounting for 13% and 10% of the factors discovered, respectively. 
The relationship of HFACS codes to the NTSB accident and incident reports 
analyzed in this study is presented in Table 17 where the frequencies of 
accidents/incidents that have at least one of the respective codes present are shown.   
Note in Table 17 that only four codes were present in more than 10% of the 
accident and incident reports.  For example, skill-based errors were present in 
approximately 78% of the cases studied, followed by the physical environment, 
communication/coordination/planning, and decision errors.  The top four codes account 
for 78.6% of the total of 569 codes determined; consequently, the rest of codes were 
excluded from further analysis based upon their low frequency of occurrence in the 
NTSB data examined.  
Examination of the distribution of all causal factors across actors involved is 
presented in Figure 13.  Note that the causal factor distribution indicates that pilots have 
the most causal factors followed by controllers. 
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Table 17. Frequency of accidents and incidents that have at least one of the depicted codes 
present. 
 
 
HFACS Category N %  
Organizational Influences   
Resource Management 1 0.3% 
Organizational Process 17 5.9% 
Organizational Climate 0 0.0% 
Unsafe Supervision   
Inadequate Supervision 5 1.7% 
Planned Inappropriate Operations 1 0.3% 
Failure to correct known problem 2 0.7% 
Supervisory Violation 0 0.0% 
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts   
Physical Environment 62 21.5% 
Technological Environment 12 4.2% 
Adverse Mental State 21 7.3% 
Adverse Physiological State 1 0.3% 
Physical-Mental Limitations 2 0.7% 
Communication/Coordination/Planning 49 17.0% 
Fitness for Duty 0 0.0% 
Unsafe Acts   
Decision Error 35 12.1% 
Skill-Based Error 226 78.2% 
Perceptual Error 24 8.3% 
Routine Violation 27 9.3% 
Exceptional Violation 0 0.0% 
Note: The table includes accidents having at least one of the designated factors and the 
percentage is expressed based upon the total of all accidents (289); therefore, since each 
accident can have multiple factors, percentages do not add up to 100%. 
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Figure 13. Distribution of the frequency of ASD causal factors across actors. 
Note: Actor number key: 1 = pilots; 2 = ATC; 3 = airport; 4 = environment; 5 = 
vehicle/pedestrian. 
 
 
 
Causal Factors for Flight Operation Categories.  The distribution of causal 
factors by types of operation is depicted in Figure 14.  The types of operations were 
grouped into four categories: Commercial scheduled (airline) operations consisting of 
Part 1218 and Part 129 operations; General Aviation operations consisting of Part 91 and 
Part 125; Commercial (non-scheduled) operations consisting of Part 135 and Part 137; 
and Public Use Aircraft (PUBU), which are government and military operations.  For 
each causal factor, Figure 14 depicts the frequency for each type of flight operation 
having that causal factor attribute.   
Clearly from Figure 14, skill-based errors are predominant across all types of 
operations.  In general, the precedence for all types of operations ranks from a high for 
                                                 
8 The “Part” reference is abbreviated to mean the Code of Federal Regulations Title 14:Part ### 
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skill-based errors, to the preconditions of physical environment, 
communication/coordination/planning, followed by decision errors, as was the case for 
all operations in total.   
The distribution of causal factors encountered in each type of flight operation by 
the four HFACS tiers is depicted in Figures 15-18.  In total, skill-based errors, and the 
two preconditions of the physical environment and communications, coordination, and 
planning dominate the total operations.  In the case of skill-based errors, the operations 
of Parts 91/125 indicate more than double (N= 180) the number of skill-based errors than 
Parts 121/129 (N=66).  Parts 135/137 indicate a considerably lesser presence (N=28), and 
public use operations are very infrequent (N=4). 
 
139 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14. The distribution of all causal factors across several types of flight operations. 
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Figure 15. Distribution of ASD Unsafe Acts across flight operation type. 
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Figure 16. Distribution of ASD Preconditions for Unsafe Acts across flight operation 
type. 
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Figure 17. Distribution of ASD Unsafe Supervision categories across flight operation 
type. 
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Figure 18. Distribution of ASD Organizational Influences categories across flight 
operation type. 
 
 
 
As seen in Figure 16, the distribution for the preconditions to unsafe acts indicate 
percentage differences between airline operations and general aviation operations that are 
considerably closer than was observed for skill-based errors as follows: 
Physical Environment 
 Part 121/129 (N=25) 
 Part 91/125 (N=39) 
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 Part 135/137 (N=10) 
 PUBU (N=0) 
Communications, Coordination, and Planning 
 Part 121/129 (N=20) 
 Part 91/125 (N=30) 
 Part 135/137 (N=5) 
 PUBU (N=1) 
The type of operations were further mapped into two basic categories: (1) 
Commercial Aviation (containing Parts 121/129, 135/137, and PUBU), and (2) General 
Aviation (containing Parts 91/125).  The distribution of all HFACS categories across 
commercial and general aviation operations is illustrated in Figure 19.  The results are 
depicted in Figure 20, for Unsafe Acts, and in Figure 21, for Preconditions for Unsafe 
Acts.  In the case of preconditions, the distributions for each precondition are nearly 
equal for each precondition, but the chi squared rest does not indicate significance.  
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Figure 19. Distribution of ASD HFACS categories across commercial and general 
aviation operation types. 
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Figure 20. Distribution of ASD HFACS Unsafe Acts categories across commercial and 
general aviation operation type. 
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Figure 21. Distribution of ASD HFACS Preconditions for Unsafe Acts categories across 
commercial and general aviation operation type. 
 
 
 
The Top Four (4) HFACS Causal Factors.   The distribution of causal factors 
across HFACS categories varies in frequency, with most of the distribution falling in 
Unsafe Acts and in Preconditions for Unsafe Acts.  As determined from the previous 
section, and as shown in Figure 22, there are four causal factors that were present at least 
once in more than 10% of the accidents and incidents studied.  Within the category of 
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Unsafe Acts and the sub-category of Errors, Skill-based errors were present in 78% of all 
accidents/incidents reported, and Decision errors were present in 12% of the accidents 
and incidents studied.   Under the category of Pre-conditions, physical environment was 
indicated in 21% and Communications, Coordination, and Planning was indicated in 17% 
of the accidents and incidents studied.    
 
 
Figure 22. The percentage of accidents and incidents having the top 4 causal factors 
present at least once. 
Note: Since multiple factors can be present in one event, the percentages do not sum to 
100%. 
 
 
 
A compilation of the sub-factors associated with the top four causal factors 
determined in this study is presented in Table 18.  As indicated in Chapter III, the NTSB 
Probable Cause reports were analyzed and HFACS codes (e.g., skill-based error, 
decision error, etc.) were assigned to each case reported.  Based upon further 
examination of the causal factors, the NTSB narratives, and rationale provided by the 
coding team, the determination of sub-factors for each HFACS category was enabled.  In 
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the case of skill-based errors, three sub factors were identified: (a) Inadequate visual 
lookout, (b) Failure to maintain control, and (c) Failure to maintain clearance (see Table 
19).  The percentage of the total skill-based errors that each of the sub-factors occurred in 
all of the NTSB cases is provided.  Thus, 37% of the skill-based errors were categorized 
as inadequate visual lookout, 26% as failure to maintain control, and 36% as failure to 
maintain clearance.  The same logic follows for the other factor categories entered in 
Table 18: Unsafe acts, include decision errors; Preconditions include: physical 
environment, and Communications, Coordination, and Planning, with each of these 
causal factors having the sub-factors indicated and occurring as presented in Table 18. 
Top 4 causal factors analyzed by actor.  The top four causal factors along with 
their respective sub-factors were examined in terms of the actor committing the error as 
assigned in the NTSB probable cause statement for each event.  As presented in Chapter 
III, five classes of actor were defined during the coding process and based upon the 
NTSB assignment of probable cause in all of the cases studies: ATC, Pilot, Vehicle, 
Airport, and Environment.  These classes are fairly broad and their context implies the 
actual individual involved.  For example, as used in the context of Unsafe Acts, ATC 
means an air traffic controller in the control tower at a towered airport.  It is not 
necessarily a specific position in the tower, it can mean the local controller, the ground 
controller, or even a supervising controller in the tower environment, all of whom may 
have contributed to the event as determined by the NTSB.   
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Table 18. Causal Factors and sub-factors with their percent contribution to the causal 
factor. 
 
  
HFACS Tier Causal Factor Sub-factor 
% 
Causal 
Factor 
Preconditions 
Physical Environment 
Sun glare 15% 
Object location on airport 
surface 34% 
Obstructed Visibility 38% 
Airport surface conditions 9% 
Wind gust 4% 
   
   
Communication/Coordination
/Planning 
Inadequate preflight planning 18% 
Poor communication 45% 
Poor coordination 38% 
    
    
Unsafe Acts 
Skill-Based Error 
Inadequate visual lookout 37% 
Failure to maintain control 26% 
Failure to maintain clearance 36% 
   
   
Decision Error 
Improper inflight planning 95% 
Delayed remedial action 5% 
Note: Percentages are the percent that the sub-factor was determined for each HFACS 
causal factor; therefore, the sum of sub-factor percentages for each causal factor is 100%. 
 
 
 
The term ATC is broadened as the HFACS hierarchy is traversed upwards to 
indicate the ATC supervisory level (above the local tower supervisor) and to the FAA in 
the HFACS organizational tier.  In terms of the Pilot, the context can include an aircraft 
pilot or co-pilot if the aircraft requires multiple flight crew members, and it can refer to 
flight crews of different aircraft if multiple aircraft are involved.  As was the case for 
ATC, moving upward in the HFACS tiers, pilot assumes the more general aircraft 
operator context, which may be the aircraft owner/pilot in the case of some general 
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aviation operations or a large corporate organization in the case of large general aviation 
fleets or airline operations.  
The classification of vehicle includes vehicle operators and pedestrians, analogous 
to pilots, these are the vehicle drivers or personnel located on the airport surface.  Airport 
refers to other personnel who have functions performed on behalf of the airport 
operation; however, if they were operating vehicles, their actions were captured under the 
vehicle category.  The airport category refers more to ground marshallers, baggage 
handlers, airport engineers or maintenance personnel, and in the higher HFACS tiers, the 
airport organization.   
Finally the term “environment,” used in terms of an actor committing an unsafe 
act, refers to an environmental event that caused an accident or incident to occur.  In all 
case studies, there were no unsafe acts performed by an environmental actor, in all cases 
the environmental actor became synonymous with the environmental precondition. 
Examining the nature of causal factors for ASDs in addressing the first research 
question, it is essential to examine the context in which these causal factors occurred.  
That is, the actor responsible for the error is part of the context of the error.  
Determination of causal factors related to ASDs ultimately aims at developing 
intervention mechanisms that will address causation and eliminate the occurrence of 
similar ASDs.  However, the intervention mechanism is dependent upon a thorough 
understanding of the context of the error.  The same type of error committed by a 
controller and by a pilot may require completely different intervention strategies due to 
the different context of the error.    
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The distribution of skill-based errors and sub-factors across the actors involved in 
the error are presented in Figure 23.  Not surprising, pilot sub-factor percentages are all 
larger than those for corresponding sub-factors for all other actors.  ATC percentages are 
second overall, followed by vehicle/pedestrian factors.  As noted, environmental 
contributions under skill-based errors are zero.   
 
 
Figure 23. The distribution of skill-based error sub-factors associated with the various 
actors involved in the NTSB cases. 
Note: The percentages expressed for each sub-factor and actor represent the percentage of 
the total of all skill-based errors. 
 
 
 
As depicted in Figure 23, the same sub-factor is utilized to denote a condition 
perpetrated by different actors; however, in these cases, the sub-factor must be evaluated 
in the context of the actor.  For example, “Failure to maintain control” in the context of a 
pilot indicates that the pilot in some way lost control of the aircraft.  In the context of 
ATC, it would have a slightly different implication such as the local controller cleared an 
aircraft to cross a runway while an aircraft was landing on the runway.  In the case of a 
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vehicle driver failure to maintain control could have the context of a vehicle failing to 
stop at a stop sign and colliding with an aircraft on a taxiway.  The number of instances 
of failure to maintain control in the case of an airport actor is limited, but the context 
might be failure of a baggage operator to secure a cart, which was blown into a taxiing 
aircraft by a wind gust.   
The sub-factor “Failure to maintain clearance” also has contextual meaning.  In 
the case of ATC, it could mean a failure to maintain separation between two aircraft; a 
pilot might have failed to maintain clearance between the aircraft wing and a light pole, 
as could be the case for a vehicle driver.  Finally, the sub-factor “Inadequate visual 
lookout” would apply to ATC in the context of failing to see or monitor the airport 
situation from the tower, while a pilot’s context could be a failure to see or monitor the 
situation from the cockpit window, as could be the case for a vehicle driver. 
The distribution of the physical environment precondition and its associated sub-
factors factors is presented in Figure 24.  Most of the sub-factors under this factor have 
had little correlation with actors and are grouped under the environment actor.  The fact 
that several sub-factors are present under the pilot and airport indicates that the sub-factor 
had a direct influence on the pilot or was directly influenced by the airport operation as 
opposed to the more general state of being present in the surrounding environment.  For 
example, the sub-factor of an “Object location on the airport surface” classified under the 
actor airport could be in the context of the lack conspicuity of a sign along a taxiway, 
which was attributed to the airport organization and personnel who were responsible for 
locating the sign.  In the case of a pilot, the context might be the location of a parked fuel 
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truck or vehicle in the proximity of a taxiway.  The pilot would have had to maintain 
separation of the aircraft from the vehicle due to its presence in the local environment. 
 
 
Figure 24. The distribution of physical environment precondition sub-factors associated 
with the various actors involved in the NTSB cases. 
Note: The percentages expressed for each sub-factor and actor represent the percentage of 
the total of all physical environment preconditions. 
 
 
 
Of course, the sub-factor alignment with the environmental actor is more direct, 
as wind, sun glare, airport surface conditions (pavement), and low visibility are 
environmental factors that can contribute to accidents and incidents, but were not directly 
responsible for the event. 
TOTAL ATC Pilot Vehicle Airport Environment
Sunglare 15% 0% 0% 0% 0% 15%
Object location on airport surface 34% 0% 11% 1% 9% 12%
Obstructed Visibility 38% 0% 4% 0% 0% 34%
Airport surface conditions 9% 0% 3% 0% 0% 7%
WIND 4% 0% 0% 0% 0% 4%
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The sub-factors associated with the precondition of communication, coordination, 
and planning are presented in Figure 25.  In this situation, the context of “Inadequate pre-
flight planning” applies to a pilot who fails to fully plan their flight, but also to a 
controller who develops an inadequate plan of action for the safe, expeditious flow of 
traffic on the airport surface.  The precondition of communication, coordination, and 
planning does not apply to actors: vehicle, airport, or environment.   
 
 
Figure 25. The distribution of communication, coordination, and planning precondition 
sub-factors associated with the various actors involved in the NTSB cases. 
Note: The percentages expressed for each sub-factor and actor represent the percentage of 
the total of all communication, coordination, and planning preconditions. 
 
 
 
The “poor communication” sub-factor generally is used in the context of pilot – 
controller communications as the flight progresses across the airport surface.  The sub-
factor “Poor coordination” generally refers to a failure of synchronization between 
controllers in the tower, such as the local and ground controllers who need to coordinate 
activities, or a failure to synchronize activities between members of the flight crew in the 
aircraft. 
TOTAL ATC Pilot Vehicle Airport Environment
Inadequate preflight planning 18% 4% 14% 0% 0% 0%
Poor communication 45% 18% 27% 0% 0% 0%
Poor coordination 38% 27% 11% 0% 0% 0%
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The distribution of sub-factors of the decision error unsafe act across actors is 
presented in Figure 26.  In this case, these sub-factors were populated only for ATC, 
pilots, and vehicle operators.  The sub-factor “Improper in-flight planning” used in the 
context of a pilot indicates that the pilot either failed to develop a plan to address the 
situation or developed an erroneous plan, as is also the case when the actor is the vehicle 
operator.  In the case of the controller, this sub-factor reflects the lack of a plan or an 
erroneous plan for the airport surface operation. 
 
 
 
Figure 26. The decision error sub-factors associated with the various actors involved in 
the NTSB cases. 
Note: The percentages expressed for each sub-factor and actor represent the percentage of 
the total of all decision errors present. 
 
 
  
The distribution of sub-factors was also calculated for type of operation: Parts 
121/129 (airline), Parts 91/125 (general aviation), Parts 135/137 (air taxi), and PUBU 
(public use).  The distribution of skill-based errors across operation type, depicted in 
Figure 27, shows that general aviation has more overall skill-based errors than airline and 
TOTAL ATC Pilot Vehicle Airport Environment
Improper inflight planning 95% 11% 71% 13% 0% 0%
Delayed remedial action 5% 0% 5% 0% 0% 0%
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air taxi, even when airline and air taxi are combined.  However, the skill-based error loss 
of control sub-factor frequencies for airline and general aviation are comparable.  In the 
case of inadequate visual lookout, general aviation is an order of magnitude greater than 
airline or air taxi, and general aviation is approximately double the percentage of Part 
121/129 in the case of failure to maintain clearance.  When viewing the skill-based error 
total and sub-factors, by type of operation, note that these frequencies extend across all 
actors; thus, the sub-factors need to be evaluated in the context of the actor.  For example, 
Part 121/129 operations indicate that 3% of the total of all skill-based errors were 
inadequate visual lookout.  In this context, those sub-factors were committed by all 
classes of actors having skill-based errors; that is, pilots, controllers, airport personnel, 
and vehicle operators. 
 
 
 
Figure 27. The skill-based error sub-factors associated with the various types of 
operation involved in the NTSB cases. 
Note: The percentages expressed for each sub-factor and operation type represent the 
percentage of the total of all skill-based errors present. 
 
 
TOTAL Part 121/129 Part 91/125 Part 135/137 PUBU
Inadequate visual lookout 37% 3% 29% 4% 1%
Failure to maintain control 26% 10% 13% 3% 0%
Failure to maintain clearance 36% 11% 22% 3% 0%
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As depicted in Figure 28, the physical environment precondition distribution 
reveals that general aviation exceeds airline and the combination of airline and air taxi 
operations in all sub-factors except obstruction to visibility and airport surface conditions.  
This may be a reflection of the fact that airline and air taxi operations are conducted in 
more inferior weather conditions than many general aviation operations; however, the 
NTSB data do not support that inference.  
 
 
 
Figure 28. The physical environment precondition sub-factors associated with the various 
types of operation involved in the NTSB cases. 
Note: The percentages expressed for each sub-factor and operation type represent the 
percentage of the total of all physical environment preconditions present. 
 
 
 
As presented in Figure 29, the sub-factor distribution for communications, 
coordination, and planning across types of operations.  Observe that the communications 
sub-factor, which reflects basically controller - pilot communications is fairly evenly 
distributed between general aviation and the combination of airline and air taxi (i.e., 
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Sunglare 15% 4% 9% 1% 0%
Object location on airport surface 34% 4% 28% 1% 0%
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commercial operations) indicating equal confusion among operation types.  However, 
coordination sub-factors are slightly higher in the case of commercial operations which 
could indicate the enlarged presence of multi-person crews or tower coordination issues 
at larger airports that are frequented by commercial flights.  Planning preconditions 
appear to be significantly more frequent for general aviation. 
 
 
Figure 29. The poor communication, coordination and planning precondition sub-factors 
associated with the various types of operation involved in the NTSB cases. 
Notes: The percentages expressed for each sub-factor and operation type represent the 
percentage of the total of all poor communication, coordination and planning 
preconditions present. 
 
 
 
As shown in Figure 30, the decision error distribution across operation types 
indicates that general aviation exceeds the combination of airline and air taxi operations 
in the case of in-flight planning decision errors by more than double.  Delayed remedial 
action indicates a much lower frequency and is attributed to only general aviation 
operations.  Generally, the lack of timely remedial action was typical in flight training 
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scenarios where the student pilot made an error and the flight instructor was slow to 
correct the error or to take corrective action. 
 
 
Figure 30. The decision error sub-factors associated with the various types of operation 
involved in the NTSB cases. 
Notes: The percentages expressed for each sub-factor and operation type represent the 
percentage of the total of all decision errors present. 
 
 
 
Selected actor skill-based errors, sub-factors, and type of operations.    An 
analysis of all ATC skill-based errors by total and sub-factor across all types of 
operations is presented in Figure 31.  Percentages of skill-based denote that a total of 
61% of the ATC failure of skill-based errors (all three sub-factors) occurred with aircraft 
operating under Airline operations (Part 121/129 rules).  A further breakout of Airline 
operations skill-based error sub-factors was: ATC failure to maintain clearance (N= 11, 
36.4%), ATC failure to maintain control (N = 18, 54.5%) and ATC inadequate visual 
lookout (N = 3, 9.1%).  If the Part 135/137 and PUBU operations are added to the Part 
121/129 to form a group of commercial aviation operations, then ATC skill-based errors 
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and all three sub-factors for commercial operations are three times greater (N = 40, 
74.1%) than ATC skill-based errors that occur under general aviation (Part 91/125) 
operations (N = 14, 25.9%). 
 
 
 
Figure 31. Frequency of ATC skill-based error sub-factors associated with the various 
types of operation involved in the NTSB cases. 
 
 
 
As presented in Figure 32, a distribution across types of operations represents 
pilot skill-based errors and their associated sub-factors.  In this case, the percentage for 
each of the three sub-factors for general aviation operations significantly exceeds the 
corresponding percentage for each of the three sub-factors associated with airline 
operations (Parts 121/129) and air taxi operations (Parts 135/137) either taken 
individually or as an aggregate.  The grouping for commercial and general aviation is 
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shown in Figure 33.  However, the contribution of each sub-factor to individual operation 
types as shown in each column is different across operations in both Figures 32 and 33.  
Under Part 121/129, failure to maintain clearance (N = 16, 59.3%) is higher than failure 
to maintain control (N = 8, 28.6%), and each is considerably greater than inadequate 
visual lookout (N = 3, 11.1%).  Under general aviation operations (Part 91/125), failure to 
maintain clearance (N = 56, 36.1%) is higher than failure to maintain control (N = 28, 
18.1%), as was the case for Part 121/129, inadequate visual lookout (N = 71, 45.8%) is 
the opposite and is highest for general aviation.  Under Part 135/137 operations, failure to 
maintain clearance (N = 7, 38.9%) and inadequate visual lookout (N = 9, 50.0%) are 
comparable and larger than failure to maintain control (N = 2, 11.1%), while under 
PUBU operations, which represents the smallest class of operations, the only reported 
sub-factor is inadequate visual lookout (N = 2, 100.0%).  Aggregating the frequencies 
into commercial and general aviation categories reveals that general aviation exceeds 
commercial aviation in all sub-factor frequencies, as is depicted in Table 19.  
Given that skill-based errors occur most frequently, it was useful to examine 
these errors in more detail.  The rate of occurrence of accidents and incidents having at 
least one skill-based error code in the 289 cases studied over the 12-year period is 
presented in Figure 34.  A trend line is included and shows an increase in accidents and 
incidents having skill-based errors over time.  Note that the number of completed NTSB 
reports for 2012 was limited to 5; consequently, the accident rate for 2012 was not 
utilized to determine the trend line in Figure 35. 
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Table 19. Frequency distribution of Pilot ASD skill-based error sub-factors for commercial 
and general aviation operations. 
 
Type of 
Operation 
Failure to 
maintain 
clearance 
Failure to 
maintain control 
Inadequate visual 
lookout 
Total 
Commercial 
Aviation 
(23, 48.9 %) (10, 21.3 %) (14, 29.8 %) (47, 
100%)  
General 
Aviation 
(56, 36.1 %) (28, 18.1 %) (71, 45.8 %) (155, 
100%) 
Total (79, 39.1 %) (38, 18.8 %) (85, 42.1 %) (202, 
100%) 
Note: data is presented as (frequency, % of frequency total for sub-factor). 
 
 
 
Figure 32. Frequency distribution of pilot ASD skill-based error sub-factors associated 
with the various types of operations. 
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Figure 33. Frequency of pilot ASD skill-based error sub-factors associated with 
commercial and general aviation types of operation. 
 
 
Figure 34.  A depiction of the rate of accidents and incidents having at least one skill-
based error code over the period of study. 
Note: The accident rate for the last year, 2012, was based upon only five completed 
NTSB accident reports and was omitted for purposes of establishing a trend line. 
  
165 
 
 
 
CHAPTER V      
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter presents a discussion of the results, offers conclusions from the study 
and provides recommendations for further study and action.  Prior to entering into 
discussion of the results it is useful to recapitulate several aspects of the HFACS 
categories and how they apply to ASDs. 
Discussion 
HFACS Categories in the context of ASDs.   The preponderance of causal 
factors obtained in this study were skill-based errors as indicated throughout Chapter IV.  
Reason (2013) presents an interesting discussion of skill-based errors in the context of a 
teapot and a cat.  As the story is told, Reason was boiling a kettle of water to make tea.  
The kettle was sitting on the kitchen counter as Reason was preparing to spoon tea leaves 
into the kettle.  At that moment, Reason’s cat entered the kitchen doorway howling to be 
fed.  Giving the cat’s disruption first priority, Reason opened the can of cat food inserted 
the spoon and dolloped the cat food directly into his teapot (Reason, 2013).   
To better explain the significance of a skill-based error in the context of airport 
surface operations, one first examines Reason’s definition of error: “The term error will 
be applied to all of those occasions in which a planned sequence of mental or physical 
activities fails to achieve its desired goal without the intervention of some chance 
agency” (Reason, 2013, p.10).  Logically, Reason (2013) deduces that there are two 
manners in which the desired objective can fail to be achieved. 
Slips and HFACS skill-based errors.  The plan of action is appropriate, but the 
execution of the plan is foiled by slips, and lapses (absent-mindedness), clumsy, or 
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maladroit actions.  Note that this type of error occurs in the execution stage and not in the 
formulation of the plan.  Often these slips are consequences of unintended activation of 
largely automatic procedural routines, which Reason (2013) calls action schemas.  
Reason’s cat food into the teapot is an example of an automatic action gone wrong; he 
didn’t stop and think about it before taking the action.  These errors are categorized as 
skill-based errors in HFACS. 
In the context of ASDs, such skill-based errors would include an aircraft taxiing 
along a route that encounters an intersection and the pilot turns the aircraft automatically 
much as an automobile driver steers the wheel as the road turns.  In this case, the pilot’s 
turn may have been onto a roadway in error and a deviation of the planned taxi route.  
Perhaps the pilot’s attention was diverted just prior to the turn as Reason’s attention was 
diverted due to the cat. 
Planning Errors and HFACS decision errors.  The actions performed in the 
execution of the plan are correct; however, the plan is inadequate to achieve the desired 
goal.  These honest mistakes, which occur when the individual lacks appropriate 
knowledge, or makes an error of poor choice, in problem solving, or in a procedure are 
categorized as decision errors in HFACS. 
In the context of ASDs, the prior example of a pilot taxiing to an intersection and 
turning the aircraft on to a roadway instead of a taxiway could also have been a decision 
error if the pilot had incorrectly (or unknowingly) misread the airport chart thinking that 
the roadway was actually a taxiway and that turn was correct in the context of the plan.  
In this example, the plan was incorrect. 
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Discussion of the Study Results.   The ASD study results were presented in 
Chapter IV, and this section provides a detailed discussion of the ASD study results.  
Prior to discussing the detailed research questions, a general discussion of the 
methodology will inform the detailed discussion.   
NTSB Reporting.   In order to fully understand the potential outcomes of this 
study, it is helpful to reflect upon the inputs and the limitations in the study and how they 
bear upon the study results.  The NTSB investigates and reports on all U.S. air carrier 
accidents, commuter and air taxi crashes, mid-air collisions, serious mishaps involving 
public use (government) aircraft and all fatal general aviation accidents.  The NTSB may 
delegate the FAA to perform the investigation of non-fatal, general aviation accidents, 
involving fixed wing aircraft of less than 12,500 pounds, home built aircraft, crop dusters 
and rotorcraft, but the NTSB retains the discretion to oversee these accident 
investigations, if necessary.  Given the scope of NTSB aviation accident and incident 
responsibility, the severity of any accident or incident has significant variance.  In the 
case of ASD investigations, the NTSB can investigate major accidents with fatalities, 
such as the 1977 airport collision in Tenerife (summarized in Chapter II),  to minor 
accidents such as an aircraft that taxis into a tree on an isolated airport in Alaska9.  While 
there were no major fatal air carrier ASD accidents during the period of this study, there 
were significant incidents where separation was estimated to have been 50 feet, and there 
were numerous ground collisions during the period.  Consequently, the visibility of the 
NTSB investigation, the complexity of the event, as well as the severity of the event all 
contribute to the depth and breadth of the probable cause report.   
                                                 
9 See NTSB Report Number ANC01LA064,  
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In the case of less severe events, a field investigation may be conducted or the 
NTSB may delegate the investigation to the FAA.  In the case of a field investigation a 
factual report is developed, from which the investigator recommends a probable cause 
determination to the NTSB.  The NTSB reviews the field investigation reports and votes 
to adopt, reject or modify the probable cause determination recommended by a Field 
Investigator. 
Major accident investigations led by NTSB "Go Teams" are more heavily 
documented.  The Investigator-In-Charge (IIC) prepares a draft NTSB Report and 
submits it to the NTSB for review.  In major airline disaster cases, and other accidents of 
great public interest, the NTSB may conduct public hearings wherein witnesses are called 
and interrogated.  Subsequently, the NTSB deliberates to determine probable cause, 
which is published in what has been traditionally called The NTSB "Blue Cover" Report, 
representing a very detailed accounting of the event.  The contents of an NTSB report can 
vary from 1 to 2 paragraphs, as was the case for the tree collision event mentioned above 
to approximately 88-pages in the Blue Book report that resulted from the last fatal 
runway incursion in the United States in 1996 (NTSB, 1997). 
The HFACS analysis performed in this ASD study was based upon the probable 
cause and contributing factors or conditions that were determined in the NTSB 
investigation and reported in the narrative of the NTSB Probable Cause Report.  Given 
the complexities of the events, the resulting HFACS causal factor determinations may 
have resulted from one phrase, several paragraphs, and in simple cases, only the unsafe 
act may have been reported as an NTSB probable cause.  In other, more complex events, 
the investigation may detail multiple unsafe acts that were perpetrated by multiple actors, 
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and there may have been numerous contributing factors identified that traverse upward 
through all HFACS tiers.  That is not to say that causal factors from the upper-level 
HFACS tiers were not present in less complex cases, they were simply not identified in 
the NTSB narrative.  Thus, the use of the NTSB narrative can be limiting with respect to 
contributing factors as determined in the upper-level HFACS tiers.  
The research questions presented in Chapter I are discussed in the following 
sections. 
The nature of ASD Causal Factors.   When considering that 569 causal factors 
were determined from the NTSB reports over the 12-year study period (January 1, 2001 
to December 31, 2012), 278 of the total of all causal factors were skill-based errors; 
consequently, it is clear from this study that skill-based errors represent the predominant 
factor in the cause of human error in ASDs as determined by this study.  That 
notwithstanding, the results identified four causal factors that occurred at least once in 
more than 10% of the accidents and incidents investigated by the NTSB over the period 
of this study.  
The Top 4 causal factors and sub-factors.  The top four HFACS factors identified 
(in frequency order) were unsafe acts: skill-based errors; preconditions (environmental): 
physical environment; preconditions (personnel factors): communications, coordination, 
and planning; and unsafe acts: decision errors.  This hierarchy utilized the total set of 
identified causal factors and was not filtered by actor or type of operation.  Each causal 
factor collected in the top four categories was examined in the context of the rationale 
provided by the NTSB narrative to determine circumstances associated with the factor.  
Based upon an evaluation of the more detailed conditions, the causal factor was 
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decomposed into a sub-factor category that was aligned with the context provided in the 
NTSB narrative.  This activity resulted in the determination of sub-factors, often called 
nanocodes in the HFACS literature, which were collected for each factor determined.  
For example, the highest occurring factor, skill-based errors, resulted in the 
determination of three sub-factors: (1) inadequate visual lookout, (2) failure to maintain 
control, and (3) failure to maintain clearance.  While these sub-factors were used as 
collectors across all 569 codes determined, they do not necessarily convey the same task 
performance or error committed by the various actors associated with the original causal 
factor.  For example, a tower controller classified as inadequate visual lookout would be 
committing an error by not maintaining cognizance of the airport situation from the tower 
cab window, whereas the same sub-factor applied to a pilot would infer a lack of 
cognizance from the cockpit window, clearly a different vantage point with a similar 
error condition.  Therefore, it is necessary to examine the results in the context of the 
actor to determine the relevance of the actor’s perspective.  Since skill-based errors 
represent the largest occurring causal factor as well as being the leading causal factor 
present at least once in an accident or incident, the following analysis is conducted only 
for skill-based errors, as noted. 
A total of 278 skill-based error causal factors were coded.  Examination of the 
actors involved in perpetrating those skill-based errors reveals the following values, 
where percentages are expressed in terms of the 278 total: ATC (n = 54, 19.4%); Pilots (n 
= 202, 72.7%); Vehicle (n = 20, 7.2%); Airport (n = 2, 0.7%); and Environment (n = 0, 
0.0%).  Clearly, the preponderance of skill-based errors were executed by pilots, 
followed by ATC, both classes accounting for 91.6% of the total of 278 skill-based errors 
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discovered.  Therefore, a more detailed examination of these two classes of actor was 
undertaken. 
Table 20 repeats the results of Chapter IV with respect to the skill-based error 
sub-factors for the aforementioned two classes of actors: ATC and Pilots.  Examination 
of this data revealed that skill-based errors attributed to pilots were more than 3 times the 
frequency of those attributed to ATC.  Some of this may be attributable to the fact that 
many of the accidents and incidents occurred at non-towered airports, where there were 
no controllers.   
 
 
Table 20. Skill-based errors and their sub-factors filtered for ATC and Pilots for ASDs 
over the period of January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2012. 
 
 
Skill-based error Sub-factors ATC Pilot 
 N %  N % 
Skill-based error Total 54 19.4% 202 72.7% 
Inadequate visual lookout 6 11% 85 42% 
Failure to maintain control 30 56% 38 19% 
Failure to maintain clearance 18 33% 79 39% 
Note:  The percentages expressed for ATC and Pilot classes represent: 
(1) In the case of skill-based error Total – the percentage of all skill based errors 
coded (N = 278), and 
(2) In the case of sub-factors – the percentage of the total of all skill-based errors 
categorized for that class. 
 
 
 
Looking at the distribution of sub-factors in Table 20 there is little similarity 
between ATC and Pilots in terms of their frequency or percentage spread.  Under ATC, 
the rank ordering is: (1) failure to maintain control, (2) failure to maintain clearance, and 
(3) inadequate visual lookout.  In the context of ATC, this means that the controller failed 
to maintain control of the situation most often, then secondly allowed separation to be 
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violated, followed by not scanning the airport situation outside of the tower window.  In 
terms of the loss of control, in the case of ATC, examples of actions within this sub-
factor include actions where the controller: failed to maintain awareness of an aircraft or 
multiple aircraft, failed to issue appropriate instructions to one or more aircraft, failed to 
monitor the position of aircraft or vehicles on the airport or their speed and destination, or 
forgot about another issued clearance. 
The failure of a controller to maintain clearance is often related to a loss of 
control, but it is more the fact that the controller allowed separation between two aircraft 
(or an aircraft and a vehicle or object) to be reduced to the point where a collision 
occurred or was narrowly averted.  Finally, the inadequate visual lookout sub-factor 
indicates that the controller did not look out of the tower cab and assess the situation as 
appropriate prior to issuing a clearance or instruction that resulted in the occurrence of a 
conflict. 
The rank ordering of the sub-factors in the case of the pilot is: (1) inadequate 
visual lookout, (2) failure to maintain clearance, and (3) failure to maintain control.  In 
the context of the pilot, inadequate visual lookout indicates that the pilot did not look out 
of the cockpit window while operating on the airport surface and therefore something 
happened.  In fact, the phrase inadequate visual lookout is a phrase that is directly 
repeated from many of the NTSB reports.  Since ground operations of aircraft are 
performed through visual observation and navigation, it is not clear why the pilot was not 
looking out the window, but it could possibly have been caused by a distraction in the 
cockpit or another event that diverted the pilot’s attention away from looking out the 
window.  Failure of the pilot to maintain clearance is most often associated with the 
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pilot’s failure to maintain physical separation of the aircraft from another aircraft or 
object.  In some cases the NTSB report refers to a misjudgment by the pilot, but in most 
cases there is no additional rationale provided beyond stating that the aircraft collided 
with an object.  Failure to maintain control by the pilot has several examples.  One, as is 
implied by the sub-factor title, occurs when the pilot fails to control the aircraft primarily 
through poor piloting skills.  Other examples include: following another aircraft too 
closely, wrong turns, failure to follow an ATC clearance, or selecting a taxiway for 
landing instead of a runway. 
Potential interventions to prevent controller and pilot skill-based errors from 
leading to ASDs require further study.  In many cases, for ATC skill-based errors, 
current views appear to look to automation as a solution.  It is difficult to provide 
definitive comments concerning solutions without knowing the exact details of the 
automation and without further investigation of causal factors; however, current tower 
ATC automation systems that provide an airport situation display to the controller and in 
some cases provide alerts of impending separation losses or potential collisions may not 
completely solve the problem.  In some cases of skill-based error where a controller 
forgets about issuing a previous clearance and then issues a conflicting clearance to 
another aircraft, surveillance-based automation systems may not detect the conflict in the 
clearance, but may ultimately detect a pending loss of separation that results from the 
clearance conflict.  Unfortunately, the latency of the resulting surveillance alert may be 
significant relative to the time the error was made; thus, options for resolution of the 
conflict may be extremely limited.  Alternatively, if a controller is fixated on another 
situation at the airport and loses awareness of other impending situations, it may not 
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matter that the controller is fixated by looking out of a tower window or by staring at an 
automation display on the tower console.  In this case, the controller’s fixation would be 
the error that needs to be prevented, possibly by some alerting or alarming mechanism.  
Similarly, in the case of pilots, adding surveillance-based automation inside the cockpit 
will likely divert the pilot’s attention from looking out the window, and may result in 
secondary ASDs that occur because of the diverted attention.  Radar sensors on wing 
extremities of large aircraft have the potential to help pilots maintain clearance of the 
wing tips, but there are cases where object collisions occurred under the wing, which 
might not be detected by these sensors.  The solution probably can be found through a 
series of multiple interventions that are well integrated across all actors involved and 
include the automation systems that form the total airport operations system. 
Integrating HFACS tiers for selected cases.  One of the virtues of HFACS is that 
it depicts the error pathway through multiple tiers, dubbed slices of “Swiss cheese.”  The 
lowest tier, unsafe acts, corresponds to the action of the operator that results in an 
accident or incident.  Utilizing NTSB reports to complete the HFACS template most 
often pairs the NTSB probable cause with the unsafe act(s) committed by the various 
actors in the event.  Consequently, most, but not all, of the ASD events drawn from the 
NTSB database have generated at least one unsafe act.  In the case of this study, 374 
(66%) of the 569 causal factors were unsafe acts. 
The next tier above unsafe acts in HFACS is preconditions, which refer to pre-
existing conditions associated with either the actor’s state of being, factors associated 
with the actor’s behavior or interaction, or elements of the surrounding environment that 
may contribute to the incident or that may enable the error vector to pierce the hole in the 
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protective slice of Swiss cheese.  Most often, when using the NTSB reports to complete 
the HFACS template, these factors are gleaned from contributors to the probable cause. 
Analysis of the NTSB reports determined 167 (29%) precondition factors.  
The next tier in HFACS is unsafe supervision, which may not apply to all ASDs 
reported by the NTSB.  For example, during taxing a general aviation pilot who owns the 
aircraft, effectively covers the role of supervisor and operator together.  In the case of 
ATC, airport, vehicles, and pedestrians, who are part of an organization, supervisory 
actions may be present.  The analysis was able to determine only 8 (1%) unsafe 
supervision factors from the 289 accidents and incidents studied, generally from 
contributing factors to the NTSB probable cause if so identified. 
The uppermost tier in the HFACS framework is organizational influences.  This 
tier reflects the influences of the organization and the consequences of these influences 
upon lower-level tiers.  In the case of a general aviation aircraft owner and pilot, there is 
likely not an organization looming over the individual, and again, as was the case in the 
supervisory level, the single individual also functions as the organization.  In the present 
ASD study, 20 (4%) of the 569 factors were identified as organizational influences, based 
upon contributory factors as determined from the NTSB reports. 
From the previous discussion, it can be seen that the frequency of HFACS causal 
factors determined from NTSB reports dwindles at higher HFACS tiers.  As has also 
been discussed earlier in this chapter, the NTSB accident and incident reports vary in 
their level of detail in accordance with the complexity of the accident or incident and the 
resulting intensity of the investigation.  Thus, the NTSB probable cause reports do not 
always provide contributory factors that reach upward into the higher HFACS tiers 
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associated with preconditions for unsafe acts, unsafe supervision, and organizational 
aspects.  As the NTSB performs accident and incident investigations, the severity of the 
event may not warrant a detailed examination of the upper tier factors that contributed to 
the event.  In some case, an aircraft owner/operator may not be traced to the higher tiers 
in terms of supervisory or organizational levels of causality.  In fact, the pilot/owner 
represents the functionality of the organization and supervisor together with being the 
operator involved in the unsafe act.  Alternatively, when the actor is ATC, there is a well-
defined organizational structure above the operator and contributing factors from these 
layers may indeed be reported.  This study was limited to the published NTSB report as 
the only source utilized to populate the HFACS framework, and the results as discussed 
herein reflect the NTSB determinations. 
There are several cases that were utilized in this study that reflect the 
aforementioned assertions, and they are reviewed briefly in the following sections.  
NTSB document numbers are provided for each case to identify the NTSB report from 
which the factors were determined. 
Case 1 - NTSB Reports FTW01IA183A and FTW01IA183B10.  This event 
occurred on August 16, 2001 at the Dallas Fort Worth Airport in Dallas, Texas.  The 
event occurred during a runway incursion between a Boeing 737-347, aircraft operating 
as Delta Airlines Flight 1521 (DAL1521), and a Boeing 737-524, operating as 
Continental Airlines Flight 1487 (COA1487) at approximately 10:42 AM CDT.  The 
Delta aircraft sustained minor damage and the Continental aircraft was undamaged as a 
                                                 
10 Note that the NTSB issues a report for each aircraft involved in an accident or incident; thus, in the case 
of a ground collision between two aircraft, two reports would be issued, numbered the same except that an 
“A” or “B” is appended to the report number for each respective aircraft. 
 
177 
 
 
 
result of the incident.   The following excerpt from the NTSB report (NTSB, 2003) is 
provided to describe the events: 
The flight crew of DAL 1521 reported that as they were taxiing and approaching 
runway 18L, the tower controller, local west one (LW1) instructed them to hold 
short and shortly thereafter were issued a "taxi into position and hold" clearance. 
As they were turning onto the runway, LW1 issued a takeoff clearance. The 
Captain, who was the flying pilot, began the takeoff roll. Shortly thereafter, both 
pilots observed a Continental 737 taxiing east on taxiway Whiskey Mike. The 
Continental 737 "approached then passed the hold point for runway 18L and 
continued taxiing onto the runway." As the aircraft entered the runway, the 
Captain "pushed the throttles to max and began to rotate." As the aircraft rotated a 
"slight bump" was felt, and they passed directly over the Continental 737, clearing 
the top of the fuselage by "100 or more feet." DAL 1521 continued the takeoff 
and landed back at DFW, taxied to the gate and deplaned the passengers. DAL 
1521 returned to DFW because the pilots believed the airplane's tail may have 
impacted the runway during takeoff.  Examination of the airplane by NTSB 
investigators revealed damage to the skin on the underside of the tail, consistent 
with contact with the runway surface. 
The flight crew of COA 1487 reported that they landed "normally" on runway 
18R and took the high speed exit Echo Five.  As they were slowing down, while 
expecting to receive instructions to hold short of runway 18L, the LW1 controller 
instructed them to "cross runway 18L, turn left on foxtrot to the gate with me."  
As the Captain increased power to cross runway 18L, he looked to his left and 
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"saw an aircraft on the runway that looked like it was holding for takeoff."  As 
their aircraft started to nose out on the runway, the pilots realized that the aircraft 
on runway 18L was on its takeoff roll.  The Captain determined that he "could not 
stop the aircraft in a safe location," so he increased power to try and clear the 
runway.  The Captain estimated that "about half of my aircraft was still on the 
runway when the other aircraft passed overhead," and he estimated that the 
aircraft "passed about 100 feet above us."  COA1487 continued to the gate and 
deplaned the passengers (p. 2). 
The NTSB probable cause stated: “The local controller clearing the taxiing 
aircraft to cross the runway in front of the aircraft on takeoff roll” (NTSB, 2003. p.1).  
The taxiing aircraft referenced was COA 1487, and the aircraft taking off was DAL 1521, 
and the same controller, LW1, conflicting clearances to both aircraft.  The NTSB 
identified three contributing factors to the probable cause: (1) the local controller's failure 
to visually scan the runway prior to issuing the crossing clearance, (2) the local 
controller’s excessive workload, and (3) the tower supervisor's inadequate supervision.  
In this case, there were two unsafe acts perpetrated by the local controller: (1) a skill-
based error (sub-factor: inadequate visual lookout) for his failure to visually scan the 
active runway prior to issuing a clearance to COA 1487 to cross (noted as a contributing 
factor in the NTSB report), and (2) the skill-based error (sub-factor: failure to maintain 
control) of issuing the taxi across clearance to COA 1487.  The second NTSB 
contributing factor was the controller’s excessive workload, which was coded as a 
precondition of adverse mental state, due to excessive workload.  Finally, the third 
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contributing factor was coded under the unsafe supervision tier as an inadequate 
supervision factor.   
In the above example, the NTSB report flowed well across the HFACS 
framework tiers, and while there could have been other contributing factors present, the 
NTSB deemed that these were significant enough to be reported.  In this sense, it is 
possible to determine how the accident or incident transpired through the defensive layers 
of Swiss cheese.  Inadequate supervision for the controller from the tower supervisor, the 
excessive workload of the controller created an adverse mental state and an environment 
where the controller was pressured and rushed, all leading to the controller either cutting 
corners in the rush or forgetting to scan the runway for potential conflicts prior to issuing 
a the conflicting clearances. 
Case 2 - NTSB Report ANC01LA064.  In some cases, the NTSB contributing 
factors do not directly map into any of the factors associated with the HFACS 
framework, but they reflect more on the outcome of the human error(s) committed.  
According to the NTSB report (NTSB, 2002), on May 20, 2001 at 1710 Alaska daylight 
time, Cessna 172P airplane was damaged while taxiing for takeoff at the Lake Hood 
Strip, Anchorage, Alaska.  During the taxi out for departure, the pilot mistakenly turned 
onto an airport roadway and while taxiing on the roadway the wing collided with a large 
tree, damaging the wing.  The NTSB probable cause was: “The pilot's selection of an 
unsuitable taxi area during taxi” (NTSB, 2002, p.1).  In addition, the NTSB indicated that 
a contributing factor was the tree.  An unsafe act, decision-based error (improper inflight 
planning) was assigned to this event, and the contributing factor (the tree) was coded as a 
precondition, under the category of an environmental factor (sub-factor: an object located 
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on the airport surface).  The presence of the tree was certainly a factor.  Had there been 
no tree, there would not have been an accident, at least not at that exact location and time.  
However, even in the absence of an accident, the human error, the decision to turn onto 
the road instead of a taxiway, remained and that should be the subject of intervention.  
Granted, one could remove the tree, and the same accident would be averted in the future, 
but the human error of turning onto the airport road could be repeated manifesting itself 
in a different accident situation.  Also, in this case, there were no additional factors 
identified that were attributable to higher HFACS tiers; however, that is not to say that 
such factors were not present.  The pilot’s condition was not reported in the NTSB report; 
consequently, there is no evidence about why the wrong turn was made or why the pilot 
failed to recognize the wrong turn prior to the collision, nor was there any evidence as to 
why the pilot did not stop prior to colliding with the tree.  Thus, there may have been 
additional human error factors present in this case, and although an intervention aimed at 
preventing wrong turns during taxi may have prevented this exact scenario from 
repeating, other human errors may remain uncovered by such an intervention. 
Case 3 - NTSB Report LAX03LA149.  This event is an example of an accident 
where there was no unsafe act coded as the NTSB probable cause did not attribute cause 
to an active operator.  The scenario description based upon the NTSB report (NTSB, 
2003?): 
“On April 23, 2003, at 0718 Pacific daylight time, a Cessna 340A, N100UW, 
taxied over an unmarked, partially collapsed telephone junction box cover with the left 
main landing gear at the Boulder City Municipal Airport (61B), Boulder City, Nevada.  
The resultant aircraft motion collapsed the nose landing gear strut” (NTSB, 2004).   
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The NTSB report stated the probable cause to be: “the airport committee 
members’ failure to repair or mark the faulty telephone junction box cover as a hazard.  A 
factor in the accident was the inadequate notification process of the airport and city 
personnel” (NTSB, 2004, p.1). 
Based upon the NTSB probable cause the event was coded in the HFACS frame 
work without an unsafe act; however, the failure of the airport committee to repair or 
mark the faulty cover was deemed to be an act of unsafe supervision of the airport 
committee, specifically their failure to correct a known problem.  The contributing factor 
was coded as an organizational influence under the category of operational process, 
specifically a failure in oversight in the establishment of a safety culture in the airport 
management and operational organization.  There is no information within the NTSB 
report that would elucidate the condition of the pilot, whether the pilot had taxied over 
the hole while distracted or was unable to perceive the hole in the taxiway due to a 
perceptual error or an environmental precondition.  Consequently, prescribing an 
intervention based upon the factors reported may not cover all human error that was 
present in this event. 
Case 4 - NTSB Report OPS10IA001.  This scenario is indicative of a complex 
situation and further illustrates the nuances of mapping of NTSB reports to HFACS 
codes.  This scenario is summarized from the NTSB report (NTSB, 2010?) as follows: 
On Monday Oct. 19, 2009, at 0605 EDT (all times in this report will be Eastern 
Daylight Time unless otherwise noted), a Boeing B767-332ER, N185DN, operating as 
Delta Air Lines flight 60 from Rio de Janeiro – Galeão – Antonio Carlos Jobim 
International Airport (SBGL was the International Civil Aviation Organization airport 
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code, and GIG was the three letter International Air Transport Association airport code) 
to Atlanta Hartsfield International Airport (ATL) landed on taxiway "M" at ATL after 
being cleared to land on runway 27R.  No injuries were reported.  The flight deck crew 
included a check airman, a captain receiving special airport qualification operating 
experience from the check airman, and one first officer.  During cruise flight, the check 
airman became ill and was located in the cabin for the remainder of the flight, including 
the approach and landing (NTSB, 2010b). 
In further explanation, taxiway M is a 75 foot-wide concrete taxiway parallel and 
to the north (right) side of runway 27R.  The taxiway was equipped with edge lights, 
colored blue, and centerline lights colored green.  During a 2009 construction project to 
extend taxiways M and L, the edge lights and centerline lights on the east end of taxiway 
M were replaced with new in-pavement light emitting diode (LED) type lights.  This 
resulted in different lighting mechanisms being installed on taxiway M, both LED and the 
traditional incandescent technologies.  At the time of the incident, there was no published 
standard for intermixing LED and incandescent lighting over a continuous taxiway 
surface.  Subsequently, an ICAO Visual Aids Working Group proposed a 
recommendation to the ICAO to limit intermixing of LED and incandescent lights.  
Finally, during the flight approach DAL had been assigned to land on a different 
runway, 27L.  As the approach continued and the aircraft descended toward the airport, 
DAL 60 was handed off to the Atlanta tower controller, who offered the aircraft the 
option of using a different runway, 27R, which the DAL 60 flight crew accepted.   
The NTSB stated that the probable cause was: The flight crew’s failure to identify 
the correct landing surface due to fatigue. Contributing to the cause of the incident were 
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(1) the flight crew’s decision to accept a late runway change, (2) the unavailability of the 
approach light system and the instrument landing system for the runway of intended 
landing, and (3) the combination of numerous taxiway signs and intermixing of light 
technologies on the taxiway (NTSB, 2010b, p.1). 
The mapping of the NTSB probable cause into the HFACS framework is as 
follows: 
1. The final unsafe act was the flight crew landing the aircraft on a taxiway, 
and this was coded as a skill-based error and a sub-factor of failure to 
maintain control. 
2. The initial unsafe act was a decision error, where the flight crew decided 
to accept a last minute change in the landing runway from runway 27L to 
runway 27R. 
3. There were several preconditions identified from the NTSB probable 
cause, including the flight crew’s fatigue, which was coded under adverse 
mental state, sub-factor fatigue.  In addition, the fact that the approach 
lights and instrument landing system for runway 27R were inoperative, 
and the fact that the airport surface automation system (ASDE-X) was not 
programmed to provide alerts to the tower controllers when aircraft were 
aligned with a taxiway for arrival or departure, combined to a precondition 
code of technological environment, sub-factor equipment failure. 
4. The issue of having mixed technology taxiway lights, which were colored 
correctly but with different intensities, was coded as a precondition, under 
crew resource management, under the sub-factor of poor communication 
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between ATC and the flight crew.  While there was no voice 
communication from ATC to the flight crew associated with the lighting, 
the lights were in place to communicate information to the flight crew; 
namely, that M was a taxiway, the edge lights indicated the lateral 
boundaries of the taxi surface, and the green lights indicated the taxiway 
centerline.  The runway edge lights are white (NTSB, 2010b). 
 ASD Trends.   Trends for ASDs developed from the FAA Runway Incursion 
database and trends for skill-based errors determined from the NTSB accident and 
incident data were presented in Chapter IV.  Category A and Category B RIs appear to be 
in a declining trend over the 12-year period, as do the Category A and B rates per million 
airport operations over the period of interest.  However, the trend for the total of all 
categories of ASD from the FAA Runway Incursion database is upward over the 12-year 
period, as is the case with the rate per million airport operations over the period of 
interest.  Upon further examination of these trends, the Category C and D ASDs are 
increasing and causing the overall upward trend in the total ASDs and their rate per 
million operations over the period.   
The overall skill-based error rate for ASDs obtained from the NTSB data is also 
increasing over the period of interest.  The skill-based error trends for ATC and pilot 
actors over the period are presented in Figures 35 and 36, respectively.   
In the case of ATC skill-based errors, shown in Figure 35, the overall trend is 
upward over the period of interest; notwithstanding, the caveat that the data for 2012 is 
incomplete and was extrapolated.  The trend line equation for ATC skill-based errors is:  
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y = 0.7818 x + 0.2182, representing a significant increase that ranged from about 3 in 
2001 to 8 in 2011. 
 
 
Figure 35.  A depiction of the frequency of all ATC skill-based error codes over the 
period of study. 
Note: The accident rate for the last year, 2012, is based upon only five completed NTSB 
accident reports and there were no skill-based errors associated with ATC in the 
available reports for 2012.  Consequently, the data for 2012 was not utilized in the trend 
line calculation, and the 2001-2011 trend line was extrapolated for 2012. 
 
 
 
In the case of pilot skill-based errors, as shown in Figure 36, the linear trend for 
both general aviation (Part 91 operations) and commercial operations (Parts, 121, 129, 
135, 137, and Public Use Aircraft (PUBU) combined) also indicated an upward trend; 
moreover, the trend for general aviation (y = 0.0818 x + 13.236) has a lower slope than 
that for commercial operations (y = 0.2818 x + 2.5818).  The increase rate of pilot skill-
based errors was 3-4 times larger for general aviation operations than for commercial 
operations.  
The current study concludes that ASDs have increased in both absolute frequency 
and in rates per million airport operations from January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2012.  
While the rates for Category A and B runway incursions appear to have declined, the 
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rates for Category C and D, as well as the total of all categories were increasing.  The 
skill-based error rates for all actors (discussed in Chapter VI) and specifically for ATC, 
general aviation pilots, and commercial pilots have also increased based upon the NTSB 
accident and incident database.  
 
Figure 36.  A depiction of the frequency of all Pilot skill-based error codes over the 
period of study. 
Note: The accident rate for the last year, 2012, is based upon only five completed NTSB 
accident reports.  Consequently, the data for 2012 was not utilized in the trend line 
calculation, and the 2001-2011 trend line was extrapolated for 2012. 
 
 
 
Based upon these findings, one substantial question arises.  As described earlier, 
Category A and B runway incursions vice those of Category C and D are trending in 
opposite directions, and skill-based errors associated with ASDs for ATC and pilots are 
also trending upward.  While the reduction in Category A and B is viewed as some 
success, which may be a false view.  In terms of human error, the same human error that 
is a causal factor for a Category C RI, could also represent the major causal factor for a 
Category A RI or a resulting accident.  As an example, the following scenario occurred at 
Philadelphia tower and was related through personal observation: 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Part 91 13 15 12 17 11 13 13 13 16 12 16
All Commercial 0 4 1 2 7 9 7 7 2 6 2
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The Local controller and the ground controller in Philadelphia tower must 
coordinate taxiing traffic across the active runways.  Their physical proximity in 
the tower cab is within 5- feet, and the process they use is that the ground 
controller will say to the local controller “cross ‘n’ 27L at Sierra,” meaning that 
there are “n” aircraft queued up to cross the active runway (27L) at taxiway 
intersection “Sierra.”  The local controller will respond “affirmative” or 
“negative,” thereby granting or denying permission for the ground controller to 
allow the aircraft to cross.  On a very hectic day of operations at Philadelphia, the 
ground controller had three aircraft queued up to cross runway 27L at taxiway 
intersection Sierra, and uttered: “cross three runway 27L at Sierra.”  The local 
controller, who was totally occupied addressing another issue, responded 
sarcastically “Yeah Right!” intending to deny permission.  The ground controller 
overlooked the sarcasm, took the response literally as “affirmative,” and 
instructed the three aircraft to cross the active runway, 27L, which was being used 
for arrival traffic on that day.  The local controller, was still engrossed in solving 
his issue, he did not notice that the ground controller had instructed three aircraft 
to cross the arrival runway at intersection Sierra,  and he had cleared an arrival 
aircraft on short final to land on runway 27L, thereby causing a runway incursion.  
Fortunately, the weather was clear that day, the pilot of the arrival aircraft saw 
that the runway ahead was not clear of traffic, and avoided an accident by 
executing a go-around (avoided landing on the unclear runway).   
Thus, the ground controller committed a skill-based error in allowing the three 
aircraft to cross the active runway without first checking that the final approach was clear 
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of landing aircraft, and the local controller likewise committed a skill-based error in not 
checking the arrival runway for traffic before clearing the arriving aircraft to land.  Both 
of these skill-based errors had the precursor of poor crew resource management, under 
the category of poor coordination.  Given the exact same scenario, but with a change in 
the weather to a  ceiling of 200 feet and a runway visual range of 2400feet, and the pilot 
of the arriving aircraft would have been in instrument meteorological conditions down to 
minimums.  Under these conditions, the pilot would not have been able to see the 
crossing traffic further down the arriving runway until his aircraft was about ½ mile away 
from the traffic, and there would have been no options available to avoid a disastrous 
ground collision between two or more airliners.  In this case a Category A (plus accident) 
RI would have been the likely outcome.  In both scenarios, the human error was the 
same; however, one of the precursors, in this case the weather, completely affected the 
error outcome in a range from a minor event to a major tragedy.  Consequently, it is not 
clear from the work performed in this study or that reported in the literature whether the 
rise in the Category C and D runway incursion trends and the reduction in the Category A 
and B frequencies is incidental and due to other factors.  If that is the case, random 
factors, such as visibility and other environmental conditions, could convert the Category 
C and D incursions into the more serious Category A or B as well as resulting in 
accidents.  Additional work in this area is required to determine the effect of a downward 
trend in Category A and B runway incursions while experiencing an increase in Category 
C and D runway incursions and an increase in skill-based errors associated with ASD for 
both pilots and controllers. 
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Detailed case study.   In the current study, the official NTSB probable cause and 
contributing factors statements were the basis for HFACS coding and analysis.  The 
mapping of the probable cause and contributing factor statements does not always contain 
enough depth and breadth to completely populate all tiers of the HFACS framework.  
Thus, it is useful, especially for future studies, to briefly examine a typical ASD case in 
complete detail using all available NTSB information including the docket to determine if 
the additional evidence would provide a more detailed mapping into the HFACS 
framework. This exercise is performed not in an attempt to alter the official NTSB 
probable cause and contributing factors, nor to second guess the NTSB’s decisions. 
Instead, additional details available in the complete NTSB docket could add new 
information to HFACS. 
NTSB report number NYC08FA265.   The ASD described in this report has been 
presented in earlier chapters as an example of a typical “text book” RI, and therefore, its 
use in the context of the present discussion represents a good case selection for an in-
depth analysis. 
The NTSB report (NTSB, 2010a) summarizes the scenario as follows: 
On August 3, 2008, at 1519 eastern daylight time, a Cessna 550 (Citation), 
N827DP, was substantially damaged when it collided with a crossing mowing 
tractor while landing at Reading Regional Airport/Carl A. Spatz Field (RDG), 
Reading Pennsylvania. The captain, first officer, and tractor operator were not 
injured. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and no flight plan had been 
filed for the flight from Pottstown Limerick Airport (PTW), Pottstown, 
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Pennsylvania, to Reading. The positioning flight was conducted under the 
provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 (p.1). 
Reading Regional Airport is a small airport in Berks County Pennsylvania that 
primarily served general aviation operations at the time of this accident.  During the 
period of October 1, 2007 to September 30, 2008 (Government Fiscal Year 2008), 
Reading had about 89,104 operations.  Reading has a control tower with a co-located 
radar approach control capability.  In this configuration, the approach radar consoles and 
approach controllers are collocated in the tower cab with the tower controllers.  At the 
time of the accident, the local control position and the ground control positions were 
combined, the approach controller was located at his console in the tower cab, and there 
was a flight data controller also located in the tower cab who was performing his duties.  
The tower supervisor was not in the tower cab at the time of the accident, he was 
downstairs in the building performing administrative duties, and this situation is 
appropriate to the facility and many similar sized facilities. The combined local and 
ground controller had been on duty approximately 21 minutes prior to the accident. 
The NTSB probable cause stated that the accident was due to: “The air traffic 
controller’s failure to properly monitor the runway environment. Contributing to the 
accident was the tractor operator’s failure to scan the active runway prior to crossing, and 
the FAA’s inadequate emphasis on vehicle operator visual vigilance when crossing active 
runways with air traffic control clearance” (NTSB, 2010a, p1.).  This example was coded 
into the HFACS framework as follows: 
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1. The air traffic controller’s failure to monitor the runway environment was 
coded as an unsafe act under the category of a skill-based error, with the 
sub-factor of failure to maintain control. 
2. The tractor operator’s failure to scan the active runway prior to crossing 
was also coded as an unsafe act under the category of a skill-based error, 
with the sub-factor of inadequate visual lookout. 
3. The FAA’s inadequate emphasis for vehicle drivers to scan an active 
runway prior to crossing was coded as an organizational influence under 
the category of organizational process with a sub-factor of poor procedure 
design. 
Further examination of the details could add additional factors, sub-factors, or add 
more detail to the coded results.  A fruitful mechanism to scrutinize the detailed 
information contained in the docket is to follow the timeline of the scenario as it unfolded 
and examine the tasks of the individual actors in the scenario.  The docket for this even 
contains 15 separate documents in addition to the NTSB factual and probable cause 
reports.  These documents include statements from the three controllers who were in the 
tower cab at the time of the accident, radio transcripts for all tower and approach control 
communications covering the period before and after the accident, and statements of both 
pilots of the Citation as well as a statement from the tractor operator.  
A schematic of Reading Airport is presented in Figure 38 and there are 
annotations showing the route of aircraft and vehicles and positions on the airport where 
events in the scenario occurred.  Note that the position of the control tower is overlooking 
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taxiway “B” between taxiway “D” and the Terminal Ramp.  Runway 31 is east of the 
tower and Taxiway B, and the south T hangars are behind the tower to the southwest. 
Recommending moving Figure 38 here, right after it’s first mentioned in the 
above paragraph.  
The events that transpired are as follows (times are local, EDT): 
1. 1512:56: Rockwell Commander (N1247J) was cleared by the tower 
controller (TWC) to land on runway 31.  
2. 1515:14: (2-minutes and 18-seconds later), Citation N827DP contacted the 
Reading TWC from a location about 8 miles southeast of the airport on a 
straight in approach for runway 31 (as had been given to N827DP by the 
Reading Approach Controller).   
3. 1515:18: (4-seconds later), Reading TWC cleared the N827DP to land on 
runway 31. 
4.  1515:24: (6-seconds later) N827DP acknowledged the landing clearance.  
5. 1515:47: (29-seconds after clearing N827DP to land) TWC advised the 
N1247J pilot to turn left onto taxiway “D,” to remain on the tower radio 
frequency, cleared N1247J to the hangar.  Neither N1247J’s nor the 
controller’s transcript stated which hangar was the intended destination. 
The controller’s statement indicated that the on-airport destination for 
N1247J was the South T-hangars.  Therefore, the trajectory for N1247J 
would have taken -- leaving off of runway 31, westbound along taxiway D 
to the intersection with taxiway “B,” then southeast bound on taxiway B to 
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the northwest corner of the Terminal Ramp, and then southwest bound to 
the South T- hangars.  
6. 1515:54: (7-seconds later) the pilot of N1247J stated, “Left on delta with 
you.”  
7. 1517:16: (1 minute, 22-seconds after N1247 acknowledged his taxi 
instructions) the tractor operator (TO) transmitted, “ground, tractor 8.” 
8. 1517:18: (2-seconds later) the TWC responded “tractor 8, ground.” 
9. 1517:20: (2-seconds later) the TO said: “terminal ramp like to head over 
alongside of the quest hangar do some mowing alongside the soil over 
there.”  Note that tractor 8 was at the terminal ramp, and the Quest hangars 
are at the far north end of the airport as shown on Figure 38; thus, the taxi 
route would have been to go northwest bound on taxiway B to the 
intersection with taxiway D, then taxiway D to cross runway 31 (which 
was the active runway at that time), continuing on taxiway D to taxiway 
“C” and then northwest bound on taxiway C to the Quest hangars. 
10. 1517:27: (11-seconds after the TO first called the TWC), the TWC issued 
taxi instructions to the TO: “tractor 8 cross 31 delta to the Quest hangar 
area.”  
11. 1517:30: the TO acknowledged the taxi clearance.  
12. 1519:11: (1-minute, 41-seconds after the TO acknowledged his taxi 
clearance, 3-minutes, 17-seconds after N1247J acknowledged taxi 
instructions, and 3-minutes, 53-seconds after N827DP received landing 
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clearance), Citation N827DP transmitted, “Reading tower citation 827 
delta papa.” 
13. 1519:20: TWC responded: “Hey. Citation 7 delta papa, roger.”  
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Figure 37. An annotated diagram of the Reading Regional Airport.   
(Diagram downloaded from http://aeronav.faa.gov/d-tpp/1402/00627AD.PDF). 
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According to the docket information, the controller stated that he was watching 
N1247J taxi to the hangar, but 1-minute 22-seconds after N1247J acknowledged his taxi 
instructions, Tractor 8 called for taxi clearance.  The taxi path of N1247J would have 
taken it along the exact path (at least up until the northwest corner of the terminal ramp) 
that Tractor 8 would have taken, except in an opposite direction.  Therefore, Tractor 8 
could not have begun to taxi from the terminal ramp northwest bound on taxiway B until 
N1247J was clear of taxiway B.  Given the elapsed time of 1-minute 22-seconds, there 
may have been a potential conflict between N1247J and Tractor 8 along taxiway B, and 
the controller’s attention may have been diverted.  The controller further states, however, 
that he continued to watch N1247J taxi to the hangars, presumably after clearing the 
tractor to the Quest hangar as it departed the Terminal Ramp and taxied along taxiway B 
and taxiway D, including when it started to taxi across runway 31.  Thus, if the controller 
was watching N1247J as it continued to taxi to the hangars, then N1247J would have 
passed by the northwest corner of the terminal ramp and would have been taxiing 
westbound to the south T hangars before Tractor 8 could possibly have started to taxi 
northwest bound on taxiway B.  Consequently, the controller would have had his back 
toward runway 31 as well as taxiways B and D, and he never saw the pending collision or 
the collision.  The statements from the other two controllers located in the tower (but both 
were seated and unable to view the runway) indicated that when N827DP called the 
tower after the collision, the tower controller responded “Oh my God, expletive deleted 
(several times), Oh my God,” which is a clear indication that he forgot about the Citation. 
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Reviewing the docket information made it possible to reconstruct the events 
leading to the accident., Through the statements and transcripts, it was also possible to 
learn that the tower controller likely forgot that not only had he cleared the Citation to 
land, but also forgot that the Citation was on approach, and he may also have forgotten 
that he had cleared Tractor 8 across the active runway.  Most of these causal factors have 
been cited in the literature in the past: controller forgets and tower supervisor not present 
in the tower, for example, NTSBNTSB (1986), Cardosi (2001), and Cardosi and Yost 
(2001).  
A comparison of the results of this study with the literature.   As described in 
Chapter II, there were many previous studies on ASDs that have been published over the 
past 30 to 40 years.  While there were numerous studies that utilized the HFACS 
framework to study human error in aviation and many other domains, there were no 
published studies that utilized HFACS to study human error based upon NTSB accident 
and incident reports for operations on the airport surface.   
A qualitative comparison of the study results from the current study with other 
HFACS applications in the aviation domain was performed.  Three overall HFACS 
studies were discovered in the literature and reported in Chapter II: (1) A study 
performed by the Canadian Department of National Defence (2005), (2) several studies 
performed by Shappell, Wiegmann, and others, associated with aviation accidents, and 
(3) an unpublished study (although presented at a conference) from Pounds and 
Scarborough (2002).  These studies are described in the sections that follow.  
Canadian Department of National Defence (2005).   This research activity has 
some synergy with the work performed for this dissertation.  The Canadian Department 
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of National Defence (2005) performed a study of runway incursions at numerous 
Canadian airports using a modified HFACS framework.  The modifications of HFACS 
that were performed in the Canadian study were mapped into the HFACS framework 
utilized in the present ASD study.  There were a total of 117 runway incursions 
discovered during the period, and the source of the error/deviation (percent based upon 
all 117 deviations) were reported as follows:  
1. VPD: (n = 63, 53%) 
2. OE (Controller): (n = 27, 23%) 
3.  Pilot Deviations: (n = 25, 22%) 
4. Other: (n = 2, 2%) (Canadian Department of National Defense, 2005, p.5). 
In addition, the Canadian Department of National Defence (2005) determined a 
total of 234 causal factors under the HFACS framework, which were as follows: 
1. Unsafe Acts Total (percent of all HFACS factors): (n = 143, 61%).  This total 
was distributed as follows (percent of all unsafe acts): 
a. Errors: (n = 137, 96%) 
i. Decision errors: (n = 69, 48%)   
ii. Skill-based errors: (n = 67, 47%) 
iii. Perceptual Errors: (n = 1, 1%) 
b. Violations: (n = 6, 4%) 
i. Routine: (n = 1, 1%) 
ii. Exceptional (n = 5, 3%) 
c. Top 4 causal factors11 (percent of total factors): 
                                                 
11 In this case, the Canadian HFACS categories were summed and mapped into the HFACS categories used 
in the ASD study.  The ASD HFACS categories are called out in the text. 
199 
 
 
 
i. Decision errors: (n = 69, 29%) 
ii. Skill-based errors: (n = 67, 29%) 
iii. Precondition - Adverse Mental State: (n = 46, 20%), and 
iv. Communications, Coordination and Planning (CRM): (n = 12, 5%). 
Examination of the results presented in the Canadian study reveals that neither 
grouping reflects the results of the current study.  Further, a conclusion of the Canadian 
study as they compared the large number of VPDs with other runway incursion research 
from Transport Canada (TC) and the FAA is: “This finding contrasts sharply with TC and 
FAA findings where both organizations indicated that PDs accounted for the majority of 
RIs” (Canadian Department of National Defence, 2005, p.5). 
In contrast with the source of ASDs discovered in the present study, the Canadian 
study indicated controller and pilot errors tended to occur at about the same overall 
frequency, which is about one-half of the frequency for vehicle/pedestrian deviations.  
The FAA Runway Incursion data indicated deviations expressed as a percentage of the 
total reported runway incursions over the 12-year period of: (a) controller errors: 15%; 
(b) pilot deviations: 58%; and (c) VPDs: 27%.  Consequently, the Canadian results are 
totally contrary to the FAA runway incursion data examined in this study as well.   
With respect to the HFACS analysis, in the Canadian study 61% of all of the 
factors identified were unsafe acts, and in the present study 66% of the total of all causal 
factors determined were associated with unsafe acts.  Thus, there is some agreement on 
the percentage of unsafe acts determined as a portion of the total causal factors; however, 
in the top four causal factors from the Canadian study, the ranking was: (1) decision 
errors, (2) skill-based errors, (3) the precondition of adverse mental state, and (4) the 
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precondition of communications, coordination and planning.  The first two factors in the 
Canadian study were identical in the magnitude of their percentage of overall factors, 
while the third was about 2/3 of the first two and the fourth factor was almost one sixth of 
the top two.  The top four causal factor rakings in the present study were quite different: 
(1) skill-based errors represented the highest percentage of the total of all factors by a 
considerable margin (49%), (2) the physical environment precondition with 13% of the 
total factors, (3) the communication, coordination, and planning precondition had 10 % 
of the total causal factors, and (4) decision errors accounted for 7% of the total causal 
factors.  The commonality of skill-based errors being at the top of the causal factor 
contribution is in agreement between studies, but the relative ordering of the remaining 
causal factors did not compare between studies.  
There are several factors that may account for the differences observed between 
the Canadian study and the present study.  First, the data were taken from different 
sources: the Canadian Defence data was obtained from airports that have a significant 
military operations presence, and a limited commercial and general aviation presence; 
however, the present study utilized data from the NTSB and FAA Runway Incursion 
databases.  In the former case, the NTSB data signifies that either an accident or a serious 
incident transpired resulting in a significant investigation of each case.  Furthermore, 
each FAA runway incursion event that did not undergo an NTSB investigation was also 
investigated to a lesser degree by the FAA runway incursion team prior to formal entry 
into the FAA Runway Incursion database.  The Canadian data was extracted from the 
Canadian Flight Safety Information System (FSIS) and not from accident and incident 
investigation data.  In addition, the version of HFACS that was utilized in the Canadian 
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study is a modified version of the HFACS framework that was the basis for analysis in 
the present study; although, it was possible to map the categories from the Canadian 
HFACS to the version utilized in this study. The last, but not least, variance is that the 
study took place using data from two different countries. 
Shappell, Wiegmann, and others.   Several studies by the HFACS originators in 
collaboration with other researchers used the HFACS framework to examine NTSB 
accident and incident data.   
Air Traffic Control study.   Pape, Wiegmann, and Shappell (2001), described a 
study using HFACS for air traffic control error analysis that investigated NTSB reports 
for all accidents and incidents in the period between January 1985 and December 1997.  
Their study focused on accidents and incidents that had causal factors associated with 
ATC, and their findings associated with the 2001 study are compared to the findings of 
ATC causal factors in the present ASD study as shown in Table 21. 
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Table 21. A comparison of findings in various HFACS tiers for ATC between the study 
performed by Pape, Wiegmann, and Shappell (2001) and the current ASD study. 
 
 
HFACS Tier 
Pape, Wiegmann, and 
Shappell (2001) Study (N = 
179) 
Current ASD Study (N = 64) 
Unsafe Acts  
ATC skill-based errors were 
associated with the largest 
percentage of accidents and 
incidents (82%, n = 147), 
followed by violations (33%, 
n = 59), decision errors 
(2.2%, n = 4),  and 
perceptual errors (1.1%, n = 
2) 
ATC skill-based errors were 
associated with the most accidents 
and incidents having an ATC causal 
factor (61%, n = 39), followed by 
decision errors (6%, n = 4) and 
violations (6%, n = 4).  No ATC 
perceptual errors were encountered, 
but violations were encountered (1%, 
n = 4) 
Preconditions 
of Unsafe Acts  
 
Crew Resource Management 
(CRM) was the only factor 
cited in more than 10% of 
the events (17%, n = 30) 
 
Communication, coordination, and 
planning (CRM) occurred at least 
once in 39% (n = 25) of the accidents 
and incidents having ATC causal 
factors 
Unsafe 
Supervision 
 
Inadequate supervision was 
the only factor cited in more 
than two reports (14% , n = 
25) 
 
 
Inadequate ATC supervision was 
present at least once in 4 (1%) of the 
ATC causal factor accidents or 
incidents 
 
Organizational 
Influences 
 
Operational process was the 
only factor cited in greater 
than three reports (8%, n 
=15) 
ATC Operational process was cited 
in 4 (1%) accidents or incidents 
having an ATC causal factor 
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Note that the comparison between the two studies indicates some qualitative 
agreement; however, the studies were from different time periods with no overlap, and 
only ASD events were considered in the current study.  The rank ordering of factors was 
the same for both studies, with skill-based errors being the most frequent; although the 
current study encountered a small number of ATC violations and decision errors.  Second 
in the ATC category ordering was the precondition of crew resource management, which 
is identical to the current study precondition communications, coordination, and 
planning.   The current study also indicated a small number of the precondition of 
adverse mental state for ATC.  The remaining factors are very low in the current study 
and are considered insignificant.  Again, given that the current study was focused on 
ASDs, one would expect the frequencies to be less than a study that focused on all 
regimes of flight.   
ASD causal factor differences between commercial and general aviation 
operations.    Two studies that utilized HFACS to determine causal factors based upon 
NTSB accident data analysis have been performed and reported in the literature: 
1. For commercial flight operations - Shappell, et al. (2007). 
2. For general aviation operations - Wiegmann, et al. (2005). 
Using the results of these two studies, which accounted for all types of accidents 
and incidents (i.e., not filtered to include only ASDs), could only result in a qualitative 
comparison with ASD accidents and incidents from the current study.  The actual causal 
factor frequencies were considerably larger in the prior studies as was expected.  Given 
the duration of flights covering all regimes, significantly more tasks and activities are 
performed by flight crews and ATC, thus providing the opportunity to detect more errors.   
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In the case of the commercial aircraft operations study (Shappell et al., 2007), 
Table 22 presents a comparison of the corresponding HFACS categories from the current 
study and the literature study (abbreviated as SDHHBW – 2007 in the table).   Table 22 
illustrates several significant differences between the two result sets, as was expected, 
and are likely based upon the scope of the data analyzed.  The study (Shappell et al., 
2007) reflects data from the NTSB and FAA’s National Aviation Safety Data Analysis 
Center (NASDAC)12 for all accidents operating under commercial regulations for the 
period of 1990 through 2002.  The current study reflects NTSB ASD data filtered to 
include only pilots or flight crews of commercial and general aviation types of operations 
as indicated in Table 22, and the data is from a different period of 2001 through 2012.  
One would expect the frequency counts to be less for ASD events as the overall 
frequency of ASD events is significantly less than that for all accidents and incidents, as 
ASD events are a subset of all accidents and incidents.   
 
 
                                                 
12 National Aviation Safety Data Analysis Center (NASDAC) was replaced by FAA Aviation Safety 
Information Analysis Sharing (ASIAS)   
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Table 22. A comparison of findings in various HFACS tiers and categories for commercial 
aviation operations between the current study and the study performed by Shappell, 
Detwiler, Holcomb, Hackworth, Boquet, and Wiegmann, (2007). 
 
 
 
Notes: 
(1) Numbers in table are frequencies and percentages (parentheses) of accidents 
associated with the designated type of operations that involved at least one instance of an 
HFACS category.  Because accidents are generally associated with more than one causal 
factor, the percentages in the table do not add up to 100%. 
(2) Columns labeled Current Study represent results developed from the present study.  
The label SDHHBW – 2007 refers to data taken from Shappell et al., (2007). 
 
Current 
Study
SDHHB
W-2007
Current 
Study
SDHHB
W-2007
Current 
Study
SDHHB
W-2007
N = 38 N = 181 N = 17 N = 839 N = 55 N = 1020
0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 4 (0.5) 0 (0.0) 4 (0.4)
1 (2.6) 21 (11.6) 0 (0.0) 29 (3.5) 1 (1.8) 50 (4.9)
0 (0.0) 4 (2.2) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 4 (0.4)
0 (0.0) 15 (8.3) 0 (0.0) 21 (2.5) 0 (0.0) 36 (3.5)
0 (0.0) 3 (1.7) 0 (0.0) 5 (0.6) 0 (0.0) 8 (0.8)
0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0)
0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2 (0.2) 0 (0.0) 2 (0.2)
0 (0.0) 11 (6.1) 0 (0.0) 4 (0.5) 0 (0.0) 15 (1.5)
1 (2.6) 67 (37.0) 0 (0.0) 525 (62.6) 1 (1.8) 592 (58.0)
4 (10.5) 6 (3.3) 2 (11.8) 60 (7.2) 6 (10.9) 66 (6.5)
0 (0.0) 6 (3.3) 0 (0.0) 18 (2.1) 0 (0.0) 24 (2.4)
0 (0.0) 6 (3.3) 0 (0.0) 39 (4.6) 0 (0.0) 45 (4.4)
2 (5.3) 34 (18.8) 1 (5.9) 75 (8.9) 3 (5.5) 109 (10.7)
0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 3 (0.4) 0 (0.0) 3 (0.3)
1 (2.6) 71 (39.2) 2 (11.8) 303 (36.1) 3 (5.5) 374 (36.7)
11 (28.9) 10 (5.5) 1 (5.9) 56 (6.7) 12 (21.8) 66 (6.5)
18 (47.4) 77 (42.5) 11 (64.7) 499 (59.5) 29 (52.7)576 (56.5)
0 (0.0) 31 (17.1) 0 (0.0) 205 (24.4) 0 (0.0) 236 (23.1)
Decision Error
Perceptual Error
Skill Based Error
Violation
Parts 121 & 129
Resource Management
Inadequate Supervision
Planned Inappropriate Operations
Failed to Correct Known Problems
Supervisory Violations
Environmental conditions
Conditions of the operator
Personnel Factors
Personal Readiness
HFACS Category
Crew Resource Management
Physical Environment
Physical-Mental Limitations
Technological Environment
Unsafe Acts
Organizational Process
Adverse Mental State
Adverse Physiological State
Organizational Climate
Organizational Influences
Unsafe Supervision
Preconditions for Unsafe Acts
Parts 135 & 137 Total
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Observing each HFACS tier in Table 22, in the case of Organizational Influences 
and Unsafe Supervision, neither study found significant activity in these categories.  
Commercial operations in the current ASD study showed a limited percentage (18.2%) of 
total events associated with preconditions for unsafe acts; however, the comparative 
study had a significantly larger percentage especially under the physical environment 
factor associated with both Part 121 & 129 and Part 135 & 137 operations.  This result 
can be explained by the fact that exposure to the risk of an event is for the full flight 
duration in the commercial study, but the risk exposure is of significantly less duration on 
the airport surface.  That is, as is the case for all HFACS categories, the commercial 
study by Shappell et al., (2007) covers all phases of flight from taxi out on the airport 
surface to departure, en route, arrival, and taxi in on the airport.  The amount of time a 
typical flight spends on the airport surface, hence its exposure to ASD risk and all of the 
flight-related HFACS categories, is a small fraction of the total flight time.  Therefore, 
based upon time exposure to risks, one would expect to observe a greater frequency of 
accidents and incidents in non-airport phases of flight.  In the final tier of unsafe acts, 
examination of the percentages, reveals comparable results for skill-based errors in both 
studies for each class of aircraft operations and the total of both classes; however, in the 
current study, the skill-based error percentage for Part 121 & 129 as well as Part 135 & 
137 operations is slightly higher (~5%) than that observed in the commercial operations 
literature study report.  This is also the case with perceptual errors for Part 121 and 129 
operations, where the current study indicates the presence of this factor in 28.9% of the 
ASD events vice 5.5% in the commercial flight study.  Since airport surface movement 
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from the flight crew perspective is entirely visual (navigation by looking outside of the 
cockpit windows), perception errors may be more frequent in airport operations than 
while flying by instruments in the airborne regimes.  However, the percentages for Part 
135 and137 operations between studies are comparable.  Decision errors were 
considerably higher for the commercial study than those for the current study.  This is 
likely an indication of the fact that the number of decisions required for a flight operation 
is a function of time.  Longer flight durations in the commercial study would require 
more decisions and, thus, the potential for more decision errors exists with the longer 
exposure.  There are no violations in the current study for either type of operation for 
possibly the same reasons as described for decision errors. 
Wiegmann et al., (2005) studied general aviation accidents and incidents over a 
10-year period from 1990 to 2000, and data from the NTSB and the FAA NASDAC 
provided the basis for the study.  After HFACS coding was complete, the data sample 
consisted of 14,436 general aviation accidents involving over 25,000 aircrew causal 
factors, involving operations in all regimes of flight including airport taxi out, departure, 
en route, arrival, and airport taxi in.  The assignment of causal factors to cases was 
essentially the same as that described for the commercial aircraft study and, as shown in 
Table 23, the general aviation results indicated that within the unsafe acts tier of HFACS, 
skill-based errors were associated with the largest portion of general aviation accidents, 
followed by decision errors, violations, and perceptual errors.  In the case of the current 
study, there were 158 general aviation accidents and incidents that had HFACS causal 
factors attributed to the flight crew during the 12-year period of 2001 to 2012.   
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As shown in Table 23, the Wiegmann et al., (2005) study percentages are all 
higher than the current study, which was also the case for the unsafe acts determined in 
the commercial study, with the exception of perceptual error as noted earlier; however, 
an interesting aspect of the results is the closeness of the percentage of skill-based errors 
between the two studies.  Although in the Wiegmann et al., (2005) study, the skill-based 
error percentage was approximately 13% higher than that found in the current study, 
given the total magnitude of skill-based errors, that difference was only 25% larger in the 
GA- 2005 study than the current study as opposed to an order of magnitude difference for 
the other causal factors.   
 
 
Table 23.  A comparison of findings in the HFACS unsafe acts tier for general aviation 
operations between the current ASD study and the study performed by Wiegmann, Boquet, 
Detwiler, Holcomb, Faaborg, and Shappell, (2005). 
 
 
 
Notes: 
(1) Numbers in table are frequencies and percentages of accidents associated with the 
designated type of operations that involved at least one instance of the HFACS category.  
Because accidents are generally associated with more than one causal factor, the 
percentages in the table do not add up to 100%. 
(2) Columns labeled ASD - 2014 represent results developed from the current study.  The 
label GA - 2005 refers to data taken from Wiegmann, Boquet, Detwiler, Holcomb, 
Faaborg, and Shappell, (2005).  
 
 
 
The skill-based error difference between the Shappell et al. (2007) and the current 
study was only about 4% (56.5%vs. 52.7%).  In the Wiegmann et al., (2005) study the 
HFACS Category GA - 2005 ASD - 2014 (N = 158)
% N %
Skill-Based Error 79.2% 100 63.3%
Decision Error 29.7% 18 11.4%
Violations 13.7% 2 1.3%
Perceptual Error 5.7% 5 3.2%
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difference was about 13% (79.2% vs. 63.3%); however, in both studies the order of 
magnitude of skill-based errors was comparable.  That is, for both general aviation and 
commercial operations, all three studies indicate comparable accident percentages where 
at least one skill-based error causal factor was present. 
Pounds and Scarborough (2002).    In the presentation by Pounds and 
Scarborough (2002) an initial study of RIs was described.  The study utilized the FAA 
ATC Operational Error database and consisted of 347 operational (controller) errors for 
the period of January 1996 to June 2000.  There are several issues associated with 
comparing their results with the current study, and these issues include: 
1. Their study utilized a modified version of HFACS that was tailored to 
controller tasks. 
2. The study is unpublished, except for the cited presentation; however, an 
annotated version of the slide deck presented was obtained through 
personal communications with one of the presenters (J. Pounds, personal 
communication, January 14, 2014). 
3. The analysis uses the notion of critical points which are points of failure 
along the task chain where (in this case) the controller could have acted 
differently; thereby altering the task chain and the ultimate outcome (loss 
of separation). 
4. The modified HFACS framework was coded in terms of critical points. 
Nevertheless, it is possible to qualitatively compare the ASD study results with 
the reported results from Pounds and Scarborough (2002).  The manner in which the 
current study examined narratives and coded HFACS causal factors is similar to that 
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described in the annotated presentation by Pounds and Scarborough (2002).  In the ASD 
study, each NTSB narrative was read and causal factors were drawn from the narrative; 
whereas, in the case of Pounds and Scarborough (2002), albeit the use of a different FAA 
database, the narratives were reviewed and critical points were extracted.   
Utilizing the current ASD study results filtered to include only ATC causal 
factors, a total of 107 ATC causal factors were extracted from the NTSB reports.  The 
ATC causal factors are those HFACS factors that were attributed to ATC (controllers) in 
the NTSB report.  In these cases, the ATC factors may not have been the sole error that 
causes the accident or incident and there may have been other contributing factors. 
The study by Pounds and Scarborough (2002) reported that approximately 90% of 
the critical points identified in their analysis were categorized into three classifications: 
Controller-Pilot Communications (63.7%), Tower Observations (17%) and Coordination 
(9.3%).  In the case of the current ASD study, approximately 80% of the causal factors 
attributable to ATC are represented in the top four HFACS categories.  A mapping of the 
classification by Pounds and Scarborough (2002) into the HFACS factors and sub-factors 
developed in the current study is presented in Table 24.  The percentages for the ASD 
study are expressed in terms of the total of all ATC factors and sub-factors determined (N 
= 107).  Clearly, the mapping between studies is problematic and the percentages should 
not be compared exactly across columns.  However, the relative magnitudes within a 
column can be compared across columns.   
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Table 24. A comparison of findings in the HFACS causal factors for ATC operations 
between the current study (ASD-2014) and the study performed by Pounds and 
Scarborough (2002). 
 
 
Notes: 
(1) ASD – 2014 refers to the current ASD study, and N are the frequencies of each sub-
factor totaled at the top of each category.  The total of all ATC factors in this study = 107.  
Percentages are the frequency over the total of all ATC causal factors (N=107). 
 (3) The column labeled PS – 2002 HFACS refers to classification by Pounds and 
Scarborough (2002) into HFACS categories of skill-based errors and decision errors. 
(4) The column labeled PS – 2002 Task refers to classification by Pounds and 
Scarborough (2002) into tasks that were crudely mapped into several HFACS sub-factors 
from the ASD-2014 study. 
  
 
 
HFACS Category
PS - 
2002 
HFACS
PS - 
2002 
Task
N % % %
107
Skill Based Error 54 50.5% 63.0%
Inadequate visual lookout 6 5.6% 17.0%
Failure to maintain control 30 28.0%
Failure to maintain clearance 18 16.8%
Physical Environment 0 0.0%
Sunglare 0 0.0%
Object location on airport surface 0 0.0%
Obstructed Visibility 0 0.0%
Airport surface conditions 0 0.0%
wind gust 0 0.0%
Communication/Coordination/Planning 27 25.2%
Inadequate preflight planning 2 1.9%
Poor communication 10 9.3% 63.7%
Poor coordination 15 14.0% 6.3%
Decision Error 4 3.7% 18.0%
Improper inflight planning 4 3.7%
Delayed remedial action 0 0.0%
ASD - 2014
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For example, the current study discovered that under ATC, skill-based errors 
were the highest occurring factor, as is the case for PS – 2002 HFACS, while the decision 
errors were less than skill-based errors, the current study did not indicate the same 
relative ratio as is the case with the Pounds and Scarborough (2002) study.  Examination 
of the PS – 2002 Task column was attempted at the sub-factor level.  The sub-factors in 
the current study were determined from examination of the narrative rationale for 
assigning the causal factor to the actor.  As such, the sub-factor has a relationship with 
the task that the actor was performing, but the sub-factors were determined after the 
HFACS codes were extracted.  In the case of Pounds and Scarborough (2002), there are 
some data reported that relates skill-based, decision, and perception errors to each task, 
but it could not be deciphered from their annotated slide deck, and unfortunately, the raw 
data or more detailed description of their study was not available as their study was 
eventually merged into a larger study.  Therefore, qualitatively there is some agreement 
in that skill-based errors are the most frequent ATC factors, but the ASD study did not 
observe the large frequency of controller – pilot communication errors reported by 
Pounds and Scarborough (2002).  Poor coordination between controllers in the tower cab 
was noted as a factor in the current study and appears to be a task that observed the same 
order of magnitude of critical points in Pounds and Scarborough (2002).  The inadequate 
visual lookout sub-factor in the current study appears to map well to the tower 
observation task of Pounds and Scarborough (2002), which is of a lesser magnitude in the 
ASD study.  While the current study also included non-towered airports, those causal 
factors were filtered out by including only the ATC causal factors. 
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Conclusions 
Several conclusions resulted from this research activity and they are grouped into 
three categories: Prior ASD Studies, Conclusions from this Study, and Other 
Conclusions.  Each category is discussed in the following sections. 
Prior ASD studies.   While the current ASD study addressed two specific 
research questions, it was critical to examine the results of the current study in view of 
the literature study results for ASDs.  As a result of this comparison, it is clear that the 
present study was unique in that while several studies utilized NTSB accident and 
incident data to determine error causality using HFACS, the present study was focused 
upon a single regime of flight, the airport surface.  Consequently, there were no other 
HFACS framework studies published using NTSB accident and incident data that could 
be utilized for a direct comparison to the results of the present effort.   
Using the study data available, some comparisons were possible.  In the case of 
the Canadian study (Canadian Department of National Defence, 2005), their distribution 
of accident and incident causation across actors does not agree with the results of the 
current study and is not supported with either the NTSB data or the FAA runway 
incursion database.  Further the distribution of HFACS causal factors in the Canadian 
study is not in agreement, except that skill-based errors are the top causal factor in both 
studies, but the relationship of the remaining causal factors does not compare between 
studies. 
The study by Pape, Wiegmann, and Shappell (2001), indicate broad agreement in 
that skill-based errors were the top causal factor in both studies.  The unsafe acts factors 
were ordered slightly differently below the top slot (skill-based errors), and there was 
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some agreement in other HFACS categories.  Crew resource management, which was 
denoted as communications, coordination, and planning in this ASD study, was the top 
factor in the preconditions category, but the factor was larger for the ASD study, possibly 
indicating more difficulty in the tower environment where coordination is visual and 
verbal with ground and local controllers standing next to each other.  Radar controllers 
are seated at individual work stations and communicate over an intercom or telephone, 
while tower controllers use signals, voice, and visual contact. 
Two HFACS studies of commercial and general aviation were performed by (1) 
Shappell, Detwiler, Holcomb, Hackworth, Boquet, and Wiegmann, (2007),  and (2) 
Wiegmann, Boquet, Detwiler, Holcomb, Faaborg, and Shappell, (2005), respectively.  
Both studies showed agreement with the ASD study in that skill-based errors are the top 
unsafe act causal factor, and the percentages of accidents having at least one skill-based 
error were comparable.  However, under the unsafe acts category, the remaining factors 
were distributed differently. In all cases, decision error was lower in the ASD study, but 
perceptual error was higher and violations were nonexistent in the ASD study.  Other 
HFACS categories were comparable, except for the physical environment in the 
commercial study, which was considerably lower in the ASD findings. 
The study by Pounds and Scarborough (2002) was difficult to compare with the 
ASD study because the publication consists of slides given at a presentation.  In spite of 
personal contact with one of the presenters and the receipt of an annotated slide deck, the 
availability of detailed data would have enabled a more detailed comparison.  
Nevertheless, it was possible to draw limited comparisons.  In the case of Pounds and 
Scarborough (2002), the presence of skill-based errors as the top causal factor is in 
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agreement with the ASD study and the other reported studies.   However, the presence of 
a considerable frequency of controller to pilot task errors was not supported by the ASD 
study.  The fact that tasks were being reported in Pounds and Scarborough (2002) and 
causal factors were reported in the ASD study made the comparison difficult, and more 
detailed data would have helped clarify the discrepancy. 
Conclusions from this Study.   The current study was designed to answer the 
following two research questions:  (1) What are the human error causal factors, their 
characteristics, and their interrelationships discovered from applying the HFACS 
framework to ASDs accident and incident reports?, and (2) Are the discovered ASD 
causal factors and their impact dependent upon the type of operation: (a) commercial 
operations (Parts 121 or 129, Parts 135 or 137, or publically owned aircraft (PUBU)), or 
(b) general aviation operations (Parts 91 or 125).    
The nature of ASD causal factors.   The current study discovered that skill-based 
errors were clearly the highest occurring error in the 289 accidents and incidents reported 
by the NTSB over the 12 year period from January 1, 2001 through December 31, 2012.  
In fact, skill-based errors were present in 78% of the 289 events reported by the NTSB.  
Skill-based errors were also the most frequent causal factor present in the 569 causal 
factors determined from analysis of the NTSB reports, and they accounted for 48% of the 
total of all causal factors.  This result is expected by the nature of skill-based errors which 
occur from the more automatic activities of the various actors.  The top-four causal 
factors appearing at least once in the 289 reported events were: (1) the unsafe act of skill-
based errors (78%), (2) the precondition of physical environment (21%), (3) the 
precondition of communications, coordination, and planning (17%), which is identical to 
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crew resource management (CRM) used in other HFACS studies, and (4) the unsafe act 
of decision errors (12%).  All other causal factors that occurred at least once per event 
were present in less than 10% of all of the 289 events. 
The analysis of ASDs for different types of flight operations.   The second 
research question was addressed through examination of the 589 causal factors 
determined from the NTSB reports as they were grouped by actor: ATC, Pilot, Airport, 
Environment, and Vehicle/Pedestrian.  The resulting factors were also grouped by the 
type of flight operation: General Aviation (Parts 91 and 125), Commercial (Parts 121 and 
129, as well as Parts 135 and 137), and public-owned aircraft (PUBU).  Skill-based 
errors were examined in each class and it was determined that pilot skill-based errors 
exceeded ATC, Airport, and Vehicle/Pedestrian.  In addition, General Aviation skill-
based errors exceeded commercial aviation errors.  Examination of ATC skill-based 
errors revealed that the frequency of ATC errors involving commercial operations (72% 
of all ATC skill-based errors) exceed the frequency of ATC errors for General Aviation 
(26%).  Alternatively, Pilot skill-based errors were higher for General Aviation (77% of 
all pilot skill-based errors) than for commercial operations (23%). 
Other Conclusions.   Several additional conclusions were evident from this 
study.  The retrieval of ASD events from the NTSB database is not straightforward.  In 
fact, in the pre-2008 version of the NTSB data, there is no causal code for RI, which 
requires collection of data based upon multiple event codes as well as phase of flight 
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codes.  This resulted in the initial collection of reports that were not ASDs and they were 
filtered out of the study. 
Use of the NTSB narrative and probable cause reports provides adequate data to 
determine unsafe acts using HFACS.  Considerable emphasis in the NTSB reports on 
contributing factors also allows for collection of numerous preconditions for unsafe acts.  
However, the two highest-level tiers of HFACS, unsafe supervision and organizational 
influences are generally not addressed in the NTSB ASD reports unless they are 
identified as major contributing factors to the accident or incident.  In addition, the degree 
of detail in the NTSB reports varies considerable with the complexity of the event, as 
expected.  Consequently, the ability to delve down deeper in identifying detailed sub-
factors of the causal factors is limited in the probable cause reports.  A limited 
investigation of the full docket for a RI and ground collision event provided a more 
detailed insight about the unsafe acts identified in the probable cause for the event. 
Recommendations 
The use of HFACS to study ASDs represents a significant accomplishment in the 
study of human error associated with ASDs.  It enables researchers to categorize error in 
terms of a framework that lends itself to intervention to reduce or eliminate human error.  
Intervention begs the question: How can I fix the source of human error if I don’t 
understand the causes of the human error?  HFACS enables an understanding of human 
error, and not just the unsafe act that leads to the incident or accident, but also to the 
levels above that unsafe act that contribute to the final error.  The levels above are critical 
targets for intervention as they can readily affect multiple lower level unsafe acts that can 
enable multiple events to occur.  The use of NTSB data or accident and incident data 
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from other repositories is a good mechanism for identifying the levels of human error 
with HFACS.  However, there are limitations in the detail of the accident and incident 
reports that result in a less than complete HFACS structure.  That is, all levels of HFACS 
may not be completed based upon accident or incident reports, because the objective of 
the accident report is to document what happened, determine a probable cause, and to 
spawn recommendations to enable elimination or reduction of the same accident types in 
the future.  It is this latter objective that contributes the most to the use of HFACS, but it 
is also often the objective that ends up with the least attention.  In many cases, the 
probable cause of an incident or an accident is traced to the fact that a participant did not 
follow the rules or orders in place for the operation being conducted.  This conclusion is 
certainly valid and is often supported by contributing factors that may indicate some 
higher level effects that explain, all or in part, why the participant failed to follow the 
rules.  However, successful intervention often requires more of an understanding of the 
how and why an event happened beyond the probable cause.  Just as James Reason 
(Reason, 2013) placed cat food into his tea pot, he can explain that it was an honest 
mistake, a skill-based error, but how do we develop an intervention to stop that mistake 
from happening again?  Clearly, the intervention is based upon the context of the 
situation, and upon the identity of the actor making the mistake.  While an honest 
mistake, a skill-based error, may be made by a pilot or a controller, and it could even be 
supported by the same upper level factors, the intervention may be different.  Further, it 
may be different based upon the type of operation.  
Addressing these questions of intervention requires that more data be collected in 
the accident and incident investigation process, and utilizing an HFACS framework in the 
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event investigation process should lead to the appropriate level of detail for analysis and 
research in human error investigations of ASDs. 
Several specific recommendations are offered based upon the findings of this 
study: 
1 – Perform a companion study that utilizes the NTSB docket information 
evaluated by ASD Subject Matter Experts to perform a more detailed analysis of the ASD 
events during the period studied.  This activity would enable the determination of more 
detailed sub-factors that could be used to develop interventions to prevent ASDs. 
2 – Additional Human in the Loop (HIL) experiments could be of some value for 
the investigation of detailed ASD causal factors and the effects of interventions.  
However, an HIL program that is comprehensive would likely be very time-consuming, 
complex, and expensive to investigate all potential ASD causal factors in a laboratory 
setting.  The complications of addressing ASD skill-based errors alone in an HIL 
laboratory setting could be daunting as described by Hooey and Foyle (2006).  The 
strength of an HIL setting is that it is a controlled environment and adequate data 
collection can be planned and designed into the experiment to facilitate the development 
of interventions.  The weakness is that the laboratory setting may perturb the experiment; 
that is, do humans make as many honest mistakes while being watched in an experiment 
as they would while alone in a cockpit?  
3 – Given the nature of skill-based errors, it would be informative to better 
understand the relationship between experience and skill-based errors.  That is, do less 
experienced pilots or ATC personnel perform their activities in a less automatic mode, 
thinking about each step prior to executing?  More experienced personnel might be apt to 
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execute in a more automated mode as their activities become habitual. A study to explore 
this question is appropriate. 
4 – The realm of potential interventions needs to be investigated based upon the 
current study as well as additional studies aimed at developing a better understanding of 
ASD error causation.  Interventions are of particular importance in determining will one 
intervention solve all issues?  In the current study, it was observed that ATC skill-based 
errors were higher when dealing with commercial operations than they were when ATC 
was controlling general aviation operations.  Thus, a better detailed understanding of this 
result is required to define an intervention.  Further, general aviation pilot skill-based 
errors exceeded those for commercial aviation.  Does that indicate that further training of 
general aviation pilots would be worthwhile?  However, given that a skill-based error is 
an honest mistake, is training (or lack thereof) really the cause? 
5 – The use of automation is a favorite intervention to prevent human error.  
However, studying automation interventions with regard to the results indicated by the 
current study and enhanced by other studies, might suggest that automation can eradicate 
only certain errors and not others, or in fact, automation may cause new errors that were 
not present prior to the introduction of increased automation. 
6 –The information to fully complete the higher tiers of the HFACS framework 
was not always present in the NTSB probable cause reports.  However, utilizing the full 
docket reports for the same 289 cases analyzed in the current study could add more detail 
to inform subsequent intervention studies.  In addition, fusion of data from other database 
sources, some of which are proprietary, might enhance or embellish the results of the 
current study. 
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Research activity into ASD causes has evolved over the past three decades, and 
the current study has contributed to this body of knowledge in a unique manner.  The 
current study was the first study in the United States that utilized a structured and proven 
framework, HFACS, and applied it to the total population of NTSB reported ASD events, 
over the most recent 12-year period (January 1, 2001 to December 31, 2012).  These data 
will provide support for the continuation, modification, and/or development of 
interventions targeted at airport surface operation safety.  The ASD accident and incident 
rates are increasing; although, the number of ASDs remains small with respect to normal 
flight and ground operations and the overall accident rate.  However, while ASD events 
are infrequent, they can potentially lead to tragic accidents and significant incidents.   
This study provides a solid analytical foundation for further research and 
development aimed at the reduction of human error during airport surface operations.  
The next step in this research activity would be to utilize the results and begin the 
development of intervention strategies to reduce human error in airport surface 
operations.  While intervention development was beyond the scope of the research 
questions addressed by this study, addressing interventions aimed at even the top four 
causal factors determined could reduce airport surface errors.  Intervention examples to 
reduce skill-based errors such as forgetting include the use of memory aids, additional 
training, and automation capabilities to alert participants of potential hazards or to 
provide reminders of things that could be forgotten.   
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